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A B S T R A C T
The ‘rule of law’ is increasingly held out as a panacea to domestic and 
international ills, but it is a concept which is severely tested when foreign military 
intervention attempts to create or reconstruct it in national communities.
At a theoretical level, the rule of law has emerged from the traditional 
division between substantive and formal views, which debate the necessary 
involvement of values, into a practitioner-centric ‘blue-print analysis,’ in which a 
universal concept of the rule of law is said to encompass a checklist of human rights- 
based, recognisable court and democratic legislative institutions. This blueprint seeks 
the ideal of the ‘fair trial’ as the mission of interveners, disregarding the extant 
recognition in international law that this human right is necessarily derogable in 
states of national emergency.
When rule of law theories are deconstructed, no universal agreement between 
cultures can be detected at a conceptual level. However, the adoption of the rights- 
based institutionalist model for the international rule of law results in international 
pressure on its constituent states to develop consistent rule of law practice, in order to 
maintain coherence at the higher level. This, however, precludes the formation of 
domestic rules of law, when the rule of law is properly understood as a relationship 
in which the community chooses law as its means of self-ordering. This fundamental 
tension is behind the underlying push for military intervention to restore or create the 
rule of law, and the failure of legitimacy which results.
The content of the laws of intervention, applying particularly to occupation 
under international humanitarian law, are based on an altogether different approach. 
Both occupation law and intervention authorised under the United Nations Security 
Council’s coercive power to restore international peace and security essentially 
confer powers relating to order and security. Occupation law specifically precludes 
intervention in the domestic judicial system which would have a permanent effect or 
cause essential change in the indigenous structure. It is to be compared with recent
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moves, including in Kosovo and East Timor, for UN Security Council authorised 
interveners to attempt permanent judicial restructuring in the pursuit of rule of law, 
as part of their “all necessary means” to restore order and security, but the result 
mirrors results under occupation: efforts tend overwhelmingly to fail without an 
existing basic level of security in society. Further, measures emanating from 
interveners, who are not part of the domestic rule of law relationship because they 
are not subject to domestic law, tend to lack legitimacy, in the sense of social 
acceptability, for the domestic population. Much more than local ‘buy-in’ is required; 
successful rule of law measures must originate within the community.
What the law of interventions in both cases does allow is measures contrary 
to the blueprint analysis of the rule of law, including establishing special military 
courts and administrative detention for security purposes, so that order and security 
may be restored. It is here where the proper focus of military intervention must lie, so 
that the conditions for the formation of a domestic rule of law may be laid. There is 
no limit on the advice or assistance the intervener may offer to the subject 
community, but overt and potentially coercive ‘rule of law’ measures cannot succeed 
until the primary mission of public order is achieved, at which point the extant 
authority of the intervener to engage in coercive measures expires. The future of rule 
of law operations must be a refocusing on public order, rather than judicial 
reconstruction, if indeed it is the rule of law which is at stake.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
“One cannot get through a foreign policy debate these days without someone 
proposing the rule of law as a solution to the world’s troubles,” declares Carothers. 1 2
The United Nations in particular considers it a “critical civilizing influence in every
2
free society,” characterised by democracy, liberty, equality and justice.
However, the rule of law, as a catchcry in support of or even as justification 
for military intervention into independent states,3 is a cry fraught with logical 
inconsistencies. Essential misunderstandings about the rule of law by both theorists 
and practitioners, who insist that it is a universal end-state characterised by rights- 
based institutionalism, ensure that operational missions are directed to unrealistic 
goals. While interventions may take steps to restore a basic level of security, the rule 
of law in a real sense will not be achieved. That is essentially because the rule of law 
is not an end state,4 nor is it universal, nor is it necessarily fixed. It is instead an on­
going dialogue among the people who are its subjects, which must be preceded by 
the establishment of a sufficient level of security for the conversation to commence.5
'Thomas Carothers, ‘The Rule-of-Law Revival,’ in Thomas Carothers (Ed), Promoting the Rule o f 
Law Abroad: In Search o f Knowledge, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 
2006 (p3), p3.
2United Nations Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1995, p303.
'The ‘rule of law’ has been seized upon, but not clearly defined, in international discussions about 
both unilateral and multilateral interventions in Palestinian occupied territories, in Iraq, East Timor, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and earlier in Somalia during the 1990s and Cambodia: see further, Jeremy 
Matam Farrall, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Rule o f Law, Issues Paper No. 1, Australian 
National University Centre for International Governance and Justice, March 2007, especially pp4-5. It 
is not always raised in the initial authorisation for intervention, but regularly emerges as a subsequent 
mission goal, as it did in Iraq and Somalia.
4In this thesis, the rule of law ‘end state’ is one which demonstrates the institutional forms, and rules 
based on human rights, which are said of themselves to comprise the rule of law. Theories which 
postulate the rule of law as an ‘end state’ assume that there is a single and immutable system which is 
the rule of law, so that once those features are realised, so is the rule of law. This is considered further 
in Chapter One below. Chesterman defines the problem as seeing the rule of law “as a means rather 
than an end, as serving a function rather than defining a status:” Simon Chesterman, ‘An International 
Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 Am J Comp L 331, at 331.
?This is an emerging school of thought, but one whose nuances appreciate the realities of intervention 
and explains the shortcomings in Iraq and other countries. Its key advocate is Nardin: Terry Nardin, 
‘Theorising the International Rule of Law’ (2008) 34 Rev o f Inti Studies 385. It is to be compared with 
the traditional schools of formalism and rights-based substantivism, and the current ‘ends-based’ 
institutionalist view fostered by intervention practitioners and academics such as Kleinfeld and
1
Its form may differ as a result of a range of cultural, religious, economic, social or 
other variables. As non-participants in the domestic legal system, interveners cannot 
create or impose such a relationship/ 1 *6although by their example they might guide it.7
The aim and purpose of this thesis is to ascertain the state of the law with 
respect to rule of law operations. However, a project of this scope necessarily 
requires two directions of inquiry. Firstly, at a theoretical and a systemic level, what 
is the accepted meaning of the phrase ‘rule of law,’ for both practitioners and 
scholars? What does deconstructing this accepted definition mean for what military 
forces might call the ‘doctrine' of rule of law intervention, or its general mission and 
practice? Secondly, is this accepted meaning of the rule of law reflected in the 
specific bodies of rules which govern military interventions? If it is not, what role 
does that body of law ascribe both to the accepted definition or other possible 
concepts of the rule of law? What are the consequences for the character of 
intervention injudicial or other legal institutions? Both avenues of discussion require 
deconstructing a web of assumptions about the relationship between economic 
development, order, security, judicial institutions and the rule of law.
Therefore, the thesis proceeds in two general parts. The first, Chapter One, 
addresses the preliminary issue of the concept of the rule of law. It compares 
traditional academic literature with emerging practitioner views on a rule of law 
blueprint,8 non-law theories such as law and economics, and finally, the emerging 
and more nuanced view of the rule of law as community self-ordering, or an internal 
relationship, on the basis of law.9 This theoretical discussion of the rule of law is 
compared to its expression in international human rights law, ahead of the second
Stromseth and her colleagues: Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law,’ in
Thomas Carothers (Ed), Promoting the Rule o f Law Abroad: In Search o f Knowledge, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2006 (p31); Jane Stromseth, David Wippman
and Rosa Brooks, Can Might Make Rights?: Building the Rule o f Law After Military Interventions,
Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006.
6Chesterman, above n4, at 341-2; Jonathan Charney, ‘Universal International Law’ (1993) 87 AJIL 
529, at 533; Stromseth et al, ibid, p65, who also discuss the immunity of other ‘outsiders:’ 
international organisations, especially UN agencies, international donors and non-government 
organisations, who are “those most actively involved in promotion of rule of law.”
7Chesterman, ibid, at 349, referring to UN Mission in Kosovo Regulation 1/1999: On the Authority o f 
the Interim Administration in Kosovo, entered into force 7 September 1999. Stromseth et al, ibid, 
make this point more generally, arguing that the credibility of the intervener depends on their own 
adherence to rule o f law principles (which they conflate with human rights protection) during the 
intervention: p4.
8See n5 above.
l)See Nardin, above n5.
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part of the thesis which analysis it in the context of the law of intervention. It is 
significant that the human right to a fair trial is considered derogable in times of 
emergency, yet the absence of traditional judicial institutions capable of 
administering it is considered a fundamental rule of law failing in any situation.
The currently accepted meaning of a system of law based on certain rights- 
based judicial and other institutions is challenged in practice and theory. Examined 
from the viewpoints of language and culture, its claim to universal forms or values 
must be rejected in favour of understanding the rule of law as a society’s choice of 
self-ordering based on law, without necessarily meeting any institutional forms. 
However, it is argued, the structure of global legal systems, in which independent 
states with their own legal forms participate in a unitary international legal structure, 
means that for the higher level to establish its own coherent principles, it requires a 
minimum measure of principled consistency among its constituents. The effect is the 
mandating for states of the form of the rule of law represented internationally, 
leading to pressure for intervention in non-compliant states. It should be noted that 
the present international conception of the rule of law need not be static, and rights- 
based institutionalism may give way to another paradigm in the future -  indeed, this 
is the logical result of understanding the rule of law as a relationship -  but the 
pressure for global consistency remains.
The second part of the thesis, Chapters Two-Four, examines closely the 
concept of the rule of law which military operations embody; the scope to intervene, 
perhaps permanently, in domestic judicial systems; and the efficacy of such 
intervention in achieving the rule of law, both as commonly understood and in its 
proper conception. The methodology employed is an analysis of actual interventions 
conducted under occupation law or by authority of the UN Security Council, which 
attempted to achieve rule of law outcomes. These have emerged most strongly since 
the Second World War and the study concludes with the end of the final Security 
Council mandate in Iraq under Resolution 1790 (2007) on 31 December 2008, the 
most recently concluded ‘rule of law operation.’ The law stated is correct as at 
January 2009.
The analysis of state practice divides intervention under the formal aegis of 
occupation, from those authorised by the Security Council. Chapter Two analyses the
3
extent to which occupation law, as the traditional field of international law governing 
military control of foreign territory, is concerned with the rule of law, however 
understood. Chapter Three considers the consequences of occupation law's 
preference for security above the rule of law, amounting to a de facto recognition of 
the rule of law in its proper conception, and interrogates the scope of authority to 
intervene in domestic judicial systems under occupation.
The period of analysis emphasises four main periods of occupation: German 
and Japanese occupation of territory during the Second World War, and Allied 
occupations of Germany and Japan on its conclusion; the Israeli occupation of parts 
of neighbouring states, especially the areas in East Jerusalem, on the West Bank of 
the Jordan River and in the vicinity of Gaza; and the US-led Coalition’s occupation 
of Iraq in 2003-04. Although weight should be given to the most recent example in 
Iraq, and the variety of measures taken there with the rule of law clearly in mind, it 
should not be at the expense of the wealth of earlier practice. The foci of this study 
span the breadth of short to very protracted occupations, and a range of institutional 
interventions prompted by necessity and by desire to improve or reshape domestic 
structures which were ineffective or judged criminal.
The fourth chapter focuses on interventions under Security Council authority, 
in particular the linkage between security, the rule of law and power to effect 
permanent change in the domestic judicial system under the aegis of the ‘rule of 
law.’ It addresses the initial question of whether the absence of rights-based rule of 
law has been, or could be, used as itself a ground for military intervention, then 
considers the different forms of intervention the Security Council has authorised. In 
particular, the chapter focuses on interventions where the rule of law, conceived in its 
standard rights-based institutionalist form, has been part of the interveners’ mandate. 
This reaches its pinnacle in UN transitional authorities, especially in Timor and 
Kosovo, but has also affected other missions less than assuming governmental 
control. Under this lesser authority, the case of Iraq stands out. Although the Iraqi 
authorities requested Security Council authority for intervention, the widespread 
public rejection of both the intervention itself and measures taken in overt pursuit of 
the ‘rule of law’ by Coalition and Iraqi participants alike (building on the 
questionable circumstances of the initial occupation) shed great light on the role of
4
legitimacy in the formation of a genuine rule of law relationship. It highlights the 
problems that reliance on a misconception of the rule of law can produce when 
applied militarily.
A case study of the situation in Iraq since 2003, spanning both occupation 
law and Security Council involvement, demonstrates the powers and pitfalls of 
would-be 'rule of law operations.'10 The 'rule of law" was not directly appealed to as 
a justification for the US-led intervention there, beginning in March 2003, which 
lacked clear authority from the UN Security Council. This was despite longstanding 
evidence of human rights abuses against Shi'ites and Kurds in particular, and the 
establishment of the extraordinary Revolutionary Court during the Ba'athist regime 
of Saddam Hussein." Instead, protagonists argued that Iraq was in possession of 
weapons of mass destruction contrary to previous Security Council Resolutions and 
that earlier Security Council authority could be relied upon for the 2003 invasion.
l0In this thesis, a ‘rule of law operation’ is one which has a self-conscious program to create, improve 
or administer the ‘rule of law’ in the area of intervention. This may occur through occupation, where 
the occupant declares itself to be acting for the benefit of the rule of law, such as in the occupied 
Palestinian areas since 1967 and Iraq in 2003-04 (although neither considered rule of law activities 
their exclusive focus -  see further Chapter Three below), or by the authority of the UN Security 
Council, which may have listed the absence of the rule of law as a justification for intervention or its 
creation as an outcome of the intervention, as occurred in Iraq (2004-08): see Farrall, above n3. 
However, in the latter case, it will become apparent that the Security Council rarely refers explicitly to 
the rule of law, and it is adopted as part of a broader mission, particularly where the UN acts as a 
Transitional Authority as it did in Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor: see Chapter Four below.
"See for example Charles Tripp, A History o f Iraq, 3rd Edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2007, pp234-250, and Chief Judge Medhat al-Mahmoud, ‘The Judicial System in Iraq: A Review of 
the Legislation Regulating Judicial Affairs in Iraq,’ Iraqi Judicial Forum: The Judicial System in Iraq, 
Facts and Prospects, Baghdad, 2004.
l2In fact, the major protagonists on the Security Council differed strongly on the legality of the war. 
None of the major Coalition participants (see note 9 below) relied on self-defence, arguing instead that 
Iraq was in ‘material breach’ of UNSC Resolution 687 (1991), which had provided for its 
disarmament and the end of the First Gulf War. This was argued to justify reactivating the original 
authority to use force against Iraq in that war in UNSC Resolution 678 (1990). The same argument 
was relied on for interventions in Iraq in 1998. However, several Security Council members took, 
objection, including France and Russia, and a compromise Resolution 1441 (2002) recognised that 
Iraq was in “material breach” and warned of “serious consequences” if it continued. For a detailed 
review, see Stromseth et al, above n5, pp47-9.
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In any case, the Coalition13 declared on 8 May 2003 that it was in occupation 
of Iraq under international humanitarian law and created the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) to govern until it transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi 
Government on 28 June 2004.14 Thereafter, at Iraqi request, the Coalition, in the 
guise of the Multi-National Force -  Iraq (MNF-I), remained with an expansive 
Security Council mandate to restore security in the country.Despite the fact that 
during initial Coalition military actions in Iraq, most legal infrastructure was 
destroyed, court records lost or destroyed and detention facilities proved unable to 
hold all those detained,16 these issues were not explicitly addressed in the 
authorisation of MNF-I.
To varying extents explored in the following chapters, Coalition forces in fact 
intervened in the Iraqi judicial system with a view to creating the rule of law and 
therefore security across the country. Their focus was on purging government service 
of Ba'athist elements (as had occurred with Nazis in Germany and individuals 
judged as militarist nationalists in Japan) and establishing two outposts of their 
flagship institution, the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, during and after occupation. 
Notwithstanding a jurisdictional focus on terror-related crimes, the structural reforms 
were intended to be permanent and to address day to day legal affairs.1' Coalition
1 'According to the United States Government Accountability Office, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, US House of 
Representatives: “In March 2003, a US-led multinational force began operations in Iraq. At that time, 
48 nations, identified as a ‘coalition of the willing,’ offered political, military, and financial support 
for US efforts in Iraq, with 38 nations other than the United States providing troops.” The latter 
included the United Kingdom, Poland, Republic of Korea and Australia. See the Statement of Joseph 
A. Christoff, Director International Affairs and Trade, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition 
Support and International Donor Commitments, GAO-07-827T, release dated 9 May 2007, available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07827t.pdf, viewed 6 October 2009.
l4Letter dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United States of America and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council 
(S/2003/538), recognised in UNSC Resolution 1483 (2003).
,5UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004).
l6Center for Law and Military Operations, Rule o f Law Handbook, Charlottesville (VA), 2007, pp8, 
116 and 126; John C. Williamson, ‘Establishing the Rule of Law in Post-War Iraq: Rebuilding the 
Justice System’ (2004) G aJ Inti & Comp Law 229, at 232-3; Stromseth et al, above n5, pp365-6.
17Coalition Provisional Authority Order 13 -  The Central Criminal Court o f Iraq (Revised) 
(Amended), entered into force 22 April 2004, establishing the Central Criminal Court, had no end 
date, and was preserved at the transfer of authority to the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004 
(Coalition Provisional Authority Order 100 -  Transition o f Laws, Regulations, Orders and Directives 
Issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority, entered into force 28 June 2004). In country-wide terms 
in Iraq during 2005, US$400 million in 2005 was being spent by “multiple [US] federal agencies for 
rule of law programs,” with another US$1 billion for police training, US$300 million for justice 
infrastructure and US$100 million for “a variety of capacity-building programs:” United States 
Department of State, Inspection o f Rule-of-Law Programs, Embassy Baghdad, 26 October 2005, 
available at http://oig.state.gov/lbry/reporthighlights/57056.htm, viewed 8 September 2009.
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forces while in occupation also devoted effort to transitional justice, to try and punish
18those responsible for major crimes committed by the deposed regime.
Between 2003 and 2008, both outposts of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq 
were significantly hampered in their day to day proceedings by lack of security and 
by criticisms of the genuineness of the ‘rule of law’ they administered from their 
inception. A significant focus of criticism was the involvement of Coalition forces in 
the creation and administration of domestic judicial institutions at all. After 31 
December 2008, MNF-I was much more limited in authority by the terms of its 
agreement with Iraq on the terms of its continued presence, and direct rule of law 
participation ceased.19
Following the pattern established by earlier interventions in Somalia, 
Cambodia, East Timor and Kosovo, the case of Iraq and its new Central Criminal 
Court highlights the problematic assumptions made about the rule of law in 
international discourse. Despite a compelling lack of academic agreement about the 
meaning of the phrase, international law has adopted a single, universal rights-based 
‘rule of law’ which depends on democracy and recognisable court institutions. The 
concept is so ingrained that authorising Security Council Resolutions tend to provide 
only the briefest of warrants for rule of law activities.2' Rather, they grant authority
l8Transitional justice, meaning the imposition of accountability for crimes committed by the deposed 
regime, is said to be an essential requirement for the society to (re)create the rule of law: David 
Tolbert and Andrew Solomon, ‘United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in Post- 
Conflict Societies,’ (2006) 19 Harv Hum Rts J  29, at 34. However, when it is sought to be achieved by 
intervention, it is often the domestic community which participates least, for example through 
Security Council-authorised international ad hoc tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda or through mixed 
national international tribunals as in Sierra Leone and Cambodia (Tolbert and Solomon, pp36-40). 
Some practitioners dispute the need for intervention in transitional justice, suggesting it is the better 
province of the domestic community: Mark Plunkett, ‘Rebuilding the Rule of Law,’ in William 
Maley, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and 
Military Responsibilities in Failed States, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (p207), p213. 
19Agreement between the United States o f America and the Republic o f Iraq on the Withdrawal o f  
United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization o f their Activities during their Temporary 
Presence in Iraq, 17 November 2008, Baghdad, entered into force 1 January 2009, available at 
https://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/CGs Messages/security_agreement.pdf, viewed 6 October 2009. 
20See for example, Stromseth et al, above n5; Kleinfeld, above n5.
21 Kelly argues that this is a consequence of the nature of the Resolution as a ‘brief warrant’ 
legitimising an intervention which is intended to be supplemented in the ordinary course by either the 
general body of international law (and Kelly identifies occupation law as the appropriate corpus of 
rules) or a “detailed framework agreement,” presumably involving the host state: Michael Kelly, 
‘Military Force and Justice’ in William Maley, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From 
Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities in Failed States, United Nations 
University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (p229), p231, reference omitted. For example, the UN Transitional 
Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) was to exercise “all legislative and executive authority, including
7
for broad activities such as “all necessary measures'* to restore security, in which the 
rule of law is included because of its assumed relationship to order.“" This can be 
compared with an explicit focus on order in occupation law and its limited concern 
with the rule of law as a uniform idea in practice.2 ’ The practical result of occupation 
is a better condition for the formation of the rule of law, properly conceived, than 
broader Security Council efforts continuing the popular misunderstanding.
That said, Security Council operations take place in a reasonably well-defined 
mission continuum. The spectrum commences with peace-making (predominantly a 
diplomatic task),24 as opposed to peacekeeping (which has since 1945 developed into 
“a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build 
peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars” as well as traditional ceasefire 
observation between warring states).2^  In between is the more recent phenomenon of 
peacebuilding, in which the mission post-conflict is “to reassemble the foundations 
of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is 
more than just the absence of war,” including by “strengthening the rule of law," 
democracy and human rights. This labelling of mission outcomes is important. 
Kelly focuses on the “interim administration of justice at the communal level” and 
the potential future scope for military operations in “support” of the International
27Criminal Court, preferring this to attempts to create the rule of law per se.
the administration of the judiciary:” Article 1, UNSC Resolution 1272 (1999). However, it is 
suggested that it is the assertion of a universal understanding of, and desire for, the rule of law, which 
makes it apparently unnecessary to elaborate the character of activities that might be undertaken.
22See, for example, UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004) in Iraq.
23Article 43, Annexe to Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs o f War on Land: Regulations 
Respecting the Laws and Customs o f War on Land, 18 October 1907, The Hague, (1908) 2 AJIL 
Supplement 90-117, entered into force 26 January 1910 (“Hague Regulations”); Article 64, 
Convention IV Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War, 12 August 1949, 
Geneva, 75 UNTS 287, entered into force 21 October 1950 (“Geneva IV”). See Chapters Two and 
Three, which demonstrate the limited inclusion of rule of law measures in the security jurisdiction. 
This is to be compared with the broader interpretations of Security Council authority in Chapter Four. 
24Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report o f the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations, A/55/305 S/2000/809, United Nations, 2000, (“Brahimi Report”), para 11.
25Ibid, para 12.
26Ibid, para 13-14. An intervention may take different forms throughout its life as the situation 
develops, relying alternately on Chapters VI (non-coercive measures) or VII (coercive measures) of 
the Charter o f the United Nations, 24 October 1945, San Francisco, 1 UNTS 41, entered into force 1 
November 1945 (“UN Charter”).
~7Kelly, above n21, p229. Helen Durham also uses these terms without looking to the ‘rule of law:’ 
Helen Durham, ‘Mercy and Justice in the Transition Period,’ in William Maley, Charles Sampford 
and Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities in 
Failed States, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (pl45).
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In the result, the continuum is practically dominated by the emergence of 
some human rights as rules of ius cogem, meaning they cannot be derogated from 
(among other limitations) ,28 and as obligations erga omnes, imposing obligations of 
intervention on other states.29 This overriding obligation regarding some human 
rights leads to the assertion that the domestic legal regulation of a community is 
becoming subject to international oversight, potentially through military intervention. 
Its nascent application to rule of law theory is demonstrated by the recognition of 
Nazi and Iraqi Ba'athist judicial activity as internationally criminal as a system when 
it did not meet certain rights and procedural standards.30 The altruistic motivation 
behind the emerging 'responsibility to protect’ doctrine,31 when applied to rule of 
law intervention, would rely on this approach.
The point is central to the notion of sovereignty since the authority to make
32and enforce laws, through a legal system, is historically the key feature of the state. 
The consequence of domestic judicial criminality, if addressed through foreign 
military intervention, is necessarily a fundamental challenge for the legitimacy of 
domestic judiciaries. Further, it must be recognised that while rule of law 
practitioners demand a rights-based blueprint, and international players call to the 
same concept, extant international law actually permits derogation of many rights, 
including the right to a fair trial, in times of emergency.
The international system continues to adopt the fundamental equality of 
sovereignty among its constituent states, the inviolability of domestic affairs and
28Including, for example, the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life and not to be subject to torture: 
Article 4, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, adopted by General Assembly 
Resolution 2200 of 16 December 1966, A/RES/2200A XXI, 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 
March 1976 (“ICCPR”); Jaime Oraä, ‘The Protection of Human Rights in Emergency Situations 
under Customary International Law’ in Guy Goodwin-Gill and Stefan Talmon (Eds), The Reality o f  
International Law: Essays in Honour o f Ian Brownlie, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999 (p413), p433. 
29See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3.
~'°US v. Altstötter et al, (1948) 3 TWC 1 (“Justice TriaF); Case No. 1/9 First/2005 al-Dujail Case, 
Iraqi High Tribunal, 2006 (“Dujail TriaL'), judgment translated unofficially from Arabic to English by 
Mizna Management LLC, available at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp, viewed 6 
October 2009.
''For a general background, see Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution o f an Idea, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2007, pp 128-134; Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an 
Evolving World Order, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1996, pp8-20.
2For example, Article 3, Convention on the Rights and Duties o f States, adopted by the Seventh 
International Conference of American States, 26 December 1933, Montevideo, 165 UNTS 19, entered 
into force 26 December 1934.
"Including Articles 4 and 14, ICCPR.
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“self determination among peoples" as core principles.34 It is an odd result that it 
effectively also demands institutional rights-based uniformity for the rule of law 
across states, without broad regard for historical, cultural or religious considerations. 
The emphasis on such uniformity in court structures, judicial process and the level of 
judicial independence, not only from the cause but from social or religious values, 
leads regularly to international pressure on non-conforming states on human rights 
grounds, not just from aid donor states or states whose nationals may be under 
prosecution, but from the general community. That there have been occasions of 
intervention by foreign states, albeit not unanimously approved, 0  which have aimed 
to achieve this kind of uniform rule of law as part of their mission is even more odd.
The demand for universal consistency fails when the domestic rule of law is 
properly understood as the manner in which a society determines its own legal 
order.36 However, uniformity is the only thing that can give the international rule of 
law coherence -  there can be no consistent expression of the rule of law in the 
international legal system if the system's participants do not uniformly mirror the 
values of that system internally. Additionally, the developmental model o f the rule of 
law aims at institutional uniformity to assist in expanding free market democracy, 
and, since democracies rarely war with each other, international peace and security. 
Rule of law interventions at the international level are therefore best understood as 
structurally self-serving, rather than in support of an independent value of the rule of 
law .38
What interveners can create is order and security, through lawful and 
authorised measures which fall short of the demanded international rule of law
,4Articles 2(1, 2 and 7), UN Charter. See also Michael J. Glennon, Limits o f Law, Prerogatives o f  
Power: Interventionism After Kosovo, Palgrave, New York, 2001, p 145.
'5Germany, for example, considers the development of the rule of law a purely internal affair, while 
the international community’s task in intervention is economic reconstruction: Joschka Fischer, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Speech at the Afghanistan Support Group (2001), cited in Rule o f Law 
Handbook, above nl4, p45 (note 44).
,6However, the link between democracy (rule of law) and peace is not well-defined and there is little 
proof about “the independent or causal role of law in either sociological evolution or economic 
growth:” Thomas C. Heller, ‘An Immodest Postscript,’ in Erik G. Jensen and Thomas C. Heller (Eds), 
Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule o f Law, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford (USA), 2003 (p382), p386.
’7lbid, p384; see also Carothers, above nl, p5; Charney, above n6, at 529.
^Notwithstanding that intervening States may claim moral and ethical justification in situations where 
the abuse of human rights through torture, extra-judicial executions and genocide is egregious. See 
further Stromseth et al, above n5, p4 for a discussion on the intervener’s need to maintain “global 
credibility” by engaging in rule of law reform.
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Standard, such as special military courts and administrative detention tor security 
purposes.39 This is so whether they act as occupants or with a broad Security Council 
mandate. Creating security is a condition precedent to the community developing its 
own rule of law, and it is here where the focus of intervention must be directed. 
International expertise and assistance may later be provided to the emerging 
domestic rule of law relationship. However, given the self-interested need of 
international law in uniformity, and having mistakenly selected rights-based, 
democratic institutionalism as its method, it seems unlikely this gap between rule of 
law rhetoric and the reality of interventions can be bridged.
,9Indeed a link to “international peace and security” is necessary to enliven the Security Council’s 
jurisdiction to authorise non-consensual intervention under Article 39, Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
1 1
C H A P T E R  ONE
THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL LAW -  A
REASSESSMENT
It is trite to acknowledge the fundamental lack of clarity about the ‘rule of 
law,’1 but it becomes a high risk with the proliferation of military interventions 
designed to achieve it through ‘rule of law operations.’ The confusion arises because 
theorists and practitioners alike are focussed on determining the parameters of the 
rule of law as a universal result or an end-state. The provision of a checklist of 
institutions for an intervener may provide an apparently useful mission plan, but it 
does not (and cannot) address the fundamental question of legitimacy or make 
legitimacy and social acceptability a measurable outcome. This is the essence of the 
problem when the rule of law is accepted as a relationship or process within the 
subject community without necessary end-state characteristics. Properly understood, 
a rule of law mission is not capable of measurable outcomes for the military 
intervener, of their nature external to the community, because legitimacy is an 
internal measure. Focussing on it distracts resources and time from efforts to restore 
public order and it is necessary now to deconstruct and reject traditional, but 
ultimately unhelpful, understandings of a universal rule of law.
To that end, this chapter reviews the substantial and growing body of 
literature which attempts to define the rule of law at national and international levels, 
both of which for reasons of structural coherence are currently defined in substantive 
human rights terms. An essential tension will become apparent in the course of this 
study: the international rule of law depends on consistent domestic rules of law for 
its own existence and credibility. There is a logical disjunct between an international 
rule of law and domestic rules of law because the two must share the same concept 
of the rule of law for either claim to be true, but to achieve this in a world based on
'For example, H.W. Arndt, ‘The Origins of Dicey's Concept of the Rule of Law’ (1957) 31 Aust U  
117.
'See Introduction. In this thesis a rule of law operation is one which intervenes in the domestic judicial 
structure with an avowed purpose of constructing the ‘rule of law.’
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nation states the former must control the latter in a manner inconsistent with the rule 
of law itself, properly understood.
Analysing why and how international law is concerned with the rule of law, 
considering both what theorists say it means and what accepted international law 
says it means, assists in explaining the phenomenon of ‘rule of law operations’ 
conducted by armed interveners and their particular focus on creating, recreating or 
reconstructing domestic legislation and the national judiciary along certain familiar 
lines. These interveners espouse the substantive definition of the rule of law adopted 
by international law, including implementing individual human rights and 
strengthening principled judicial and democratic institutions; however, their success 
is generally at the procedural and value-free level, schools of thought considered 
below. It is therefore necessary to understand each view and its place in current 
international law.
1.1 Rule of Law Theories: A Review
During the ancient period of rule of law theorising, law was a permissive 
means of ruling.3 4 However, modem rule of law theory, usually traced to the Magna 
Carta, focuses instead on procedural limitations imposed by law on the exercise of 
sovereign power. 5 At this point, ambiguity begins to emerge in the conceptualisation 
of the rule of law. For the people, limited legislative power in the sovereign was felt 
to be liberation from repressive government, however, the concept of ruling itself 
requires the exercise of authority over the people.6 The concept of law as authority 
permeates rule of law theory; defining the ‘rule of law’ thus depends on the 
definition o f ‘law,’ and of ‘rule,’ as well as the implication of a rule ‘o f  law.
3Erik G. Jensen, ‘The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy of Diverse 
Institutional Patterns and Reformers’ Responses,’ in Erik G. Jensen and Thomas C. Heller (Eds), 
Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule o f Law, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford (USA), 2003 (p336), p339.
4For Plato, ‘rule by law’ was a suitable second alternative to rule by a philosopher king: The Republic, 
715d (translated by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin, 1970); Aristotle took the opposite view, based on a 
range of Greek constitutions, preferring ‘rule of law’ rather than the subjection of law to any 
individuals authority: The Politics, III. 16 (translated Benjamin Jowett, Nuvision, 2004).
5Professor W.T. Eijsbouts, ‘Introduction,’ in Thomas Vandamme and Jan-Herman Reestman (Eds), 
Ambiguity in the Rule o f  Law: The Interface Between National and International Legal Systems, 
Europe Law Publishing, Groningen, 2001 (p3), p3.
6Ibid, p5.
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The bulk of pure rule of law theorists since Plato can be uncontroversially 
divided into two camps: formalists (proceduralists), who are not interested in the 
content of the law but only in certain procedural requirements to identify and apply 
it, and substantivists. These are also known as the “thin” and “thick” concepts of the 
rule of law, respectively.7 *Substantivists accept formal procedural requirements, but 
demand that the content of the laws and legal system meet identified values. The 
divergence of views on what the specific values should be means that a single
o
substantive theory cannot be extracted from the debate.
To some extent, the procedural/substantive debate about the rule of law 
mirrors the broader positivist/natural law debate. Beginning with a rudimentary 
definition of law as rules, a legal system can be understood as a system of general 
rules deriving from authority.9 However, the requirement for rule-making authority 
necessarily requires that participants in the rule-making process, whether democratic 
representatives or otherwise, are constrained by the nature and limits of the authority. 
This idea of normative constraint on officials is identified as the essence of the rule 
o/law . 10
1.1.1 Formalism
The constraint of officials is addressed procedurally, by the existence of rules 
about the system for making law, the clarity of the law itself, and the temporal scope 
of its application. 11 To amount to the rule of law, they must be sufficiently certain to
12
allow legal subjects to plan their lives in accordance with them.
7See Simon Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 Am J  Comp L 331, at 340.
^Douglas J. Simsovic, ‘No Fixed Address: Universality and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 35 RJT 739, at 
751. Chesterman would add a third group, functionalists, who are not interested in rules or their 
implementation but “a kind of political ideal for a society as a whole:” above n7, at 332. However, the 
same problem arises - it is difficult to distinguish Chesterman’s functionalists from the broad 
spectrum of values all broadly directed to the achievement of liberal, free market democracy, put 
forward by substantivists.
9See for example, H.L.A. Hart, The Concept o f Law, 1907 (2nd Edn, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994).
10Terry Nardin, ‘Theorising the International Rule of Law’ (2008) 34 Rev o f Inti Studies 385, at 392, 
emphasis added. See also Chesterman, who distinguishes this kind of system from one of rule by law, 
but prefers to describe a principle of equal and non-discriminatory rather than general application of 
law, summing his three-point view up as “government of laws, the supremacy of the law, and equality 
before the law: above n7, at 342. Although phrased differently, each formal definition is essentially 
the same.
"Paul Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ 
[1997] Public Law 467, at 467; Charles Sampford, ‘Reconceiving the Rule of Law for a Globalizing 
World’ in Spencer Zifcak (Ed), Globalisation and the Rule o f Law, Routledge, London, 2005 (p9),
14
Predictability in the formal rule of law requires publication and congruent 
interpretation of rules, and penalties for breaches, whether committed by individual 
citizens or by officials exercising state authority; or more broadly, a pre-agreed 
system of dispute resolution about the content and application of rules. Such dispute 
resolution is to be administered by impartial and independent tribunals, after the
1 o
grant of procedural fairness. It follows on this theory that a “recognized, organized, 
and independent legal profession” must also exist to facilitate this process. This is 
Summers’ “institutional and axiological core” of the rule of law. 14
Formalists at no point insist on any particular content of rules, although their 
institutional analysis seems largely descriptive of the Western legal tradition; they 
accept that a ‘wicked legal system’ may satisfy the rule of law, 15 but recognise that 
wicked laws and disregard of the formal rule of law often exist together. 16 This 
deliberate amorality and apoliticality has claimed advantages, including a “unified 
focus” to identify and create the rule of law through essential institutions, chiefly a 
procedurally constrained rule-maker and an independent judiciary. Its source- 
orientation is said to offer greater certainty than systems with substantive content,
_ 1 o
which tend to rely on non-specific and mutable values such as ‘due process.’ The 
claim is alternatively formulated as having a greater appeal to universality. 19
pl4. Thin theorists include F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1944 (1976); Lon Fuller, The Morality o f Law, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964 (1969); R.A. 
Cass, ‘Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-making’ (1995) 75 Boston Uni LR 
954, at 960. To these constraints may be added interpretative method: see further Tom Ginsburg and 
Tamir Moustafa (Eds), Rule by Law: The Politics o f Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2008, on the deliberate choice of civil law, with its mechanical 
interpretative method and this ‘thin’ approach to the rule of law, as a means of constraining judge- 
made law, at p i9.
l2Craig, above nl 1, at 469; Cass, above nl 1, at 960, for whom “principled predictability” allows ‘fair 
warning’ of enforcement, leading to adjustment of behaviour and lowered decision costs. 
l3Robert S. Summers, ‘A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law’ (1993) 6(2) Ratio Juris 127, at 129. 
l4Ibid, at 131. Tolbert and Solomon also argue that “functioning courts and a judiciary system” are 
“axiomatic” for the existence of the rule of law: David Tolbert and Andrew Solomon, “United Nations 
Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies,” (2006) 19 Harv Hum Rts J  29, at 
45.
l5Craig, above ni l ,  at 469, discussing Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 94 LQR 
195.
l6Summers, above nl3, at 139. For example, extensive rule by executive fiat in Nazi Germany or in 
Ba’athist Iraq in the later years of each regime, rather than through the legislature.
17Ibid, at 135. 
l8Ibid, at 132.
|l,Ibid, at 136. And see Thomas Carothers, ‘The Rule-of-Law Revival,’ in Thomas Carothers (Ed), 
Promoting the Rule o f Law Abroad: In Search o f Knowledge, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Washington DC, 2006 (p3), p7.
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This view is not supported by the groundswell of public opinion against 
regimes in the Soviet Union, South Africa and East Germany, including aspects of 
their legal organisation overthrown by their own subjects, which prompted a new 
revolt against the notion that all certain and predictable legal systems were equally 
lawful. To these may be added regimes which are subject to intervention from other 
States in the sole or part pursuit of internal rule of law. Further, the emphasis on 
certainty and predictability in formalism runs the risk of confusing certainty of rules 
with a sense of physical security within law. Appeals to the rule of law during 
colonial rule in the penal colony of New South Wales, expressed in principles such 
as “control of the king by Parliament, the right to petition, the rule of law and trial by
. 9 1jury gave the unenfranchised security consistent with the idea of a free society,” but 
not the freedom itself which was sought.
1.1.2 Substantivism
Formalism assumes that adopting correct procedures results in formal justice 
or its Anglo-American cognate fairness. However, adopting an objectively fair 
procedure to provide a precisely equal opportunity to disputing parties, such as 
flipping a coin, does not produce the desired result, because there is an intuitive 
desire for some further institutional characteristic allowing determination, under 
universal laws prevailing generally, whether the particular case meets exactly the 
situation dealt with under law. This is what makes it positively just, as opposed to not 
unjust. These characteristics have been described since Aristotle as distributive, 
corrective, retributive and commutative, and are substantive not procedural.24 They 
are the concern of theorists who do not accept institutional formalism as a complete 
explanation of the rule of law.
20George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts o f Legal Thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, p38. 
Importantly, while in each case aspects of the legal organisation were rejected and considered void, 
others were upheld or continued, indicating the role of political shifts in the change.
2'David Neal, The Rule o f Law in a Penal Colony: Law and Power in Early New South Wales, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p33, citing E.S. Morgan, American Slavery, American 
Freedom, Norton, New York, 1975, pp60-l.
22Fletcher, above n20, p81; Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998, p225 et 
seq (“law as integrity”).
23Ibid.
24Ibid, pp80-l.
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Substantivists require not just the enactment of certain substantive rights but 
argue that the existence of such rights precedes law, and therefore rules must express 
these moral and political rights if they are to be law at all.“ A leading proponent, 
Dworkin, demands positive recognition of individual rights, enforceable on 
individual request through “familiar” judicial institutions. This rule of law, he argues, 
is “the ideal of rule by an accurate public conception of individual rights.” Aside 
from the articulation of justice, there is not a great deal of difference in the 
institutional focus of the two schools thus far. Both insist that there be familiar 
legislation, courts and trial processes, differing only in the overt inclusion of rights- 
based values.
From the practitioners’ perspective, Stromseth, Wippman and Brooke adopt 
what they call a “descriptive and pragmatic” definition of the rule of law, an 
admittedly substantive but minimalist concept including only the most universally 
recognised human rights.“ They make a number of concessions to modem reality. In 
particular, they argue that a rule of law state must control “the means of violence” 
since insecurity and the rule of law are antithetical.“ Further, they acknowledge an 
element of “cultural commitment” by requiring citizens to choose to accept their 
system. Finally, they recognise a pragmatic necessity for recognisable institutions 
such as courts, consistent with other nations in a globalised world, although their 
dispute resolution only need be “consistent with rules and rights” rather than
25Simsovic, above n8, at 752.
26Ronald Dworkin, A Matter o f Principle, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1985, 
pp 11-12. John Rawls, also concerned with justice rather than the rule of law explicitly, favours 
certainty achieved through four principles: firstly, rules must be comprehensible and observable; 
secondly, determinacy requires a system of treating like cases alike (ie generality); thirdly, prospective 
application of criminal law; and the fourth, natural justice as “as a necessary aspect of the rule of law,” 
since it serves to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. Only the fourth adds to formalism but 
Rawls defines natural justice to include an independent and impartial judiciary as well as open and fair 
trials: John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1971, 
pp236-239. Raz sought the same outcomes through “principled faithful application of the law” by the 
judiciary to ensure coherence and to limit “majoritarian democracy,” although his view of democracy 
and its impact on the rule of law differs sharply from the traditional view that the preservation of 
individual rights is the purpose of democracy: Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain; Essays on the 
Morality o f Law and Politics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, pp373-5; and see Craig, above ni l ,  at 
484-5.
27Jane Stromseth, David Wippman and Rosa Brooks, Can Might Make Rights?: Building the Rule o f 
Law After Military Interventions, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006, p78.
28Ibid.
29Ibid.
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necessarily compulsory court-based resolution. From their theory, it appears that 
Stromseth, Wippman and Brooke are critical of the notion that the rule of law itself 
requires traditional court-based dispute resolution, but they acknowledge 
pragmatically that the exigencies of participation in the modem system of global law 
do require courts in familiar form as an institutional baseline upon which to interact 
with other states, persons and corporations.
1.1.3 Tension between Strict Formalism and Substantivism
The distinction between the two schools is not absolute: most theorists agree 
that views which are avowedly proceduralist are predicated on a substantive content 
as well. Even strict formalists predicate their rule of law on the moral autonomy of 
the individual. For example, there is some dispute as to whether the mutually 
essential institution of the independent court-based judiciary is a procedural or a 
substantive requirement, Even if the view of the purest of rule of law formalists, who 
have proceduralism simply as government “bound by rules fixed and announced 
beforehand,” is accepted as true, it can easily be translated into rights discourse, as 
a right not to be subject to penalty for an act not proscribed at the time or a right to 
do that which is not proscribed by rules - yet rights are construed as substantive not 
procedural aspects of law.34
30Ibid, pp78-81. Helen Durham, ‘Mercy and Justice in the Transition Period,’ in William Maley, 
Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military 
Responsibilities in Failed States, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (pi45), p i47, largely 
agrees. As to commitment or local ‘buy-in,’ see Michael Kelly, ‘Military Force and Justice’ in 
William Maley, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil 
and Military Responsibilities in Failed States, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (p229), 
p243, who is particularly focussed on what he calls the “public security function” which includes the 
judiciary but does not solely comprise it, with police and other social institutions as critical to the 
outcome. Plunkett emphasises courts more strongly: Mark Plunkett, ‘Rebuilding the Rule of Law,’ in 
William Maley, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil 
and Military Responsibilities in Failed States, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (p207), 
p223.
31Simsovic, above n8, at 751.
32Fallon considers this “covert” inclusion of substantive elements: Richard H. Fallon Jr, ‘ “The Rule 
of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ (1997) 97 Columbia LR 1, at 54 (FN260) and the 
references he cites.
33For example, Antonin Scalia ‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’ (1989) 56 Uni Chicago LR 1175; 
Raz, above nl5.
34See further Craig’s discussion of whether the prohibition on arbitrariness is substantive (preserving 
fundamental rights of individual freedom) or substantive (prohibiting punishment without the colour 
of law): above nl 1, at 470-3.
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1.1.4 Functionalist, Ends-Based Rule o f  Law Thinking
This tension has driven Chesterman to conclude that a coherent 
understanding of the international rule of law really requires a formal minimalism 
and a functional understanding of how it applies to an international legal system that 
places subjects not in a vertical relationship to a legislative body but in a horizontal
'y c
relationship. He and other modem theorists seek instead to identify the precise ends 
which comprise the rule of law. Kleinfeld has defined the school most clearly to date, 
requiring:
1. Government bound by law;
2. Equality before the law;
3. Law and order;
4. Predictable, efficient justice; and
5. Lack of state violation of human rights.
None of these ends are innovative in themselves, but are proposed to be universal, 
partly through their cultural generality and independence from internal merit- 
ranking, since they concern different cultural and political issues. They reflect in 
much more specific terms the view of Waldron, who prefers to conceive of the rule 
of law as a “political ideal” constraining the exercise of political power to protect 
subjects and emphasising the importance of the “procedural and argumentative
i o
aspects of legal practice” in addition to predictable rules. He also requires five 
characteristics of a system of law: courts, “general public norms,” “positivity,” 
“orientation to the public good,” and “systematicity” -  granting a much greater level
IQ
of values flexibility than Kleinfeld. As will become apparent below, even 
Waldron’s view becomes normatively prescriptive when applied to an intematio nal 
structure.
35Chesterman, above n7, at 333, references omitted. Therefore “substantive political outcomes -  
democracy, promoting certain human rights, redistributive justice or laissez-faire capitalism, and so 
on” are not necessary requirements of the rule of law.
36Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law,’ in Thomas Carothers (Ed), 
Promoting the Rule o f Law Abroad: In Search o f Knowledge, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Washington DC, 2006 (p31), pp36-46.
37Ibid, p35.
,sJeremy Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 43 Georgia Law Review 1, at 5.
39 Ibid, at 20 et seq.
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Kleinfeld’s theory maintains the two predominant features of the substantive 
view: it has the rule of law as an end state with identifiable institutional 
characteristics, and it includes normative content. Importantly Kleinfeld’s view is 
based on the ‘rule of law’ in terms which focus on states, like the formal and 
substantive schools, whereas Chesterman is explicitly interested in the international 
rule of law.
Critics of all those who import normativity into the rule of law argue that:
If the rule of law is the rule of good law then to explain its nature is to propound a 
complete social philosophy. But if so the term lacks any useful function. We have 
no need to be converted to the rule of law just in order to discover that to believe in 
it is to believe that good should triumph. ... It is not to be confused with 
democracy, justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of any 
kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of man.40
The same can be applied a fortiori to functional theories. Describing the rule of law 
as a situation in which the law, made by an agreed body, constrains officials and is 
general in its application merely restates the concept of authority, not the authority of 
law in society.41 This is a general handicap in rule of law thinking. For this reason, 
Nardin, objecting to normativity, distinguishes law and the rule of law; the latter is a 
“moral” concept in the sense o f constraining governments and individuals. Failing to 
recognise this conflates “law as a constraint on the exercise of power [and] law as an 
instrument of po wer.” 42
The attempt to prescribe a complete and unitary system of formal or public 
social ordering in the rule of law is flawed for further reasons. Firstly, not all 
aspirational values, such as economic or social rights, are capable of realisation 
through law, leading to confusion for a rule of law system that purports to include 
them. Lack of rules might actually be the only possible outcome.43 Secondly, 
increased economic and social complexity and therefore the social goals required of 
government may require purposive interpretation of general rules, whose generality 
is no longer sufficient to achieve certainty and predictability.44 Thirdly, the rule-
40Raz, above n33, at 196. See also Chesterman, above n7, at 340-1.
4lNardin, above nlO, at 392. See also Craig, above nl 1, at 478, discussing Dworkin’s theory of law. 
42Nardin, above nlO, at 385.
43Summers, above nl3, at 140-1.
44Roberto Unger, Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism o f Social Theory, Free Press, New 
York, 1976.
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maker in modem societies is not the sole, and perhaps not the main repository of 
authority, which also lies in the workplace and family. A commitment to formal 
equality under the rule of law cannot effectively alter this distribution of non­
government power, because it assumes that government is the impersonal repository 
of authority.45 Rather than simply being a case where society elects to sacrifice the 
formal rule of law for other social goals,46 assuming that this is a valid path contrary 
to the assertion of rule of law thinking, the theory poses a fundamental challenge for 
an immutable and universal concept of the rule of law.
1.2 Deconstructing the Assumption of Cross-cultural Universality
‘Universality’ has two rule of law meanings: it is both a positive principle, 
demanding that laws apply to all (internal universality or generality of application), 
and a claim of systemic right or legitimacy because there can be only one ‘rule of 
law’ for all (external universality). The problem with nearly all theories of the rule of 
law is the necessary claim to the latter by mandating certain institutional forms and 
values.
The claim to universality has its origins in Continental justice theory that 
there was only one “Right,” in which individual choices were harmonised under a 
“universal law of freedom,” and that the purpose of law was to realise it.47 That is, 
the singular Right was the rule of law.48 For these theorists, Right is because it is, 
either in the state of nature or as a derivative of reason -  it is identified not created.49 
On its face this sits easily with the substantive view of the rule of law. However, 
when it comes to defining the concrete features of ‘Right,’ in order to separate rule of 
law systems from other rules, difficulties are encountered because there is no
45Ibid.
46Craig, above ni l ,  at 477; see also Summers, above nl3, at 137. If domestic choices can be made 
about the relative merit of rule of law principles, then those principles must be advisory at best. 
47Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics o f Morals, 1785 (translated by Mary Gregor, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1991), p56. Radbruch too places Right as the ideal goal of law: Gustav 
Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, 1932 (6th Edn, K.F. Koehler, Stuttgart, 1963).
48Fletcher, above n20, p37.
49Ibid, pp35-6.
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universally recognised procedure for identification.50 The very debate leads to 
violence and conflict.51
A comparison of cross-cultural theories of law and the rule of law reveal 
immediate differences in approach which challenge the claimed universality of 
Right. Historically, comparative legal study has not been a focus of legal theory, 
which has drawn largely on Western experience, so that the very idea of the ‘rule of 
law’ springing from ancient Greece is said to be ‘particular’ to the West. It is true 
that non-Westem theories do not tend to emphasise the rule o f law but their theories 
of law itself demonstrate a divergent understanding of Right, and indeed whether 
Right is the purpose of law at all. It is also a fallacy to ascribe one theory of Right 
and the method by which the rule of law realises it to Western theorists.
1.2.1 The Problem of Language
The language of rule of law discourse demonstrates a strong preference for an 
Anglo-Saxon, common law tradition. Common law terms generally advanced as 
foundations of a rule of law system, in particular ‘due process,’ cannot be adequately 
rendered out of English.54 No Anglophone culture has successfully adopted other 
than a common law system, and nor have non-English speaking countries 
successfully adopted it.55 However, by contrast, the ability to translate German legal 
concepts into local languages has led to the adoption of continental civil law in a 
range of non-German speaking countries, including, Russia, Greece and Japan.56 
This begins to suggest a link between the institutional features of the traditional rule 
of law and the capacity to express them in the local language.
Fletcher argues that this is due in part to the peculiarity of the English 
language. Unusually, it allows the single word ‘law’ to represent both rules enacted
50Stromseth et al, above n27, p71.
51Tolbert and Solomon, above nl4, at 32.
' 2Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law o f Nations: Shaybarii’s Siyar, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 
1966, p.xii.
53Simsovic, above n8, at 767.
54Indeed, there is a “strong affinity” between the broad concept of the common law and the English 
language: Fletcher, above n20, p5. Fletcher also locates institutional deference ‘peculiarly’ within 
common law Anglo-American legal systems, because of their “complex structures of power.” 
Continental legal systems struggle to make “an apt translation:” pp72-3.
55Ibid, p5.
56Ibid.
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(‘law’) and a higher principle, which binding because of its inherent soundness 
(‘Right’)- An essential example is the very phrase ‘rule of law.’ Using the single 
term leaves it open to overlapping formal and substantive interpretations. Continental
CO
languages, however, traditionally assign different words to each. The latter 
meaning also captures in each non-English language individual rights, so that 
substantive appeals to human rights really call to Right above rules enacted.59 Non- 
English language-based theory can better theorise the universality of Right, because 
it readily distinguishes it from rules laid down.60 It is clear that the language used 
shapes the focus of rule of law thinking, and that this can easily vary on the global 
scale.
The shaping of legal theory by language controls the texture and complexity 
of law.61 It governs not only the terms of the rule of law, but the nature of the 
institutional forms which are popularly agreed as an essential characteristic of the 
rule of law - a strong and independent adjudicative process, taking the form of courts 
and a judiciary. However, if that is accepted as universal at least in the present world 
order, the function of courts and judiciaries remains contested across legal cultures. 
For example, in the Anglo-American common law culture, it centres on regulating 
the exercise of government authority, privileging judicial process and equalising 
standing before the law, and need not rely on a written constitution over case-by-case 
precedential development. Continental jurists are less interested in judicial process 
than the character of the state in determining social order, and therefore emphasise 
the development of a firm ‘basic law’ understood through doctrinal analysis.
57Ibid, ppll-13.
58Ibid, for example Gesetz/Recht (German), loi/droit (French), zakon/pravo (Russian), ley/derecho 
(Spanish). The same observation may be made about Arabic, geographically closest to the cradle of 
Western legal traditions, which distinguishes likewise between qantin and huqüq, the latter of which 
derives from the root word for truth.
59Ibid.
6l)That is not to say that it necessarily always does - German Hans Kelsen’s positivism (formalism in 
another guise) happily conflates the two, accepting rules laid down as conclusive of Right: A Pure 
Theoty o f Law, 1934 (translated by Max Knight, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967).
6’Fletcher would not go so far, rejecting the proposition that “language dictates the horizon of 
thought” and accepting only that there is “some not-fully understood connection between language 
and legal thought,” so that concepts including the rule of law develop within the “linguistic terrain:” 
above n20, p i2.
62Chesterman, above n7, at 336, summarising A.V. Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study o f the 
Law o f the Constitution (1st Ed), 1885.
63Chesterman, above n7, at 336-7.
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1.2.2 The Problem o f  Culture
The conceptual flaw which demands the description of universal Right at a 
level of generality in which it has no content becomes more apparent when non- 
Westem traditions are included. Where language challenges the universality of 
Right, cultural divergence shatters it completely. This is the result of the application 
of pure theory to legal context, a task which must be part of the rule of law thinking
64process.
Asian and Hebrew legal thinking and language posit law as a “path” to other 
values as opposed to the Western end-state view of Right as the description of a good 
legal system.65 In the foimer, rather than human rights being seen as individual, the 
“commonality and cooperative nature of the legal experience” prefers the greatest 
community benefit rather than the Western competition of individual against 
individual for the maximisation of personal rights.66
The primacy of the group in African as well as Asian and Hebrew legal 
discourse demonstrates fundamentally different concepts of Right between 
traditional rule of law theorists and the rest of the world community. Many non- 
Westem cultures value group rights above the individual, and rights of group 
members over non-members, and identify the ‘group’ much more broadly than the 
Western nuclear family.67 Cultural background may also affect one’s predilection for 
generality over particularity in law, challenging the assertion that generality is a 
precondition of the rule of law. Tension can, of course, exist within cultures not just 
between them.69
It could be suggested that non-Western theories which do not accept human 
rights as the underlying substance of the rule of law have been rendered obsolete by
64Nardin, above nlO, at 386.
65Fletcher, above n20, pp38-9.
66Ibid, pp38-40.
67Michael J. Glennon, Limits o f Law, Prerogatives o f Power: Interventionism After Kosovo, Palgrave, 
New York, 2001, pp 162-3 and the references he cites.
68“Asians are more likely than Americans to take note of background and context, raising the question 
of whether Asians might thus incline to qualify ‘precedent’ more heavily and to view precedent as 
controlling or even apposite in fewer circumstances:” ibid, p 171.
69For example, the difference in ancient China between the Confucian view that society be organized 
around //, or rules of propriety, and the Legalist preference for fa, or rules imposing a threat of 
sanction. The dispute persisted from the eighth to the third century BC: Chesterman, above n7, at 338.
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the embrace of human rights on a global scale. However, this would generalise the 
universality of rights to create cultural uniformity when in fact there is little. For 
example, States agree almost universally that there is a right to life, but, based on 
cultural determination of traits suitable for participation in civil society, do not 
necessarily accept that each life has an equal value.70 The difference in values 
regarding retributive punishment and the lack of general acceptance of economic 
rights necessary to sustain life (a right to food, a right to medical care) or its quality 
(a right to education, a right to adequate housing) place the ‘right to life’ at different 
levels in different areas. Notwithstanding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and subsequent rights treaties, Glennon is still disposed to speak of a “gap in 
fundamental values” for this single right. “ More broadly, feminist critiques of rights 
law point out that they do not address at all the “political, economic, social and 
cultural context in which most women live” as a result of the “various distinctions 
between public and private worlds” employed, questioning therefore whether there 
are any “general” human rights norms. Indeed, the results of this lack of a shared 
understanding as to content of rights are “very broad ‘margins of appreciation’” in 
international debate about their implementation.74
Finally, questioning the notion of universal rights in a globalised world, 
Kinley notes that a “focus on needs and capabilities exposes the reality that for the 
vast majority of the world’s population, favourable economic and social conditions 
are at least as important to the fulfilment of an individual’s capabilities as facilitative 
civil and political conditions,” which is the focus of well-accepted human rights 
through, for example, the ICCPR, and that it is “globalising economic forces” which 
are able to address them. The result, according to him, is potentially only a “limited
70Glennon, above n67, p i66.
7lArticle 3, Universal Declaration o f Human Rights 1948, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 
217 (1984), A/RES/217 A III; Article 6(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200 (1966), A/RES/2200A XXI, 999 UNTS 171, entered 
into force 23 March 1976 (“ICCPR”); Article 2(1), Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted by the Council of Europe, 4 November 1950, Rome, 213 UNTS 
221, entered into force 3 September 1953 (“ECHR”); and Article 4(1), American Convention on 
Human Rights, adopted by the Organization of American States, 2 November 1969, San Jose, 1144 
UNTS 123, entered into force 18 July 1978 (also known as the Pact o f San Jose) (“ACHR”), among 
others, which all employ the same undefined formulation of a right to life.
72Glennon, above n67, at 166.
73Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Whose Rule? Women and the international rule of law,’ in Spencer Zifcak 
(Ed), Globalisation and the Rule o f Law, Routledge, London, 2005 (p83), p86.
74See further ibid, p89.
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7Srole for the rule of law” in globalising rights practice. Kinley recognises the focus 
of that limited role as the provision of a “regulatory framework” only, since “‘legal 
rights and legal systems’ do little (though not nothing) to ensure anything like an 
equitable division of spoils as needs demand.”76
Communities do not necessarily accept a need for the rule of law to be 
universal and general outside their own context. There is evidence to suggest that the 
opposite may be true. Communities may be happy with a rights-based definition of 
the rule of law that is universal but is sufficiently general to permit a local gloss. 
During the ultimately unsuccessful international intervention in Somalia in the 
1990s, “the de facto clan division and the re-appearance of tribalism had the 
unforeseen advantage of establishing a sense of trust between the population in one 
particular area and the people who would later serve as judges and police, because 
they were all of the same clan or subclan.” Taken at its highest, this local refusal to 
trust in or want total cultural independence and objectivity when constructing the 
‘independent rule of law-based judiciary’ has significant implications for the nature 
of the rule of law as an end state the way it is traditionally conceived. Independence 
is a popular value only when it exists within a satisfactory cultural paradigm -  
independence from the cause is required, but not from society. For this reason, a 
project to develop a model transitional criminal code drawing on various legal 
systems for use in interventions is unlikely to be any more successful at producing 
the rule of law than the importation of foreign laws wholesale.
The inclusion of religious courts, or personal status courts based on religious 
precepts, in various, predominantly Islamic, legal cultures, adds another dimension. 
They pose a challenge because they exist alongside laws of general application
75David Kinley, ‘The Universalizing of Human Rights and Economic Globalization: What Roles for 
the Rule of Law?’ in Spencer Zifcak (Ed), Globalisation and the Rule o f Law, Routledge, London, 
2005 (p96), ppl06-7.
76Ibid, p i08, although Kinley notes that many economic and social rights are non-binding are not yet 
in force.
77Martin P. Ganzglass, ‘Afterword: Rebuilding the Rule of Law in the Horn of Africa,’ in William 
Maley, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and 
Military Responsibilities in Failed States, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (p340), p342. 
Ganzglass noted a similar phenomenon in the early days o f the Kosovo intervention, pp348-9.
78Project being undertaken by the University of Galway and the United States Institute of Peace, see 
Tolbert and Solomon, above nl4, at 43; Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report o f the 
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305 S/2000/809, United Nations, 2000, (“Brahimi 
Report”), para 83.
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which apply universally to the community and its officials, but permit religious 
determination of certain areas of law according to the specific legal religion of the 
individual -  that is, rather than having universal determination of personal status 
before general courts, personal status is decided by the ecclesiastical tribunals of the 
individual’s religion. 79 Tribal custom, more broadly, might also be envisaged as 
applying separately to different groups in multi-tribal states, but through national
on
law. Is this an impermissible lack of universality, contrary to the rule of law? Not if 
Right as the substance of the rule of law is accepted as universal only when it is
O 1
vague enough to permit culturally specific institutions and participation.
Islamic law poses particular problems for the acultural, universal rule of law 
advocated by formalists and substantivists alike, but they are not irreconcilable. 
Formalists do not demand that procedures to identify rules take any particular form 
and can accommodate revealed law. In fact, revealed law has a natural consonance 
with the tenets of rule of law theory: since the source of authority of law is above 
challenge by any in society, including officials, it naturally embraces “a notion of 
supremacy of law -  application of law to the ruler as well as to the ruled, and the 
independent interpretation of law by scholars.” Historically, then, Islam 
demonstrated a core feature of the rule of law before the emergence of the debate in 
European theory, even though the “term ‘rule of law’ does not translate directly into 
modem Arabic.
79Personal status courts according to religious law, which includes differing rules between sects, for 
example Sunni and Shi’ite Islam, are provided for constitutionally in Iraq: Article 39, Permanent 
Constitution o f the Republic o f Iraq. Other countries use statutory arrangements, including Lebanon 
and Egypt, in the judicial regulation of marriage, divorce and inheritance between monotheistic 
religious groups: see further Sherifa Zuhur, ‘Empowering Women or Dislodging Sectarianism?: Civil 
Marriage in Lebanon’ (2002) 14 Yale J  L & Feminism 177. India, Israel and Malaysia also preserve 
personal status for religious determination: see Josh Goodman, ‘Divine Judgment: Judicial Review of 
Religious Legal Systems in India and Israel’ (2009) 32 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 477. 
x0South Africa allows the application of tribal “customary law,” where not contrary to constitutional 
and statutory rights: section 211, Constitution o f South Africa.
8'Kant, however, considered that until differences in religion and language were overcome, no more 
than a superficial mingling of ideas was possible, and therefore “a genuine coming together of 
fundamental values held by the mass of humanity ... was years away,” and “supranational organization 
[was] unattainable:” Glennon, above n67, p i64, discussing Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, 1795 
(translated M. Campbell Smith, Allen and Unwin, London, 1903), p259.
82Chesterman, above n7, at 339.
83It is rendered as siyadat al-qanun, which literally translated means ‘sovereignty of law,’ a concept 
closer to rule by law: Chesterman, above n7, at 339-40.
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1.2.3 The Blueprint Analysis o f  the Rule o f  Law
The result of a cross-cultural analysis of the universality of the rule of law 
whether as a procedural or a substantive result is the recognition that it is a 
“culturally situated idea.” It must follow that the cultural situation of the rule of law 
is able to accommodate institutional differences (as it in fact does, even within 
Western experience). Instead a group of theorists, many of whom have practical 
experience in interventions, insist that there is a “‘blueprint’ for building the rule of 
law in post-intervention societies, addressing institutional forms of the constitution, 
of courts, police, legislatures and bar associations. The centrality of these institutions 
to a ‘fair trial,’ and therefore, it is said, the rule of law in a free, rights-based society 
has been repetitively declared in international fora, to the extent that “the expansion 
and fulfilment” of the rule of law is described as the “primary” responsibility of
• • .  85junsts.
The existence of these forms and a “normative cultural commitment” to them 
must produce the rule of law, it is claimed, although the argument that there be 
cultural commitment is usually defined absolutely as an acceptance of a prescriptive
oz:
list of human-rights based normative values and liberal democratic institutions. 
Despite the attempt to locate it in differing cultural landscapes, it appears that this 
“rule of law” can only exist in liberal democratic (and thus largely Western) 
monocultures. Many “paths” might be recognised but only if all lead to the “same 
bottom line.” Therefore cultural accommodation is limited to the means by which a 
community can reach the rule of law ideal, which is singular and universal. It 
remains to be seen whether there is in truth any actual scope for cultural divergence 
to reach the same result.
84Stromseth et al, above n27, pi 1. See also Fletcher, above n20, p35.
85Declaration o f Delhi, International Congress of Jurists, 10 January 1959, ‘reaffirming’ the 
International Congress of Jurists, Act o f Athens 18 June 1955, convened at the invitation of the 
International Commission of Jurists. However, the Congressional Report o f Committee 1, New Delhi, 
5-10 January 1959 also saw this as the responsibility of the legislature. The documents are reproduced 
in Norman S. Marsh (Ed), The Rule o f Law in a Free Society: A Report on the International Congress 
of Jurists, New Delhi, India, 1959, International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 1959.
86For example, Stromseth et al, above n27, pi 1.
87John Norton Moore, ‘Toward a New Paradigm: Enhanced Effectiveness in United Nations 
Peacekeeping, Collective Security and War Avoidance’ (1997) 37 Virg J  Int’l L 811, at 860. 
Stromseth et al are critical of the “lip service” paid even to this approach by rule of law program 
“decision-makers” in the field: above n27, p75 (FN56).
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The problem of universality has led at least one writer to assert that “a 
definition that is applicable and acceptable across cultures and political systems will
o o
necessarily be a formal one.” Even that is not supportable, however, given the core 
institutionalism with which formalism has been endowed. All that can be concluded 
is that it is fundamentally inconsistent and flawed to conceive of the rule of law as a 
universal end-state of Right. Instead, it indicates that the universality and the good is 
in the process, or the relationship, of a community to law and not the result.
The blueprint analysis originates with rule of law practitioners, who seek to 
create it in troubled societies, particularly those in which armed intervention occurs
o n
with the creation of the rule of law as one of its missions. Given that extant human 
rights law provides for derogation, particularly affecting judicial institutions 
identified as core rule of law requirements, in times of national emergency,90 it is 
necessary to consider blueprint interventions and rule of law theory against that 
landscape as well as the ideal rule of law.
1.3 States of Emergency and Rights-Based Rule of Law Institutions
The permissibility of derogating from individual human rights in response to 
national emergencies has been described as “the cornerstone” of the rights system.91 
It allows measures otherwise not permitted to restore order in “time of public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation,” provided the emergency is 
“officially proclaimed” 92 and exceptional.93 ‘Order’ in this context represents “the
88Chesterman, above n7, at 342.
^Including Stromseth et al, above n27; Kleinfeld, above n36.
90Article 4, ICCPR, for example.
9'Jaime Oraä, ‘The Protection of Human Rights in Emergency Situations under Customary 
International Law’ in Guy Goodwin-Gill and Stefan Talmon (Eds), The Reality o f International Law: 
Essays in Honour o f Ian Brownlie, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999 (p413), p413. The principle of 
derogation in emergency is repeated in Article 4, ICCPR; Article 15, ECHR; and Article 27, ACHR. 
Oraä considers it to be of “general acceptance” in international law, as custom (p414). See also the 
Explanatory Paper prepared by Mr L. Despouy (Argentina), Special Rapporteur for the Sub- 
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/19 (17 Jun 1985) (“Despouy Report”).
92Article 4, ICCPR. The Minimum Standards o f Human Rights Norms in a State o f Emergency 
adopted by the International Law Association at their 61s1 Conference (Paris, 26 Aug -  1 Sep 1984), 
(“Paris Minimum Standards"), employ the same language in section A 1(a), although it elaborated 
further in (b) that “an exceptional situation of crisis or public danger, actual or imminent, which 
affects the whole population or the whole population of the area to which the declaration applies and 
constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of which the state is composed.” The Paris
29
sum of rules which ensures the functioning of society or the set of fundamental 
principles on which society is founded. Respect for human rights is part of public 
order.” 94
The cause of the threat can be manifold. Although war is not referred to 
specifically -  because the drafters were concerned about consistency with the object 
of the United Nations in preventing war95 - this “most vivid paradigm of a threat to 
the life of a nation” is included.96 It has also been applied to internal disturbances, on 
a test of whether the ordinary functioning of the criminal justice system is “rendered 
wholly impossible,” and to revolutions resulting in a fundamental change of
Q O
national character. Force majeure was also in the mind of the drafters, but not 
circumstances of economic underdevelopment, which were subject to separate study 
by the United Nations.99
Although derogation from fundamental rights is permitted in these 
circumstances, procedural safeguards are applied, including temporal restrictions, 100 
certain criteria-based controls and the prohibition on changes to the “bases of 
institutions” (as opposed to temporary modification of functions) to allow simple 
reversion when the emergency is resolved. 101 The criteria associated with control are: 
public notification of the emergency and measures, proportionality to the actual
Minimum Standards are reproduced in Subrata Roy Chowdhury, Rule of Law in a State of Emergency, 
Pinter Publishers, London, 1989.
"Section A(l)(b), Paris Minimum Standards.
"Principle 22, United Nations, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of 
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1984/4 (1984) (“Siracusa Principles”), defining ‘public order’ in the ICCPR.
)STravauxpreparatoires to Article 4, ICCPR: 10 GAOR Annexes, UN Doc A/2929, para 39 (1955). 
"Chowdhury, above n92, p23, and see Oraä, above n91, p416. The Siracusa Principles seem to place 
internal conflict in a complex definition of “national security,” which demands a threat of force to “the 
existence of the nation or its territorial integrity or political independence,” but not “merely local or 
relatively isolated threats to law and order:” Principles 29 and 30.
97Lawless v Ireland (Application Nr 332/57) Pub EUR Court of HR, Series B (1960-1), at 82-3.
98The Greek Case (1969) 12 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 1; see 
Chowdhury, above n92, p39.
"This and armed conflict are discussed in the travaux preparatoires to Article 4: N. Questiaux, Study 
of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning Situations known as States 
of Siege or Emergency, UN Doc E/CN 4/Sub 2/1982/15, 27 July 1982 (“Questiaux Study”), paras 25- 
6; Chowdhury, above n92, p i5. Chowdhury considers that rights restrictions for economic or social 
development “might well be covered by limitations clauses permissible in normal times by the express 
terms of the ICCPR and need not at all” necessarily rely on derogation under Article 4. He is critical 
of underdevelopment as a “pretext” for derogation, given empirical evidence of the failure of 
derogation in emergencies to result in economic development: pp 19-21 and the references he cites. 
'"Section A(l)(3b), Paris Minimum Standards.
""Questiaux Study, above n99, paras 86-8.
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situation, non-discriminatory application and consistency with other obligations
109under international law. Finally, measures must not derogate from the small
109number of rights identified as non-derogable in any circumstances.
Oversight of emergency measures is less comprehensive and responsibility 
has been attributed to the legislature to maintain the rule of law, 104 or to the courts 
through judicial review or to another “national monitoring mechanism.” 105 However, 
the unwillingness of common law courts, for example, to engage in robust review of 
derogation measures, where bad faith on the part of the executive cannot be 
demonstrated, means Alexander recommends that they “ideally should not be 
involved.” 106 He concludes that courts have an important role only against threats 
less than armed conflict, in which they “should insist on the Rule of Law and resist 
the temptation to embellish legislative proscriptions.” Further, where the country 
is in an institutional “state of flux,” Lalive at least recognises that a “Western pattern 
of checks and balances” between legislature, executive and judiciary, on which this 
kind of review depends, may not be possible. He considers that that does “not per se 
affect the operation of the Rule of Law,” which rather depends on the relative interest
1 ORof the citizen and national security.
The dominant view is that protection of human rights as presently identified 
represents that balance. Interestingly, the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation o f Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
l(l2Despouy Report, above n91, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/30/Add.2/Rev.l, paragraph 2; Paris 
Minimum Standards, Section B: Emergency Powers and the Protection of Individuals. Siracusa 
Principle 51 takes a slightly narrower focus, emphasising limitations of severity (control), duration 
and geographic scope as a means of assessing reasonableness of emergency measures. Principle 66 
reasserts the applicability of obligations such as under Geneva Conventions: see further Chowdhury, 
above n92, p i03; Oraä, above n91, p424.
l03Oraa, above n91, p417. These principles have been applied as custom by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, for example in Report on Paraguay, 1987 (Paraguay had not ratified 
the convention), 16; Report on Chile 1974, leading Meron to consider it a regional custom: Theodor 
Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1989, p219 (FN262). Oraä makes clear the importance of custom in this field given that a 
third of states are not parties to the major rights treaties which provide for emergency derogation: 
p412.
ll)4Chowdhury, above n92, p55.
l05Despouy Report, above n91, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/30/Add.2/Rev.l, paragraphs 2-3; Oraä, 
above n91, p424. This is consistent with Siracusa Principle 24, that public order agencies be under 
judicial or legislative control, or that of “other competent independent bodies.”
l06George Alexander, ‘The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National Courts during Periods of 
Emergency’ (1984) 5 Human Rights Journal 1, at 1. See also Chowdhury, above n90, p59.
107Alexander, ibid, at 64; Chowdhury, ibid.
l0xJean-Flavien Lalive, ‘Introduction,’ Marsh (Ed), above n85, pp.xii-xiii.
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(Siracusa Principles) require review to allow “challenge to and remedy against ... 
abusive application” of emergency measures, 109 notwithstanding that the very 
departure from rights standards is said by rule of law theorists, especially blueprint 
theorists, to be abusive. For non-derogable rights, their special character means that 
judicial review cannot be ousted, which is said to mean that even in emergencies “the 
rule of law shall still prevail.” 110
This is a troubling aspect. If democratic rights protection through certain
institutional forms represents the rule of law, as is claimed, then both derogation of
rights and the necessity of government “in a sense by decree” 1 I11 in emergency
situations must amount to a derogation from the rule of law. However, extant and
accepted legal practice attempts to cloak rights derogation in rule of law forms
through review and thus an implied principle of legality, in which emergency
measures are authorised by law and otherwise meet legal requirements of certainty
and generality of application. 112 This is at the expense of conceptual clarity. The
Siracusa Principles, for example, explicitly acknowledge that rights violations
“[undermine] true national security” and therefore security purposes cannot justify
“measures aimed at suppressing opposition to such violation” or repression of the 
1 1 ^population.
However, practitioner theorists such as Stromseth and the ‘blueprint’ school 
overcome this difficulty in the only conceivable way -  when advocating rule of law 
interventions, they advocate efforts directed to the rule of law in ordinary situations, 
to procure a return to order and security which they see as coterminous with the rule 
of law. They do not advocate the deliberate usage by interveners of emergency 
measures in derogation of fundamental rights standards. The focus is illustrated 
clearly in the case of the right to a fair trial.
1 09 Siracusa Principle 8.
I U) Siracusa Principles 60 and 64.
II 'issue introduced by Judge Harold E. Stevens, United States, at the International Congress o f  Jurists, 
Debate on Tuesday 6 Jan 1959, 1500-1730; see further Marsh (Ed), above n85, p67.
112Siracusa Principles 15-17.
113Siracusa Principle 32.
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1.3.1 Non-Derogability and the Right to a Fair Trial
Although human rights instruments generally self-define ‘non-derogable 
rights’ within their own field of operation, there are only four human rights 
commonly considered non-derogable as ius cogens norms: the right to life, the right 
to be free from torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the 
right to be free from slavery or servitude, and the principle of non-retroactivity of 
criminal laws.114 Oraä objects to this minimalist approach to non-derogability, 
arguing that, inter alia, it excludes “some fundamental rights which are indispensable 
for the protection of human beings and very much at risk in emergencies, such as 
some minimum guarantees against arbitrary detention and concerning fair trial.”115
However, while the eight non-derogable rights in the ICCPR touch on aspects 
of criminal justice,116 rights to liberty and security of the person, including freedom 
from “arbitrary arrest or detention” and procedural safeguards in case of arrest or
i 1 *7
detention are not identified in Article 4, ICCPR, as non-derogable rights. Above 
all, none of the provisions in Article 14 regarding a “fair and public hearing by a
li4As to customary law, see Oraä, above n91, p433; as to treaty law see Jaime Oraä, Human Rights in 
States o f Emergency in International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, p96, citing the ICCPR, 
ECHR and IACHR. Siracusa Principle 69 adds freedom from “medical or scientific 
experimentation.” Other areas, such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
include other rights, such as freedoms of expression and communication: Copenhagen Document 
(1990), para 25 ((1990) 29 ILM 1305), Moscow Document (1991) paras 28.1-10, reprinted in (1991) 
30 ILM 1683. Meron notes that there is “no immediate prospect of consensus” beyond this minimal 
list of four: ‘On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights’ (1986) 80 AJIL 1, at 16. However, there 
is clearly a penumbra of uncertainty regarding interpretation here. For example, the American Law 
Institute posits that “prolonged arbitrary detention” would also be “against ius cogens norms; 
however, if the conditions of the derogation clause are met in a state of emergency, the detention 
would presumably not be arbitrary:” American Law Institute, Restatement o f the Law (Third): The 
Foreign Relations Law o f the United States, St Paul, Minnesota, 1987, pl74-5.
ll sOraa, above n91, p434. He is also critical of the inclusion of some “not so indispensable” rights as 
non-derogable in the ICCPR and ECHR.
'^Including procedural rights in case of the death penalty (Article 6(4)), freedom from imprisonment 
as a debtor (Article 11) and recognition as a legal person (Article 16). There is effectively a ninth non­
derogable right in the prohibition on derogating from other rights in a manner which is discriminatory 
for prohibited reasons, including race or gender (Article 4). Since procedural non-discrimination 
between prosecutor and accused in criminal trials (egalite des armes) is said to be the first principle of 
a fair trial (Pataki v Austria', Dunshrin v Austria Application Nrs 596/59 and 789/60, (1963) YB 
ECHR 714), there is undoubtedly some overlap in protection: Chowdhury, above n92, p213. 
Similarly, freedom from torture overlaps with the procedural right to freedom from self-incrimination, 
because it prohibits the gaining of evidence through compulsion. Chowdhury considers this important 
in a state of emergency, in which it is often abused: ibid, p217.
ll7Articles 9-10. Nor are restrictions to freedom of movement, when authorised by law and directed to 
“national security [and] public order,” inter alia, or expulsion of aliens without review or appeal: 
Articles 12-13. Further, the question of derogability on freedom from arbitrary detention does not 
preclude administrative detention in situations of emergency, as was upheld, for example in 
Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206.
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competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law,” which even in a 
stable democratic society may be modified in the interests of “national security” or 
“public order,”118 are non-derogable in emergencies.
The European Convention on the Protection o f Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR) also permits derogation of rights to a fair trial
and to liberty,119 justified on grounds that the “acts of violence which cause a public
emergency, menace the personal security of other members of the community,” and
temporary suspension, as authorised by many Continental constitutions, was
permitted to restore security for all. The Siracusa Principles specifically refer to
“national security” and “public order,” as well as non-emergency reasons for
derogation, including preserving the “fairness of the trial,” as reasons to derogate
• • 1 2 1from the right to a public trial.
The IEA Conference of 1984 took a markedly different approach when it 
established the Paris Minimum Standards o f Human Rights Norms in a State o f 
Emergency, identifying sixteen rights as non-derogable, including the right to a fair 
trial and the right to remedy. “ The previous year, the International Commission of 
Jurists recommended that “all the due process rights should remain non-derogable, 
except three types of measures: suspension of the right to a public trial; permitting 
larger delay than normal in proceeding to trial,” and some procedures relating to 
admission of testimony from witnesses not appearing at trial. Although consistent
ll8Article 14(1), similarly the presumption of innocence (14(2)), procedural equality including 
avoidance of “undue delay” (3), review on appeal (5) and protection from double jeopardy (7), 
ICCPR. This is demonstrated by the UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, who described how near permanent states of emergency in states such as Egypt resulted in 
the suspension of fair trial standards by military courts trying civilians, contrary to the ICCPR, 
including the lack of judicial independence and a right of appeal. The criticism was in the 
characterisation of the underlying national situation as an emergency. See Commission on Human 
Rights, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any Part of the 
World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and other Dependent Countries and Territories: 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly 
Ndiaye, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/61, Addendum: 
Country Situation, UN Doc.E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.l, 19 December 1997, paras 152-3. 
ll9Articles 5, 6 and 15, EHCR.
mLawless v Ireland, above n95, at 125 per Professor Waldock.
121 Siracusa Principle 36.
122Articles 1-16, in which Article 7 refers to a right to a fair trial and Article 16 to a right to remedy. 
The Siracusa Principles also establish not only a non-derogable right to a fair trial and freedom from 
arbitrary detention but identify complex minimum standards amounting to it: Principle 70.
1 "^International Commission of Jurists, States of Emergency: Their Impact on Human Rights, Geneva, 
1983, p429; see also Chowdhury, above n92, p212. Chowdhury differed, however, with the 
Commission and with the Paris Minimum Standards on the derogability of unreasonable delay in trial,
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with blueprint rule of law, these documents have not in the previous 25 years 
crystallised into a new rule o f custom establishing a non-derogable right to a fair trial 
in emergencies less than armed conflict.
However, where the national emergency amounts to an armed conflict 
attracting the protections offered by the Geneva Conventions, common Article 
3(1 )(d) prohibits sentencing “without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples.” 124 It has been argued that if these protections are 
indispensable in time of war, they must “a fortiori be considered non-derogable in 
times of lesser threat.” Chowdhury brings what he argues are non-derogable 
aspects of fair trials rights, which could never “be justified on the principle of strict 
necessity,” under the aegis of common Article 3 “indispensable judicial
1 9Aguarantees.”
Common Article 3 has been subject to recent analysis as a result of the so- 
called war on terror and US detention practices at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Rejecting 
the form of military commissions established by executive decree, the US Supreme 
Court said of these indispensable guarantees:
Like the phrase “regularly constituted court,” this phrase is not defined in the text of 
the Geneva Conventions. But it must be understood to incorporate at least the barest 
of those trial protections that have been recognized by customary international law ... 
[The] procedures adopted to try Hamdan deviate from those governing courts- 
martial in ways not justified by any “evident practical need,” and for that reason, at 
least, fail to afford the requisite guarantees. We add only that, as noted in Part VI-A, 
supra, various provisions of Commission Order No. 1 dispense with the principles, 
articulated in Article 75 and indisputably part of the customary international law, 
that an accused must, absent disruptive conduct or consent, be present for his trial 
and must be privy to the evidence against him.127
considering that “it is implicit in the concept of the fair trial that there should not be any unreasonable 
delay,” although he would allow some delay in case of national emergency: p215. 
l24For example, Convention IV Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War, 12 
August 1949, Geneva, 75 UNTS 287, entered into force 21 October 1950.
l25Dr Jimenez Arechega (former president of the ICJ), Final Recapitulation, Inter-American Seminar 
on State Security, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Inter-American Institute o f Human Rights, 
San Jose, 1982; Chowdhury, above n92, p211.
l26Chowdhury, ibid, p210. He would also include them under “other obligations under international 
law” in Article 4, ICCPR, but, as discussed above, the general recognition of non-derogable rights in 
customary law is limited and does not expressly include fair trial rights.
127Hamdan v Rumsfeld 548 US Rep 1 (2006), at 70-1 per Stevens J, for the Court, noting that the 
requirements of common Article 3 are “are general, crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal 
systems.”
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The Human Rights Commission considered that derogation from “normal” 
Article 14, ICCPR, protections should be “strictly” proportional, “ clearly 
suggesting the legitimacy of derogation per se in circumstances not attracting higher 
protection under common Article 3. This is the heart of the issue -  applying fair trial 
rights instruments as indicative of international agreement on the ‘indispensability’ 
of judicial guarantees in customary law must result in a minimum set of non­
derogable standards. Suggesting they are something more, and should therefore 
apply a fortiori in peacetime, is circular because their indispensability in civilised 
nations at peace is what gives such guarantees meaning under common Article 
3(1 )(d). However, the minimum standards the US Supreme Court has identified, 
drawing on Article 75 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions o f 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection o f Victims o f International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I) 1977, and labelled as customary law, are remarkably similar 
to derogable Article 14 procedural protections.
l28Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, Article 14 (Twenty-first session, 1984), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.l at 14 (1994), paragraph 4. But compare Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment Number 29: States o f Emergency (Article 4),
CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Ass.l 1,31 August 2001, where the Committee concluded that “as certain elements 
of the right to a fair trial are explicitly guaranteed under international humanitarian law during armed 
conflict, the Committee finds no justification for derogation from these guarantees during other 
emergency situations. The Committee is of the opinion that the principles of legality and the rule of 
law require that fundamental requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state of emergency. 
Only a court of law may try and convict a person for a criminal offence. The presumption of 
innocence must be respected:” para 16.
i2)8 June 1977, Geneva, 1125 UNTS 3, entered into force 7 December 1978. Article 75(4) in 
particular provides that “ No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person 
found guilty of a penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction 
pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized 
principles of regular judicial procedure, which include the following:
(a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the particulars of the 
offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused before and during his trial all necessary rights 
and means of defence;
(b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal responsibility;
(c) no one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account or any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offence under the national or international law to which he was subject at 
the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was 
applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of the 
offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit 
thereby;
(d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law;
(e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence;
(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt;
(g) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses 
against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him;
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Notwithstanding, the suggestion that the Supreme Court may have been 
willing to entertain divergence from their minimum trial standards, if justified by 
“practical need,” presumably security, or legislative sanction, leaves little genuine 
difference between the Human Rights Committee’s view of Article 14 as derogable 
in emergencies less than an international armed conflict and common Article 3(1 )(d) 
“indispensable judicial guarantees.” Significantly, Justice Stevens for the US 
Supreme Court reminded the executive that “in undertaking to try Hamdan and 
subject him to criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the Rule
1 T/V
of Law that prevails in this jurisdiction.”
It has been suggested “in circumstances of extreme political, economic and
1 3 1social upheaval the contingencies of the rule of law may be of a different order.” 
The tension, as Teitel phrases it, is between the rule of law “as backward looking and 
forward looking, as settled versus dynamic ... it serves merely to mediate the 
normative shifts in justice that characterise these extraordinary periods.”132 Kinley 
goes further, to argue that even in societies not in “hypertransition ... the rule of law 
is nevertheless always contingent on political circumstances,” describing it as a 
question only of “degree.” This is not the rule of law as popularly advocated, 
although it better accommodates the tensions arising in states of emergency. The 
desire for “tools” to reform domestic organisation towards “democracy and respect 
for the rule of law and human rights, as well as effective management of resources” 
stems particularly from the series of atrocities in Rwanda, the Balkans and elsewhere 
late in the twentieth century.134
(h) no one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an offence in respect of which a final 
judgement acquitting or convicting that person has been previously pronounced under the same law 
and judicial procedure;
(i) anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to have the judgement pronounced publicly; 
and
(j) a convicted person shall be advised on conviction or his judicial and other remedies and of the 
time-limits within which they may be exercised.”
130Hamdan v Rumsfeld, above nl27, at 72. 
l3lKinley, above n75, ppl08-9.
l32Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation’ (1997) 106 
YaleU  2011, at 2016.
133Kinley above n75, pp 108-9.
l34For example, Pirrko Kourula, ‘Governance and Coordination in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Situations’ in Guy Goodwin-Gill and Stefan Talmon (Eds), The Reality o f International Law: Essays 
in Honour o f Ian Brownlie, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999 (p351), p352.
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1.4 The Rule of Law as a Means to Separate Goods: Other Theories
Democracy and economic development are chief among the social goods 
postulated as flowing from the existence of the rule of law, including legitimacy,
1 1 C
which give it purpose. These multi-disciplinary theories view the rule of law as a 
set of norms whose observation and institutional forms lead to other, identified 
goods.
1.4.1 Rule o f Law and Democracy
Removing the rule of law from the realm of pure law theory puts in 
contention the relative role of the rule of law and the state. Traditional Continental 
thinking was preoccupied with the Rechtsstaat or Etat de droit: a state in which law 
was the supreme authority. The legitimacy of law, and therefore the state, derived 
from reason “as well as the formal requirements of legality.” Rousseau in 
particular argued that law was supreme, but only as the formulation of the popular 
will. This is a manifestly substantive rule of law theory, with a democratic state 
based on reason as a necessary co-efficient.
Modem rule of law interventions are founded on the precept that democracy 
cannot exist without the rule of law, which is capable of measurement by its 
institutions. Once a critical mass of blueprint rule of law institutions is established, a
1 t o
stable democratic state is supposedly the result. This result means no other form of 
state is capable of expressing the rule of law. Socialism, for example, because it 
places the state in a surrogate role to the citizen and not as a “disinterested arbiter,”
n5Chesterman, above n7, at 341-2. For example, development theory has ‘thickened’ the meaning of 
the rule of law by elaborating substantive goods: Thomas C. Heller, ‘An Immodest Postscript,’ in Erik 
G. Jensen and Thomas C. Heller (Eds), Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the 
Rule o f Law, Stanford University Press, Stanford (USA), 2003 (p382), pp382-3.
136Chesterman, above n7, at 337 and the references he cites.
l37Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, 1762 (translated by Maurice Cranston, Penguin, 
London, 1968); although the formalist Raz considered it well possible that democracy could produce a 
legal system that did not accord with the rule of law: above nl5, see further discussion in Craig, above 
nl 1 at 469.
n8Stromseth and her colleagues review a series of interventions, armed and aid-based, in the 1990s 
which attempted to “rebuild shattered societies broken apart by civil wars and ethnic conflicts. Crises 
in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone led to rule of law efforts designed to 
rebuild (or at times build up from scratch) legal institutions, restore functioning governments, provide 
accountability for abuses and war crimes, and permit gradual economic recovery.” The concrete 
outcomes sought were the fostering of the rule of law and of democracy, through “the rewriting of 
constitutions and key legislation, support to law enforcement and the courts, and the provision of other 
forms of structural and technical assistance:” Stromseth et al, above n27, p62.
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unable to produce disinterested and consistent results, cannot produce a rule of law 
state. 139
Law and democracy allows us to conceive of the rule of law as something 
wider than the legal system, emphasising not ‘law’ in the ‘rule of law,’ but ‘rule.’ It 
demands democratic, reason-based governance and it draws on certain empirical 
facts discovered about democratic systems: democracies “rarely, if ever, wage war 
against one another.” 140 It has now moved from academic debate to US foreign 
policy: it has been argued that ‘democracy enlargement’ became “the central 
intellectual theme of the Clinton administration.” 141
However, a blueprint analysis founded on a judiciary independent from the 
legislature and executive, procedurally protecting rights, cannot successfully lead to 
democracy, in that governments in both democratic and authoritarian states are 
capable of, and demonstrate, judicial independence; independence alone cannot 
“produce effective checks on power.” 142 In fact, courts in democratic as well as 
authoritarian regimes are “making decisions that were previously reserved for 
majoritarian institutions.” 143
In a feature regularly observable in states of emergency and in authoritarian 
regimes, the fragmentation of the judiciary into regular and exceptional courts often 
actually reflects an increasing degree of independence in the regular courts, so that 
the greater autonomy of a court in an authoritarian state, “the greater the likely
l39Discussing a case study of the Budapest taxi drivers strike and the government response in 1990: 
Fletcher, above n20, p i7.
l40The so-called “democratic peace phenomenon:” Norton Moore, above n87, at 822-3, who cites the 
independently empirical works of Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a 
Cold War World (1993); Spencer Weart, Peace Among Democratic and Oligarchic Republics (1994); 
James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace 
Proposition (1994; unpublished); Rudolph Rummel, Power Kills, Absolute Power Kills Absolutely 
(1991; unpublished); Spencer Weart, Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another 
(1994; unpublished). Norton Moore notes at his FN16 that with two exceptions, “the work of all these 
scholars was partly supported by the US Institute of Peace.” 
l4lNorton Moore, ibid, at 825.
l42Ginsburg and Moustafa (Eds), above ni l ,  pl6. At pi (FN1), they acknowledge the contradiction 
between this criticism and the equally popular view that “judicial policy-making is antidemocratic.” It 
follows, as case studies in their volume indicate, that formal independence as the rule of law cannot 
“ensure substantive notions of political liberalism,” for example in Lisa Hilbink, ‘Agents of Anti- 
Politics: Courts in Pinochet’s Chile’ (p i02) and Gordon Silverstein, ‘Singapore: The Exception that 
Proves Rules Matter’ (p73).
l4?They consider that in modem undemocratic states across the world, courts have an “increasingly 
prominent role” both in advancing regime interests and crystallising opposition: Ginsburg and 
Moustafa (Eds), ibid, p2.
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degree of judicial fragmentation in the judicial system as a whole,” with a moving 
delineation between the two “according to political context.” 144 Secondly, 
emphasising institutional independence overlooks the possible constraint of the 
judiciary through jurisdictional structure, the scope of review and standing, imposed 
by the rule-maker, 145 and the “characteristic weakness of civil society” in 
authoritarian regimes as a result of extralegal coercion and illiberal legislation. 146
While democratic peace provides a basis for popular rule of law legitimacy, it 
overlooks the employment of rule of law rhetoric in other contexts to other ends, 
which have little to do with democracy at all. Part of ‘legitimacy’ is seen as the 
presence of independent judicial institutions. 147 The appeal to ‘pure’ rather than 
emergency rule of law institutions is the quest for legitimacy, either as internal social 
acceptability among the subject population, or external acceptance as a participant in
14Äthe international community on the same international rule of law footing.
This is apparent in peaceful, but authoritarian, regimes such as China, which 
has made the concept a “central component of its legitimation strategy,” 149 and in 
interventions in emergency situations. 150 It is of no matter that ‘legitimacy’ 
especially in the former may often be of use only to “economise on the use of force 
that is also a component of maintaining power.” 151 Rule of law legitimacy was also 
employed in the penal colony of New South Wales in the eighteenth and nineteenth
l44Ginsburg and Moustafa (Eds), ibid, p i8. In authoritarian states, they identify five particularly curial 
functions: “(1) establish social control and sideline political opponents, (2) bolster a regime’s claim to 
‘legal’ legitimacy, (3) strengthen administrative compliance within the state’s own bureaucratic 
machinery and solve coordination problems among competing factions within the regime, (4) 
facilitate trade and investment, and (5) implement controversial policies so as to allow political 
distance from core elements of the regime: p4.
145Ibid, p i9, footnotes omitted.
146Ibid, p20.
147Ibid, p5, arguing that courts may be used to “give the image, if not the full effect, of constraints on 
arbitrary rule.”
l48For example, Ginsburg and Moustafa argue that the central role of the modernisation of Japan’s 
legal order in the late nineteenth century, in face of “the threat of Western colonialism ... provided a 
sort of formal legitimacy to demonstrate to other nation states that Japan was a member of the club of 
modernity,” although as a form of internal “social ordering” it was much less important: ibid, p6.
I4 )lbid, p3, citing the article in their edition by Pierre Landry, ‘The Institutional Diffusion of Courts in 
China: Evidence from Survey Data’ (p207). Landry himself demonstrates the significance of politics, 
including part membership, to practice in public institutions: for example, p209. 
l50The ‘rule of law’ has been seized upon in international discussions about both unilateral and 
multilateral interventions in Palestinian occupied territories, Iraq, East Timor, Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, among others: see further, Jeremy Matam Farrall, United Nations Peacekeeping and the 
Rule o f Law, Issues Paper No 1, Australian National University Centre for International Governance 
and Justice, March 2007, especially pp4-5. 
l5lGinsburg and Moustafa (Eds), above nl 1, p5.
40
centuries to settle the independent social order and balance of power between
1convicts, emancipated convicts and their supporters, and free settlers, 
notwithstanding that democracy and individual rights were not the organisation 
sought, and to establish a form of independence from Britain.
In several African states, Mexico and post-Nasser Egypt, authoritarian 
regimes provided access to courts “to better institutionalise rule and to strengthen 
discipline within their states’ burgeoning administrative hierarchies,” including 
against corruption, 154 or in Turkey and Iran as a means of social control. 155 In other 
areas -  and including democracies -  the use of courts to make significant decisions is 
seen as strategic “delegation by office holders and strategic compliance by judges 
(with somewhat similar policy preferences) who are better insulated from the 
political repercussions of controversial rulings.” 156
Importantly for the liberal-democratic rule of law in the international system, 
empirical analysis shows “no necessary connection between the empowerment of the 
courts and the ultimate liberalisation of the political system,” while some analysts 
have noted a greater move towards rule of law rhetoric by regimes whose primary, 
substantive legitimising rhetoric, whether independence, wealth redistribution or 
other, has failed. 158 The effect of the rule of law institutional blueprint often has little 
to do with the ulterior purpose of the quest for legitimacy, questioning theories such 
as law and democracy or law and economics.
l52Neal, above n21, p62 et seq. Significantly, ‘rule of law’ was used not in terms of individual rights 
or liberties, which were well-known from contemporaneous revolutionary movements in other 
regions, but in reliance “on their British birthrights:” p25.
153Ibid, p23.
l54Ginsburg and Moustafa (Eds), above ni l ,  pp7-8, discussing the chapters of Jennifer Widner with 
Daniel Scher, ‘Building Judicial Independence in Semi-Democratic Uganda and Zimbabwe’ (p235); 
Beatriz Magaloni, ‘Enforcing the Autocratic Political Order and the Role of Courts: The Case of 
Mexico’ (p i80); and Tamir Moustafa, ‘Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The 
Judicialisation of Politics in Egypt’ (pi32). Chesterman also notes this as a consequence of 
intervention, in which interveners believe they are advancing rights and democracy, whereas local 
officials believe the interveners are augmenting (rather than restraining) central authority: above n7, at 
340, references omitted.
l55Hootan Shambayati, ‘Courts in Semi-Democratic/Authoritarian Regimes: The Judicialisation of 
Turkish (and Iranian) Politics’ in Ginsburg and Moustafa (Eds), ibid, pp283-303. 
l;i6Ginsburg and Moustafa (Eds), ibid, plO.
l57Hilton Root and Karen May, ‘Judicial Systems and Economic Development’ in Ginsburg and 
Moustafa (Eds), ibid, pp304-325.
l;,sFor example, in Egypt the move to rule of law rhetoric by Anwar Sadat (1970-81) to “distance 
himself’ from the failure of the preceding Nasser regime (1954-70) to achieve revolutionary goals: 
Ginsburg and Moustafa (Eds), ibid, pi 1.
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Critics of law and democracy theory argue that formal legal requirements, 
especially at the international level, in fact constrict and undermine democracy and 
the state. The advantage of this is that it maintains legal stability in face of the 
momentary whim of the community. 159 It has also been argued that the impact of 
international law ‘destabilises’ domestic orders, such as in several European states, 
by destabilising the relationship between the domestic courts called upon to apply the 
rules of international law which penetrate the domestic structure. 160
1.4.2 Law and Economics
Theories about the contribution of the rule of law to market economies take a 
similar form. Economic growth, it is said, progresses relative to the health of the rule 
of law within a state -  the rule of law and “good governance” produce sustainable 
development. 161 It appears that this is a response to predictability and enforceability 
as a core element of the rule of law, enabling investors as well as citizens to plan 
their business affairs with a level of regulatory certainty.
In fact, the emphasis of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and 
international aid donors on the development of the rule of law is intended to produce 
efficient economic outcomes, through a predictable and economically liberal 
(procedurally) legal culture, in which obedience to laws is ingrained. Thus in its
l5)However, Daintith also argues that democratic decision-making is not significantly different from 
the development of international rules through executive participation abroad, since domestic laws are 
developed and put to Parliament by the executive, at which time “the legislature does not so much 
make law as make the executive accountable for its lawmaking: Terence Daintith, Ts International 
Law the Enemy of National Democracy?’ in Thomas Vandamme and Jan-Herman Reestman (Eds), 
Ambiguity in the Rule o f Law: The Interface Between National and International Legal Systems, 
Europe Law Publishing, Groningen, 2001 (pi 15), ppl 17-9.
l60For example, Dominique Remy-Granger, ‘The Ambiguities of the State Based on the Rule of Law; 
a Unitary System ä la Franpaise’ (p53); Heinhard Steiger, ‘The Relationship of German National Law 
with Public International Law and with European Community Law’ (p65); Wouter Hins, ‘An 
Ambiguous Story about Supremacy of EC Law; Report from the Netherlands’ (p85); and Thomas 
Vandamme, ‘Changing the Lawmaking Process in the Netherlands for the Sake of Implementation; a 
Question of Going Too Far and of not Going Far Enough’ (p97), all in Thomas Vandamme and Jan- 
Herman Reestman (Eds), Ambiguity in the Rule o f Law: The Interface Between National and 
International Legal Systems, Europe Law Publishing, Groningen, 2001.
U,IUN General Assembly Resolution 60/1 (2005), 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, UN Doc. 
A/RES/60/1 (16 September 2005), para 11.
l62However, Chesterman makes the point that organisations such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund are specifically prohibited “from referring to political processes as such, 
‘governance’ provides a convenient euphemism for exactly that:” above n7, at 347. This view of the 
free market as the result of governance constrained by law is not without critics. Gray, for example, 
argues that “free markets are creatures of state power, and persist only so long as the state is able to
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international programs, the World Bank measures, among others, the confidence of 
actors in “contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of
i  z:
crime and violence.” The free market result comes from the protection these forms 
tend to give to private property and contracting. 164
This economic theory of the rule of law is not the same as the economic 
theory of law. It is common ground for rule of law theorists that laws be general in 
their terms and universal in their application. This contradicts economic theories of 
law which prefer optimised implementation. For example, the cost of criminal 
enforcement is balanced against the cost of crime, determining the “optimal” balance 
between enforcement and tolerance. However, the principle of legality, strongly 
adhered to in civil law traditions, tolerates no criminal behaviour at all. 165 If Fletcher 
is correct, and the popular concept of the rule of law demands non-optimal 
implementation, then the necessary conclusion is that in the public mind at least, the 
rule of law is based on ‘principle,’ or rather something like Dworkin’s “principled 
consistency,” 166 aimed at an economic result, rather than an economic theory of the
1 S ' !
rule of law. It is supported by the unwillingness of rule of law practitioners to take 
advantage of rights derogation in times of emergency, which are designed for the 
restoration of order, in favour of the pure rule of law blueprint.
Economic theories depart from typical explanations for the rule of law, which 
prioritise criminal justice and constitutionalism over other aspects of law, including 
property and personal status. The core logic must be that, since many theorists 
essentially argue that the concept of the rule of law is one of ‘ordered liberty’ (to 
quote Rawls), then the system most likely to affect liberty itself is the area on which 
to focus greatest efforts. That is, all rule of law theories except this one can tolerate a 
level of non-legal self-ordering in some areas to preserve the greatest level of formal 
legality in the other. However, the result is reduced predictability and certainty -
prevent human needs for security and the control of economic risk from finding political expression:” 
John Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions o f Global Capitalism, New Press, New York, 1998, pi 7.
163As quoted in Chesterman, above n7, at 347 and the references he cites. 
l64Stromseth et al, above n27, p58. 
l65Fletcher, above n20, pp30-l.
166Ibid, P32.
l67Nardin describes this as “law as economics because it makes law the servant of economic policy:” 
above nlO, at 389.
l6XPlunkett takes the view to its extreme, arguing that the ‘rule of law’ is a “functioning criminal 
justice system:” above n30, pp208-9.
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those core values attributed to the ordering of liberty, which are of greater 
importance to these aspects of ordinary life, rather than a focus on crime as 
extraordinary behaviour in society. Economic rule of law theories respond to this.
1.4.3 Law and Development, and Post September 11 Rethinking
The result of the rule of law as an essential element of a free market economy 
and a liberal democratic state produces a summative theory of law and development, 
applied in the course of foreign aid as well as foreign intervention.169 After 11 
September 2001, a third step has been taken: the economic and democratic theories 
of the rule of law, via the theory of law and development, have produced a 
conclusion that the rule of law is antithetical to terrorism and threats to national and 
international security. That is, since the rule of law’s rights focus is directed to 
eliminating abuses, it must therefore also eliminate the conditions which foster 
terrorism and violence.170
The difficulty with all these approaches is that they are not concerned with 
the law, beyond the familiar allegedly immutable institutional forms. The goal is the 
promotion of liberal democratic and economic values as goals, not as constraints on
• 1 7 1government authority, particularly in US policy. Rule of law operations in Iraq 
provide a clear demonstration of rule of law discourse as Western liberalism in 
action. When the method proposed to achieve the rule of law as democratic 
development is the wholesale export of a legal system or systemic concepts of one 
state, then the cross-cultural problems discussed in the preceding section are realised. 
For example, critics of the law and development US aid program commencing in the 
1960s objected to its “over-reliance” on exporting systemic US legal concepts,
l6<)It is this combination of efforts to use the institutional forms of the rule of law -  constitutions, 
laws/codes, courts, judges and police -  to encourage development in the Third World that dominated 
US foreign aid budgets from the 1970s onwards. Efforts began in Latin America, and after the end of 
the Cold War spread to the former Communist states in Europe. Their focus was “democratisation and 
decentralization, on the elimination of state abuses ... [and] efforts to promote capitalism and market- 
oriented reforms.” They primarily focused on judicial training and the provision of American 
technical expertise to help nations ‘modernise’ their laws: Stromseth et al, above n27, p61. See also 
Carothers, above nl9, p4.
l7uStromseth et al, ibid, pp59-60, references omitted. 
mNardin, above nlO, at 389.
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including “strategic litigation and activist judges, that were incompatible with the
172target countries.”
The criticism should also include the emphasis on constitutionalism in rule of 
law development, notwithstanding the absence of written constitutions in States that 
would self-identify as proponents of the rule of law, such as the United Kingdom. 
Even the United States constitution, which unlike continental constitutions does refer 
to certain specific human rights such as ‘due process of law,’ is silent on an 
explicit commitment to the rule of law. US constitutional authority has held that ‘due 
process’ means “the concept of ordered liberty” and must be implicit in 
constitutional interpretation. 174 There can be little clarity about the rule of law when 
theory turns directly to the benefits which are supposed to accrue from it, whether 
they be democracy, human rights or economic arrangements. Nor can there be 
clarity about the nature of the desired end-state when its qualities are asserted to be 
desirable' but not always much more, leaving only “provincial ideas’” ' which are 
claimed to be universal.
At heart is the characterisation of the rule of law. All non-law-based theories 
discussed to date remain predicated on the rule of law as a result (a good in itself) or 
a situation which produces a result (that result being the good). Because of this, the 
theories must focus on elements of the rule of law which are capable of identification 
as results: courts, judiciaries, democratic parliaments, suitably certain and predictable 
laws, and human rights, which have not been subject to derogation. As results or 
situations cannot lend themselves to more than one definition, rule of law theorists 
must accept a theory of universality which has been shown to be culturally
l72Chesterman, above n7, at 346.
m Fifth Amendment to the Constitution o f the United States: “An individual charged with a crime is 
entitled to due legal process, cannot be tried twice for the same offense, and cannot be compelled to 
testify against him- or herself. The government cannot seize private property without just 
compensation.”
l74This domestic recognition of substantivism at least at the constitutional level in the US has 
developed far beyond the recognition of personal rights, or Right, in international law and now 
includes “unrestrained freedom of contract” as well as rights to abortion. However, it is limited by the 
theory of ‘originalem,’ by which “all basic rights [must] be spelled out in the Constitution:” Fletcher, 
above n20, p i3, citing Palko v Connecticut (1937) 302 US Rep 319, Lochner v New York (1905) 198 
US Rep 45 and Roe v Wade (1973) 410 US Rep 113. 
l75Chesterman, above n7, at 360.
l76Nardin, above nlO, at 396; Brian Tamanaha, On The Rule o f Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p i3.
177Nardin, ibid, at 388-9.
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unsupportable without a non-existent core agreement about the nature of law, the 
nature of rule or governance, and the nature of the rule of law. The only coherent 
solution is an altogether different conception of the rule of law as a relationship, or 
social dialogue, between the subjects of law and the authority of law. Such a theory 
neither demands universal institutions nor universal values.
1.5 The Rule of Law as a Relationship
The rule of law as a relationship rather than a result is relatively new to
international rule of law discourse. Its main proponent is Nardin, who advocates a
definition of a “specific kind of relationship, a relationship based on non-
instrumental law.” In this relationship normative non-instrumental rules emanate
from law as legitimate authority to achieve the end identified by the community of
subjects, not uncontrolled power. Instrumental rules which set out the “unalterable
status of human personality that the moral relationship presupposes” control the
1variable outcomes desired from instrumental rules.
The advocates of relationship theory are interested in the developing 
perception of the community of legal subjects of the legitimacy of their legal system. 
The rule of law in this environment is neither universal nor stationary. Koskenniemi 
argued that the definition of law has to be such as to preserve the moral content of 
legality and therefore needs to be responsive to developments in ideas such as 
justice. Its responsiveness to social change should not reduce it to a “discursive idea 
of democracy” but accept the rule of law as “a distinct mode of association among 
persons whose status as human beings is a matter of ‘nature’ or ‘reason’ rather than
178Ibid, at 395.
I79lbid, at 394. Nollkaemper, reviewing the origin and case law of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, uses ‘legitimacy’ as a shorthand for “the justification o f the authority o f the 
law” with both formal and substantive understandings: Andre Nollkaemper, ‘The Legitimacy of 
International Law in the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,’ 
in Thomas Vandamme and Jan-Herman Reestman (Eds), Ambiguity in the Rule o f Law: The Interface 
Between National and International Legal Systems, Europe Law Publishing, Groningen, 2001 (p i3), 
p i3. Glennon’s view is that law is a “limit on self-dealing,” in which consent to be bound is given on 
joining (or remaining) in the community of subjects. This consent is his legitimacy o f law: Glennon, 
above n67, p i46. 
l8()Nardin, above nlO, at 394.
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‘convention’ or ‘decision.’” Thus the only universal requirement of the rule of law 
is the mutually accepted nature of the participants in it.
At the international level, the role of consent arising from sovereign equality 
fills this role. “ Rather than being a barrier to universality (and therefore the rule of 
law), consent is a prerequisite for the rule of law since if states and communities 
cannot consensually agree to universal norms then they cannot be uni versah sed. 
However, “the traditions of the international legal system appear to work against the 
ability to legislate universal norms.” Does international law demonstrate a system 
where the foundation relationship of law is so restrictive as to prevent its own 
development?
The logical flaw in Nardin and Koskenniemi’s system is the supposition that 
if reason produces an agreed moral status of humans as equals, that should lead to 
justice based on reason. It is a fallacy to assume that the community will necessarily 
decide on its non-instrumental and instrumental laws with any element of reason, or
1 84that legitimacy, in the sense of social acceptability, is a function of reason. 
Morgenthau and Schmitt, in the immediate pre- and post-World War Two periods 
both tended to agree, concluding that no rule of law could realistically require or 
facilitate the depoliticisation of power struggles for arbitration by independent 
judges. In fact, since all conflicts were essentially political, defining them in other 
terms, moral or legal, simply intensified them “by substituting totalising ideologies
i Q r
for pragmatic accommodation.”
18'ibid, at 392, discussing Martti Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer o f Nations: The Rise and Fall o f 
International Law 1870-1960, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.
I82lndeed Chamey picks up on a thread of theorising which argues that the “freedom of states to 
control their own destinies and policies has substantial value” in permitting the choice of social 
ordering: Jonathan Chamey, ‘Universal International Law’ (1993) 87 AJIL 529, at 530. This view of  
international law presupposes a freedom of states to determine legal ordering which may not 
necessarily survive today, given the elevation o f certain individual rights to ius cogens status and the 
determination of minimum legal standards for domestic criminal justice: compare US v. Altstötter et al 
(1948) 3 TWC 1 (1948) (“Justice Trial”) and Case Nr 1/9 First/2005 al-Dujail Case, Iraqi High 
Tribunal, 2006 (“Dujail Trial”), judgment translated unofficially from Arabic to English by Mizna 
Management LLC, available at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp, viewed 6 October 
2009. This is explored further in Chapter Four below.
IS3Chamey, ibid, at 530.
lx4That is, the problem is the subordination of the categorical imperative to comport with morality 
based on reason to the Nietzschean Superman “who acts solely for his own gratification:” Glennon, 
above n67, p 171. 
l85Nardin, above nlO, at 388-9.
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Understanding the rule of law as a relationship is consistent with much of 
current theory. It simply rethinks the concept and explains the failure of most ‘rule of 
law programs’ to date. Analysing Stromseth’s argument, in which the institutional 
forms of the rule of law which support peaceful democracy and development must be 
matched by a cultural commitment from the subject community to uphold the rules 
and institutions, the latter is the rule of law relationship, the former merely its 
momentary form, perhaps the most popular contemporary relationship but by no 
means the only possible manifestation.
1.5.1 The Risk o f  Indeterminacy
Traditional approaches to the rule of law, formalism in particular, overcome 
the risk of a too-broad scope for a rule of law relationship. The emphasis on certainty 
of form and process in formalism, the desired uniformity of values in substantivism 
and the mix apparent in modem blue-print approaches provide a reassuring core in 
defining the rule of law. The range of possible rule of law relationships is unlimited 
for Koskenniemi, however, who defines it negatively. 187 That said, certainty through 
uniformity in traditional approaches should not always be interchanged with 
immutability. Traditional formalist certainty and predictability of rules does not 
preclude an acknowledgement that rules certain on their face may be capable of 
different contexts and meanings, particularly over time. Substantive values may 
develop, so long as their application is on a universal human basis. Some formalists 
even allow some “virtues” of the formal rule of law to be set aside by the subject 
community to allow the achievement of other necessary ends. The risk, however, 
is losing the rule of law in post-modem relativism, in which the only requirement to 
create a rule of law relationship is the existence of public discourse.
The proposed limit to indeterminacy is the underlying acceptance of human 
moral equality as subjects of law. 190 While universally indeterminate, the rule of law 
has a determinate meaning within each society professing it, in the form of the 
characteristics of its independent rule of law relationship. This is in fact consistent
l86Stromseth et al, above n27, p4.
l87Koskenniemi, above n 181, p507; and see Nardin, above nlO, at 390.
188Nardin, ibid.
'^Including Craig, above nl 1, at 469. 
l90Nardin, above n 10, at 391.
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with traditional rule of law formalism, but has the benefit of overcoming the 
problems of universality. Nardin, though, does not subscribe to the total 
indeterminacy of post-modern theory: he asserts that to create the rule of law, there 
must be law, and if law is entirely policy-based and indeterminate, then law “as a 
distinct mode of human relationship” is erased.191
The prerequisites of a rule of law relationship then are the acceptance of 
“permissible coercion” and the existence of non-instrumental rules identifying laws 
which are predicated on an equal moral relationship between citizens.192 The moral 
equality of legal subjects, however, is not fully described -  for example, if a society 
asserts that men and women are formally equal but are different and ought therefore 
to be treated differently in certain respects, it is not clear whether either Nardin or 
Koskenniemi would accept this as a potential rule of law society. The acceptance of 
human equality as the foundation of a future rule of law relationship is demonstrated 
in the calls of the community in the penal colony in New South Wales, then under 
military governance for a “legislative assembly and trial by jury” in 1819, putting 
aside the existing relationship of prisoners, guards and free settlers.194
The possibility of rejecting societies from the scope of the rule of law is one 
of the positives Nardin sees in defining it as a relationship, because it retains 
meaning and determinacy in the concept.195 However, in this example, moral 
equality but not equivalency could be accepted but differentiation in instrumental 
rules would be necessary to preserve it. End-state rule of law theory would also reject 
this as discriminatory or insufficiently general law.
191 Ibid, at 401.
I92“lt is important to note that these rule-of-law criteria are not themselves the outcome of an 
authoritative decision. ... Unlike enacted law, they cannot be altered or annulled by authority:” ibid, at 
395. They are complemented by secondary, instrumental rules setting out procedural constraints on 
legal officials traditionally associated with the rule of law, including freedom from arbitrariness and 
the prohibition on secret or retrospective laws, which prevent officials acting outside the law: ibid.
192Some religious laws posit such an approach on their face. The Old Testament begins with religious 
equality in Genesis 1:27 but describes different gender roles in the New Testament, for example I 
Timothy 2:8-12 and I Peter 3:4-8. The Quran also reveals spiritual quality in 3:195, 4:124 and others, 
but differing gender roles, for example 4:34. This thesis does not attempt any interpretation of these 
religious passages beyond this observation. 
l94Neal, above n21, p20, references omitted.
,95Nardin goes on to dismiss a growing research school dedicated to defining an “Asian rule of law” 
with different features to what might be seen as Western rule of law for this reason: above nlO, at 397.
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1.5.2 The Permissibility o f Coercion
Coercion is also problematic. Nardin rejects the Weberian state as a coercive 
association in which the coercion is accepted as legitimate by its subjects because, 
while instrumental rules are not fixed in content, moral equality has not been 
institutionalised as the core value of the system.196 He uses non-instrumental rules to 
distinguish between permissible coercion, which is essential to the rule of law 
relationship, and impermissible coercion, which is a feature of the authoritarian 
state. The coercion debate defines the rule of law relationship in two ways: 
vertically, between the citizen and the legal authority, but also horizontally, between 
each member of the community as moral equals. Only the state professing both 
relationships is a rule of law state:
As members of that association -  ‘citizens’ -  they are associated not only with 
government but also with one another. The subjects of a managerial state, in 
contrast, are associated only with the manager.198
Laws in the latter state would be instrumental, but not necessarily in the former 
where subjects pursue self-chosen ends without interference except to prevent 
interference in each other’s freedoms. In such a state, coercion is available and 
perhaps necessary to prevent unjust coercion.199 Therefore, according to this theory, 
coercion is both a limited permissible means to enforce the rule of law, and also the 
right of the citizen to displace a non-rule of law system.
1.6 The Concern of International Law with the Domestic Rule of Law
The overt concern of international law with the rule of law -  that is, its actual 
recognition in the existing system -  is with a substantive concept, and the self- 
consciousness of the international system picks up closely on the asserted links 
between law, democracy and economic development. When speaking of the 
international rule of law, three things could be meant:
l96Ibid, at 393.
I97lbid, at 394.
198Ibid, at 393.
199This is the familiar Kantian, “classical liberal” understanding of a morally legitimate state: Nardin, 
ibid, at 392-3. Rawls argues that acknowledging this is the “basis of rule of law theory:” above n26, 
pp235-43.
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a. Rule of law theory applied to subjects of international law (primarily 
but not exclusively states);
b. The privileging of international over national law, in a ‘rule of 
international law,’ establishing, for example, the primacy of human 
rights covenants over domestic legal arrangements; or
c. A ‘global rule of law’ in which “a normative regime that touches 
individuals directly without formal mediation through existing 
national institutions.” 200 This increasingly results from the emphasis 
on individual human rights, which, like the ancient Islamic law 
(,siyar), begins to recognise “the individual as a subject on the 
international plane.” As a result, one “might speak of a global rule 
of law in a possibly nascent legal system in which individual human
90 9beings have rights and duties unmediated by national institutions.”
It is the combined effect of all three aspects which produces the ‘international rule of 
law’ as currently formulated.
Realists argue that since international law can never be law but only politics,
90*2
it can never embody the international rule of law in any of these three meanings. 
The current mood of international law defies realism, with constant demands for 
certain ideals and efficacy within and without the state. Accepting this as fact 
requires the pursuit of law in international relations, where law is the “product of 
decision and an instrument of policy and power.” 204 The assumptions on which this 
depends are:
20<)Chesterman, above n7, at 355-6.
2<)lKhadduri, above n52, p69.
202Nardin, above nlO, at 399.
2<l3Ibid, at 386. Political realists argue that that the political “stakes” for states are too high to allow 
anything more than pragmatism in international relations, at 387.
204lbid. See also Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Ambivalence about International law’ (2005) 11 
International Legal Theory 1.
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a. the coming together of “sovereign territorial groups,” each forming a 
domestic legal system, to form an international community subject only to
70Sthe restrictions o f international law; and
b. the existence o f sovereign equality at the international level, derived from 
the moral equality of citizens, which is in turn derived from nature."
These two assumptions allow the formation of a Nardinian international rule 
of law relationship. It has been asserted that the emphasis on sovereign equality for 
the international rule of law is misplaced, given domestic differentiations between 
juridical persons. Rather the focus ought to be on the character o f the state or 
international system’s coercion over its subject in the absence of choice or consent to 
participation.208
1.6. i  Realism and Equality in the International Rule o f  Law Relationship
A substantial criticism of the international rule of law relationship is that the 
formal equality of participants in international law, as a foundation of the rule of 
law,209 is not reflected in actual arrangements. The voting arrangements of the United 
Nations Security Council, in which only five nations hold a permanent power of 
veto, is held out as evidence that some states “are more equal than others,” 
particularly where Security Council Resolutions purport to express a quasi-legislative 
power. Its decision-making process and practice makes equality “nonsensical” and 
“institutionalizes a form of self-dealing that is, indeed, antithetical to the very notion 
of the rule of law.” This is not altogether surprising, given the Charter attempted to 
“replicate the existing power structure,” rather than constrain it, as the rule of law 
would require, or even represent law as power.
2l)5Khadduri, above n52, pi.
2l)6Emmerich de Vattel, The Law o f Nations or the Principles o f  Natural Law, 1758, Book 2, lxiii 
(translated by Charles Fenwick, Oceana, New York, 1964).
207Chesterman, above n7, at 360.
208Ibid.
2I) )Article 2(1), Charter o f the United Nations, 24 October 1945, San Francisco, 1 UNTS 41, entered 
into force 1 November 1945 (“UN Charter”).
2l0Chesterman, above n7, at 354.
21 'Glennon, above n67, pp 151-2.
212Ibid, p 153.
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The suggestion that the General Assembly better expresses international 
democracy is also exploded by the realities of self-interested power politics. In the 
acceptance of sovereign equality, it ignores population, wealth, respect for 
community order or the well-being of a state’s own people.“ Chesterman doubts 
whether the UN, in fact or capacity, can embody the rule of law.214 Indeed, the 
system of UN organisations, in which economic and human rights sub-agencies are 
restrained by the scope of their delegated authorities, distinguishes international 
relations from the “autonomous and complete” domestic legal systems which are 
traditionally associated with the rule of law.215
Equality of participation in the international system does not necessarily 
produce an international rule of law in which the law is applied equally to all. A 
strident criticism of recent times is that the enforcement of international law is 
anything but equal (which critics translate as consistent), for example the exercise of 
Charter powers to maintain peace and security in the Middle East, where it is alleged 
that Security Council actions are actually biased by the national interest of permanent 
members. This, it has been claimed, amounts to a “qualitatively different” 
international law for Middle Eastern states.217
While some aspects of this criticism are distinctive to the character and 
composition of the UN Security Council, and post-war collective security 
arrangements, as the UN Charter centralises coercive authority to restore 
“international peace and security” in that body, it is indicative of a disjunct 
between the theory and practice of equality in the application of international law. In
213Ibid, p 151.
214Chesterman, above n7, at 354.
2l5Ibid, at 355.
2l6Jean Allain, International Law in the Middle East: Closer to Power than Justice, Ashgate, 
Aldershot, 2004, p i27.
2l7Ibid, p i61. Brownlie agrees in a strident criticism of the Security Council for selective and 
unprincipled exercise of legal authority in its response to Libya’s refusal to surrender the suspects in 
the case of the Lockerbie bombing: Ian Brownlie, The Rule o f Law in International Affairs, Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague, 1998, p224, considering UNSC Resolution 731 (1992).
2l8Glennon, above n67, p i53. The composition and practice of the Security Council is currently and 
has long been subject to review and debate: most recently see Jakob S. Lund and Daniel Safran-Hon, 
‘Third Round of Intergovernmental Negotiations on UN Security Council Reform Conclude,’ 63rd 
Plenary Session of the UN General Assembly (1-3 Sep 09), Centre for UN Reform Education, 
http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/407, viewed 11 October 2009. The session voted to continue 
discussions into the 64th Plenary Session.
2l9Article 42, UN Charter, except for force used in self-defence pursuant to Article 51, which is to be 
reported to the Security Council.
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place of Nardin’s human equality as the foundation of the rule of law relationship, 
actual practice demonstrates a ‘hegemonial approach’ to the application of law, in 
which the relative power of the protagonist affects the obtaining of “legal approval” 
for its actions.220
1.6.2 International Intervention in the Domestic ‘Rule o f Law ’
The power dynamics of the current international rule of law are further 
challenged in circumstances where the domestic collapse of the rule of law in a state, 
or of the state itself, attracts international intervention. ~ These ‘rule of law 
interventions’ are a self-conscious attempt by the international system to maintain its 
own rule of law system, which cannot survive without the consistent rule of law, 
however formed, in its constituent parts. The standard by which international law 
measures the rule of law is by human rights based democracy, as above. The 
provisions of the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights 1948 “broadly correspond” 
to the fundamental principles of the rule of law agreed among theorists, expressing 
its judicial institutionalist focus. “ It is, therefore, a substantive view. This is 
notwithstanding the formal derogability of fair trial right outside the explicit context 
of armed conflicts attracting the protection of the Geneva Conventions.224
The contemporary international community features states in a variety of 
circumstances, including emergency. Saikal describes several categories of states, 
which due to failures of the rule of law, administrative efficacy and resilience, and 
“tolerant pluralism,” are unable to operate independently:
220Brownlie, above n2l7, p33. See also feminist critiques of domestic and international law, for 
example Charlesworth, above n73, pp83-95.
22'Disrupted states include Afghanistan since 1978, Lebanon during its civil war ( l 974-89), and 
Somalia after the overthrow of the regime of Mohammed Siad Barre. Would-be states often emerge in 
the break-up of larger states, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. Embryonic states include pre-independence 
Namibia, the Baltic states and East Timor: Amin Saikal, ‘The Dimensions of State Disruption,’ in 
William Maley, Charles Samp ford and Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil 
and Military Responsibilities in Failed States, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (p i7), 
pi 7.
222Chesterman, above n7, at 358-9. For example, the right to a form of trial in Article 10 compared to 
fair trial in Article 14, ICCPR.
222Tolbert and Solomon, above n l4, at 32-3. But compare Chesterman, ibid, at 344, who distinguishes 
between the substantive values by including specific rights, and the manner in which he argues that 
the rule of law promotes rights generally.
224See text accompanying nl28 above.
225Saikal, above n22l, p i 8.
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a. ‘disrupted’ states, where open conflict does not affect
international recognition of the state itself, such as 
Afghanistan since 1978 or Lebanon during its 1974-1989 
civil war;
b. would-be states, for example now-recognised Bosnia and
Herzegovina which was challenged by Serbia in the break­
up of the former Yugoslavia, contested by neighbours so as 
to prevent their consolidation;
c. “embryonic states” under contested occupation and facing
pressure to permit self-determination, including East Timor 
and “to some extent” Kashmir;
d. states subject to international control, whether by sanctions or
intervention, for violations of international law, such as Iraq 
after 1990; and
e. states which would disintegrate but for military control,
226including Pakistan.
All these categories of states have prompted intervention. Significantly, the causes of 
the disruption centre on the breakdown of the social order through sectarianism, 
“ethnic antagonisms” ideology, economic collapse, “a specific legitimacy crisis,” or 
separatism. Recalling Rawls’ linkage of the necessity for rules with the ordering of 
liberty, it is the breakdown of the social order which is inextricably linked with the 
break-down of the rule of law within a state.
The self-consciousness of international law to its own substantive, rights- 
based definition of the rule of law is evident in its refusal to accept the status quo of 
disrupted states as a necessary or justified part of the international legal order: human 
rights treaties make the rule of law a requirement for an internationally-recognised
226Ibid, pp 18-20. These examples are among those provided by Saikal in his analysis.
227Ibid, pp20-2.
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state, development agencies both national and international consider it “essential for 
economic growth” and “more recently security actors, notably the UN Security 
Council, have promoted the rule of law as a form of conflict resolution.”““ 
Increasingly, the rule of law is being used obliquely (but rarely explicitly) as a 
justification for intervention, as part of a broader mission to restore security, which to 
that extent is contrary to the general prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter,229
Scholars conservatively argue that rights-based humanitarian intervention is 
evolving and that, by analogy with the Security Council finding of a threat to 
international peace and security in an overflow of refugees across borders, the lack of 
the rule of law, as internationally recognised, is a humanitarian and security concern 
which can, and will increasingly, permit intervention. It has even been suggested 
that interveners’ efforts to create rights-based structures as a domestic rule of law can 
positively affect an intervention which might otherwise lack legitimacy in 
international law.
The phrase ‘rule of law’ was first used operatively in Security Council 
Resolution 1040 (1996) for the Secretary-General’s work “to promote ‘national 
reconciliation, democracy, security and the rule of law in Burundi,” although the 
‘rule of law’ was rendered in French as de retablissement de Vordre.' Where the 
UN does authorise such an intervention addressing significant rule of law issues, it 
often takes the form of UN transitional administration, which temporarily supplants 
self-rule in part to rebuild justice systems and recreate the rule of law. Given the
228Chesterman, above n7, at 343.
22<)Other than in Article 51 self-defence, and in sharp counterpoint to the declaration in Article 55 that 
member states are to “promote and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms:” Stromseth et al, above n27, p24.
230Stromseth and her colleagues, while not committing to a “clear or uncontested” right of 
intervention, are able to point to a number of interventions during the 1990s, including NATO in 
Kosovo and Coalition intervention to protect Iraqi Kurds, concluding that at a minimum such 
interventions were “excusable breaches” of the Charter rules: ibid, p38 and see p3; also Chesterman, 
above n7, at 348. This is the subject of succeeding chapters.
23lStromseth et al, ibid, pp51-2, as in Kosovo and Iraq in 2003. However, such efforts could not confer 
lawfulness on an intervention in breach of international law, unless there is a purely rule of law-based 
right of intervention: see Chapter Four below.
232Chesterman, above n7, at 348, references omitted. The French rendering as the “re-establishment of 
order” will become significant in Chapters Three and Four.
233Tolbert and Solomon, above nl4, at 42. Recent examples are the UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNSC Resolution 745 (1992)), UN Mission in Kosovo (UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999)) 
and UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNSC Resolution 1272 (1999)).
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theoretical background, this is an ambiguous term which does not point to any 
objective outcomes by which to measure the end of the need for UN intervention. It 
permits the overwhelming theoretical and international preoccupation with 
institutional forms and criminal justice to dominate a problem they are not suited to 
resolve.234 This is the subject of Chapter Four of this thesis.
It can also be a simplistic solution. C'howdhury, for example, explicitly and 
solely links the problem of the rule of law in states of emergency with the (non)- 
derogability of human rights norms,235 overlooking security concerns as part of the 
democratic peace approach. It would follow, in his view, that the restoration and 
application of non-derogable human rights solves domestic rule of law problems. 
This conclusion typifies the international rule of law relationship -  it implicitly 
requires not simply sovereign equality as the underlying condition for international 
participation, but participatory equality derived from equality (or better, equivalency) 
of rights-based institutions, procured through intervention if necessary.
1.7 The Pursuit of Universality in the Current International Rule of Law 
Relationship
The three essential characteristics of the international rule of law relationship 
are therefore: the existence of states as participants, the sovereign equality of such 
states and the existence of human rights-based instrumental rules governing the legal 
flowering of the relationship. The first is a precondition -  it merely highlights the 
character of the subjects of the law. The second provides Nardin’s moral foundation 
to the establishment of a rule of law conversation. The third is not without 
disagreement. It has been said, for example, that the foundation of the law between 
states is non-aggression, or, alternately, collective security, rather than rights.
234Chesterman, above n7, at 348-9; Tolbert and Solomon, above nl4, at 42. The preponderance of 
institutionalism and criminal justice is demonstrated in the United Nations Basic Principles on the 
Independence o f the Judiciary, UN General Assembly Resolutions 40/32 (1985) and 40/146 (1985). 
245Chowdhury, above n92. Stromseth and her colleagues also link human rights abuses with the 
absence of the rule of law, which lead, they say, to the recurrence of violence if not dealt with by the 
intervening force: Stromseth et al, above n27, p7.
23<’For example, Chamey sees the UN Charter and its collective security system as “central” to 
international law:” above nl82, at 543. Stromseth and her colleagues pick up both human rights and 
non-aggression: Stromseth et al, above n27, p26.
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However, it is not difficult to construe the latter in rights terms, especially as a right 
to intervene to protect against and punish human rights abuses.
It is concerning that international rule of law discourse, instead of conversing 
about the rule of law as an international mode of association, postulates it as “a 
universal mode of association,” affecting domestic as well as international law.“ In 
some ways this can reflect tensions within multicultural or multiethnic states, in 
which there may be multiple “micro rule of law” societies within a state, but the 
peacekeeping mission is seen as ‘harmonising’ them under the overarching 
system. The international rule of law cannot exist coherently without the separate 
existence within its constituent states of a reasonably similar and consistent rule of 
law in its dominant features. States which choose not to, or unable to, comply with 
the international standard are subjected to pressure to reform their systems or 
otherwise treated as pariah states. It is the essence of Waldron’s demand for “general 
public norms” to have a system of law, which may operate within the rule of law. 
That is the reason why international human rights law attempts to impose an external 
universality of principle; without it, international law is incapable of demonstrating 
an internal coherence of principle and the rule of law. In this sense, coherence 
requires the exclusion of non-conforming states as full and equal participants in the 
international sphere.
A comparison with the early Islamic siyar, a branch of religious law 
regulating the relations of the Islamic state with non-Islamic communities external to 
it, and, as tolerated religious minorities within it, is instructive. It too attempted to 
resolve the problem of creating an ordered and universal world society.240 Where the 
modem state arguably now exists to facilitate the exercise of self-determined 
sovereignty by its population and to protect and facilitate their human rights, Islam 
and the siyar conceived of the state as a means to achieve an ultimate religious
227Nardin, above n 10, at 401.
27xPlunkett, above n30, pp211-2. Demonstrating the importance of Plunkett’s harmonisation, the 
decision of the Pakistani government to allow such a ‘micro rule of law’ within its territory, by 
permitting the introduction of Shariah courts in the northern Swat Valley in April 2009 without appeal 
to the Pakistani High or Supreme Courts, was heavily criticised as fostering insecurity in Pakistan: for 
example, Farhan Bokhari, ‘Judicial Independence for Swat Threatens Integrity of Pakistan,’ Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, 22 April 2009, p5. The need for consistency for security at domestic level reflects the 
contradictions of the international rule of law.
279Waldron described such norms as being identified “in the name of the whole society:” above n38, at 
24.
240Khadduri, above n52, p3.
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objective.241 As a result, the siyar divided the world into the dar al-Isläm (the house 
or territory of Islam) and the dar al-harb (the ‘territory of war’). The communities of 
the dar al-harb were regarded as being in a ‘state of nature,’ lacking legal 
competence to enter into equal and reciprocal intercourse with Islam because they 
failed to conform to its ethical and legal standards. Necessarily, legal arrangements 
with the dar al-harb were to be temporary, because the territories were not 
recognised as legal entities in Islamic law.“ ” The law of war (jihad) was the siyar ’s 
chosen means of interface between the two worlds. Its purpose was to preserve the 
integrity and internal coherence of the Islamic rule of law by managing domestic 
relations in other States with which it dealt.
In the modem, secular law of nations it is human rights, rather than war, 
which are accepted in international discourse as the “mediator” between national and 
international rules of law.243 Dialogue about the content of instrumental rules does 
not require that there be an absence of disagreement about the content of human 
rights as the value which international law uses as the measure of the rule of law. 
Indeed the absence of discussion or criticism would indicate a withering of the rule 
of law relationship.244 However, there must be a modicum of agreement about the 
manner in which human rights is to govern the international order, including among 
state participants -  that is the minimum necessary understanding of the “public 
good” which the participants of a legal system agree is the outcome of its 
instrumental rules. Glennon is thus correct when he asserts that “consensus is 
necessary as to both ends and means” for the rule of law,245 but consensus need not 
necessarily equal uniformity.
1.7.1 Universality and Uniformity in Rights Practice
Lack of total uniformity among participants in international law has long 
been accepted as a systemic feature, although early Western cases justified it with
241 Ibid, p5.
242Ibid, ppl2-3, reference omitted.
24?Nardin, above nlO, at 399, referring to Gerry Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’ (2001) 12 EJIL 537, 
although they recognize on-going dispute as to its content and even “whether it is the proper 
mediator.”
244Summers, above nl3, at 128, in the context of domestic rule of law where he ascribes the critic’s 
role to the “special clientele” of the rule of law: lawyers, judges, law students and legal academics. 
245Glennon, above n67, p i75.
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arguments about cultural superiority.246 While such explicit arguments have fallen by 
the wayside in post-1945 international law, there remains scope for differentiation in 
the application of the agreed instrumental rules.
What legalist rule of law theorists tend to overlook in international law is the 
on-going conversation which has always existed about the underlying principle, or 
the non-instrumental rules, governing international relations. It was not until the 
Thirty Years War and the 1648 Peace o f Westphalia that sovereignty supplanted 
religion as the organising principle of international relations.247 The modem reliance 
on human rights has also led to suggestions that they may emerge as the new 
organising principle in international legal society.^ The recognition of human rights 
now, and indeed the older recognition of sovereign supremacy, as the public good 
which the international rule of law is to achieve, does not stand in the way of the 
change in the principled basis of the rule of law internationally as time passes and 
society develops. Kleinfeld, while accepting that new rule of ends “can be 
discovered,” suggests that the process occurs through “reinterpretation or re­
emphasis of old ideas,” albeit in a lengthy process.249 This is consistent with her view 
of the rule of law as a set of ends, but not necessarily of the rule of law as a 
relationship. It cannot be impossible, whether likely or not, for there to be altogether 
new ideas added as non-instrumental rules.
1.7.2 The National /  International Interface
Critics o f international law as a rule o f law system focus not on the concepts 
agreed as the foundation of the law-based relationship between participants in the 
system, but on the system’s institutional forms. This is a carry-over from the 
misplaced preoccupation o f rule of law thinking with institutional formalism. To
246Sir William Scott declared that the “inhabitants of those countries [in the Ottoman Empire] are not 
professors of exactly the same law with ourselves; in consideration of the peculiarities of their 
situation and character, the Court has repeatedly expressed a disposition not to hold them bound to the 
utmost rigour of that system of public law, on which European states have so long acted, in their 
intercourse with each other:” The Madonna del Burso (1802) 4C Rob 169, High Court of the 
Admiralty. A similar comment was made with respect to Algeria by the same judge in The Fortuna 
(1803) 2C Rob 92. See also Khadduri, above n52, p66.
247Glennon, above n67, p i49.
24x“In the 21st century human rights will be the fundamental basis for defining international relations,” 
the Polish Foreign Minister declared during NATO’s intervention in Kosovo: Barton Gellman and 
Steven Mufson, ‘Humanitarian War: Conflict Tests a Paradigm of Values-Based International 
Action,’ Washington Post, 6 June 1999, at A20.
24,Kleinfeld, above n36, p36.
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some extent this is unavoidable, since the crystallisation of the rule of law 
relationship must be “institutionalized in rule making processes, in rules, in 
interpretative and applicational methodologies, and in processes of judicial and other 
enforcement.” The error is in assuming that those institutional forms are self- 
evidently the institutional forms of the rule of law. Thus, political realism misses its 
mark when arguing there can never be an international rule of law because the 
standard institutional forms of mandatory legislature and binding courts do not exist. 
These institutional forms are not “contingently necessary.” This is distinct from
9^9
legal realism which argues, as above, that law itself is “conceptually impossible.” 
The attraction of the approach is the scope it offers to quantify objectively the rule of 
law.253
More importantly, political realism is not consonant with the universal self- 
consciousness or self-awareness of international law and its actors as to the rule of 
law as a conscious restraint on action and an ideal to be achieved; nor is it consonant 
with the notion of the rule of law as a process. Further, the institutionalist, realist 
view struggles to put aside the existing features of the international legal system and 
deal with the distinction between the definition of a legal system (ie a prerequisite for 
the rule of law), and an assessment of its efficacy.254
International law’s self-awareness of its instrumental rules -  its definition of 
the public good as the observation of normative human rights guarantees -  is evident 
in the concept of ius cogens. Ius cogens are distinguishable from ordinary principles 
of law, because they are said to originate in natural law, and therefore to be 
universally applicable and self-evidently binding.“ There can be no derogation from
250Summers, above nl3, at 129. Compare Chesterman, who criticises the “primitive” character of the 
Declaration on Principles o f International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter o f the United Nations, adopted by UN General 
Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (1970), UN Doc. A/5217 25 GAOR Supp (No 28) (1970) and the 
Millenium Declaration, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 55/2 (2000), UN Doc. 
A/RES/55/2 (2000), which challenge rule of law formalism by questioning “whether the process of 
international rule-making can itself be said to be governed by laws.” He demonstrates this through the 
“voluntary jurisdiction” of international judicial institutions and the “myth” of sovereign equality: 
Chesterman, above n7, at 357.
25lNardin, above nlO, at 391, 398.
252Ibid, at 391.
253Compare Norton Moore’s desire to end “the seemingly neutral ‘even handed cop-out’ that portrays 
all government structures as equally advantageous or appropriate:” Norton Moore, above n87, at 851. 
254Nardin, above nlO, at 398.
255Chamey, above nl82, at 540.
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them, not even by persistent objection.256 Although non-instrumental rules must be 
exempt from objection in a rule of law community, the international existence of the 
persistent objector rule is indicative of the dialogue between participants which is the 
essence of the rule of law system -  objection by participants in legal discourse. It is
9 S7the instrumentality of the system which ultimately determines the outcome, 
reminiscent of ‘ordered liberty.’ To universalise legitimacy, there have been other 
changes in the recognition and formation of international law, including the shift to 
“more structured” multilateral fora away from the “traditional” means of forming and 
identifying customary law in individual state practice and opinio iuris.
Where there is military, political or financial intervention by a foreign 
State, ' the internal social dialogue as to the rule of law is disrupted, perpetuating 
the apparent need for intervention to resolve rule of law collapse. Where the mandate 
for intervention comes from the UN, further difficulties arise because of the status of 
the UN as an intervener. When States intervene in other States, the universality of 
human rights law at least purports to impose a common standard which all 
interveners are bound by their own obligation to observe (if not necessarily enforce). 
The UN, on the other hand, is a non-State body which has increasingly “assumed 
State-like functions,” including transitional administrations, while its obligations 
under human rights laws are unclear. There is little judicial authority clarifying the 
point, or indeed any aspect of validity of Security Council action, although the 
International Court of Justice held by majority that it’s jurisdiction was not displaced
9 /in
by subsequent Security Council Resolutions in the Lockerbie Case.
Intervention poses this conundrum for international law: the international rule 
of law cannot exist without a compatible domestic rule of law system in each of its
256Cassese argues, alone, that the so-called persistent objector rule should apply to rules of ius cogens. 
If accepted, states that pressed persistent objection in a timely manner to emergent norms would not 
be bound to comply with that norm as of law: Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided 
World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, p i78. This leads some international lawyers to identify a 
legislative, norm-creating capacity in the international community, albeit not located in a single 
institution: Chamey, above nl82, at 542.
257Ibid, at 540, references omitted.
25sIbid, at 543 and 550, and see generally in support Thomas M. Franck, The Power o f Legitimacy 
Among Nations, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990.
259Identified as a cause of state disruption: Saikal, above n221, p22.
260Questions o f Interpretation and Application o f the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States o f America) (Preliminary 
Objections) (1998) ICJ Rep 115 (Judgment of 27 February 1998). The case offers only modest 
support to judicial review of Security Council action.
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constituent units, and therefore authorises intervention to procure a domestic rule of 
law capable of supporting the rule of law internationally (rather than for the pure 
domestic good). However, by intervening to create the rule of law, international law 
destroys it in the bud because the rule of law can only emerge internally in its subject 
community. In principle, “if the rule of law is a mode of association among free 
persons, natural or artificial, the rule of law among states is compatible with 
authoritarian or managerial rule within each state,” but the instrumental rules of 
international law are predicated on a public good which does not allow that. Even the 
emphasis of Stromseth and her colleagues in describing the third feature of their 
“synergistic” approach to rule of law efforts as the “deeply political” nature of rule of 
law reform and the need to understand the interaction and effect of activities at all 
social levels for the projected society, does not resolve the fundamental 
contradiction of the international rule of law.
1.8 Conclusion
Chesterman recognises the rule of law as international political idealism, but 
not “normative reality” given the conduct of much international relations in 
diplomatic rather than legal forms.263 However, it is conceptually possible to concede 
several points. International law could be law. It could and does demonstrate non­
instrumental rules governing the conduct of the relationship between the governed 
(individuals and States) and the system.264 Further, these non-instrumental rules 
currently but not immutably emphasise individual human rights. Finally, the system 
currently recognises certain institutional forms, but this too is not immutable. 
Understanding the rule of law as an on-going relationship -  in this case, a self- 
conscious sequence of attempting to perfect domestic rule of law in order to improve 
the international rule of law -  does not require us to take this drastic step.
26lNardin, above nlO, at 399.
262Stromseth et al, above n27, pp81-3.
263Chesterman, above n7, at 360, reference omitted.
264Even this is currently under pressure from the globalisation of trade and commerce because it 
reorders states and private legal personalities such as corporations in the concept of justiciability, by 
allowing the latter to bring international actions against states: see The Hon Sir Anthony Mason, AC, 
KBE, ‘The rule of law and economic transactions’ in Spencer Zifcak (Ed), Globalisation and the Rule 
o f Law, Routledge, London, 2005 (pi 21), pi 28.
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C H A P T E R  TWO
THE GENERAL LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF AN 
OCCUPANT AS TO THE DOMESTIC RULE OF LAW
One of the most recent examples of intervention in domestic judicial systems 
with a view to creating the rule of law, at least in part, began with the US-led 
occupation of Iraq in 2003-04.1 2*Aside from the long-standing Israeli occupation of 
the West Bank and other Palestinian territories, it was the first exercise of a 
belligerent occupation in many years where the occupant has been self-consciously 
so following invasion, and also attempted explicitly to create the ‘rule of law’ 
through domestic intervention in day to day judicial institutions.4 As the rule of law,
'The occupation commenced with the securing of control over Iraq in May 2003 and concluded with 
the handover of legislative power to the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004, a period of 
approximately one year. The rule of law through representative democracy was one of the goals 
identified by the occupants to the UN Security Council: Letter dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent 
Representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/538), p2.
2In this thesis, the “West Bank” encompasses the occupied area referred to in Israel as “Judea and 
Samaria,” reflecting its historical antecedents and the rejection of the Jordanian claim of sovereignty: 
Adam Roberts, ‘Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories since 1967’ (1990) 
84 AJIL 44, at 59. It is important to note that the application of occupation law in the Israeli- 
administered areas of the West Bank and other Palestinian areas is disputed between an international 
majority, including the UN General Assembly, which consider that it applies as of law, and the State 
of Israel, which asserts that it applies only by Israeli consent, since it argues that the areas in question 
were never lawfully part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, therefore were never ‘enemy territory’ 
and were not ‘occupied’ in 1967: Justice Haim Cohen, ‘Introduction’, The Rule of Law in the Areas 
Administered by Israel, Israel National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Tel Aviv, 
1981, p.vii. For a summation of the Israeli argument regarding the applicability of occupation law in 
various territories under its control as of policy only, see further Roberts, ibid, at 61 et seq.
2In several other post-World War Two situations, the international community has decided that a de 
facto occupation has been in effect, including South Africa’s presence in Namibia after the 
termination of its UN mandate in 1966: Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 
[1971] ICJ Rep 16 (Advisory Opinion of 21 June) (Namibia Case) and see further Roberts, ibid, at 49. 
Roberts traces the recognition of occupation by Turkey in northern Cyprus since 1974, Moroccan 
forces in Western Sahara in 1975, and Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea in 1978 by the General 
Assembly but not always consistently: at 50-1, and the references he cites.
4For example through the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, discussed further below. In other 
occupations, but particularly in Namibia, the international community through the UN General 
Assembly have indicated a desire for change to domestic structures to facilitate self-determination: 
Namibia Case; and see further Roberts, ibid, at 49. The ICJ in the Namibia Case considered that 
multilateral conventions “of a humanitarian character” would be binding on South Africa in its 
occupation, potentially much wider than occupation law: paras 96, 122.
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properly understood, is a domestic relationship between subjects and their laws, and 
need not take any particular form, it is unsurprising that efforts to create the rule of 
law in Iraq, or better an Iraqi rule of law, have failed. There has been, however, some 
success in law and order reconstruction which focuses on certain practical and 
facilitative issues associated with preparing Iraq to participate in the ordinary 
provision of justice and thus in the international rule of law. This, it is argued, is the 
actual and intended focus of occupation law.
This chapter, preparatory to further analysis in the succeeding chapter of the 
specifics of judicial intervention during occupation, examines the general 
competence of the occupant to act in an occupied territory and the purposes for 
which international law confers that authority, particularly with respect to the rule of 
law and public order. These purposive provisions of occupation law act as significant 
limitations on the capacity of the occupant to effect permanent changes to domestic 
structures and law.
2.1 Belligerent and Non-Belligerent Occupation
The traditional academic distinction between a belligerent and a non­
belligerent occupation, and the legislative competence that should arise from them, 
can be put aside since agreement on Article 6 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV 
Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War (“Geneva IV”)5 which 
allows continued occupation after the cessation of hostilities, although in that case, 
“stringent measures against the civilian population will no longer be justified.”6 7In all 
other respects, the same law of occupation applies regardless of the means by which 
the occupant came to be in control of part or all of the territory of another state. The 
asserted illegality of an occupation, for example following unlawful aggressive war,
o
does not create a category of ‘illegal occupants,’ which attract no rights or powers.
512 August 1949, Geneva, 75 UNTS 287, entered into force 21 October 1950.
6The framers had in mind the post-war situation of Germany and Japan: Jean Pictet, The Geneva 
Conventions o f 1949: Commentary: Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection o f Civilian 
Persons in Time o f War, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1958, pp62-3.
7Roberts has created a “far from exhaustive” list of seventeen kinds of occupation, all with a common 
law of occupation: above n2, at 51.
^Compare I.P. Trainin, ‘Questions of Guerrilla Warfare in the Law of War’ (translated from Russian 
by Dr John N. Hazard and reprinted) (1946) 40 AJIL 534; and see further Palestinian arguments
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There is a variety of practice requiring states to apply occupation law regardless of 
the cause of their occupation. However, discussion as to whether different 
interpretations of occupation law ought to apply in the case of prolonged 
occupations, such as Israel in the Palestinian territories, permeates the discussion of 
the legislative competence of the occupant to re/construct a domestic rule of law.9
It has been recently argued strongly that occupation law should be applied in 
all circumstances of intervention, as an “international law regulating military 
presence in foreign territory.”10 Such a title obscures the limited jurisdictional scope 
of and the source of this body of law in the Geneva Conventions and its 
predecessors, the Annexe to 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and 
Customs o f War on Land: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs o f War on 
Land (“Hague Regulations”) and the historical customs of war* 11 - that is, the firm 
province of international humanitarian law. It also overlooks the extent to which an 
intervention under the authority of the UN Security Council may modify or adapt the 
position.12
summarised in Roberts, above n2, at 66, who thinks the suggestion “questionable” both on the facts of 
the Israeli situation but also the idea that a State may be bound by the obligations of a Convention but 
be unable to exercise rights granted by the same Convention. However, the assertion of a majority of 
Portuguese judges on the East Timorese Court of Appeal interpreting UNTAET Regulation 1 of 1999, 
the applicable law in East Timor was Portuguese law and not Indonesian law, since Indonesia had 
never lawfully been in occupation, caused significant difficulties there: P v Armando do Santos, p4, 
Court of Appeal, Case No: 16/PID.C.G./2001/PD.DL, 15 July 2003. The ruling was disputed in other 
decisions: see further Mohamed C. Othman, Accountability for International Humanitarian Law 
Violations: The Case o f Rwanda and East Timor, Springer, Berlin, 2005, p91.
9For example, Theodor Meron, ‘The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law’ (1987) 81 AJIL 348, at 
368. Feilchenfeld argues that for prolonged occupation, every field of law must come within the 
competence of the occupant: E.H. Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Belligerent 
Occupation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1942, pp86-7. Compare 
Kelly, who takes a more pragmatic approach of arguing that the “administrative responsibilities and 
pressures must increase with the relative duration of the occupation: Michael Kelly, Peace 
Operations: Tackling the Military, Legal and Policy Challenges, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1997, para 509. However, as the case of Iraq demonstrates, modem occupations 
will be controlled by the activity of the UN Security Council taking charge of situations threatening 
international peace and security under the aegis of Chapter VII of the Charter o f the United Nations, 
24 October 1945, San Francisco, 1 UNTS 41, entered into force 1 November 1945. 
l0Kelly, ibid, para 455.
11 Annexe to Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs o f War on Land: Regulations 
Respecting the Laws and Customs o f War on Land, 18 October 1907, The Hague, (1908) 2 AJIL 
Supplement 90-117, entered into force 26 January 1910; Geneva IV and with it Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection o f Victims o f International 
Armed Conflict, 1125 UNTS 3 (“Additional Protocol I”) and Protocol II Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions o f 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection o f Victims o f Non-International Armed 
Conflict, 1125 UNTS 609 (“Additional Protocol II”), both adopted 8 June 1977, Geneva and entered 
into force 7 December 1978. 
l2This is taken up in Chapter Four, see 4.2 et seq.
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2.2 The History and Sources of Occupation Law
The modem law of occupation begins with Article 43 of the Hague
1 T
Regulations, representative of customary international law, which provides that
L ’autorite du pouvoir legal ayant passe de fa it entre les mains de l ’occupant, celiu- 
ci prendra toutes les measures qui dependent de lui en vue de retablir et d ’assurer, 
autant qu ’il est possible, l ’ordre et la vie publique en respectant, sauf empechement 
absolu, les lois en vigueur dans le pays.
It is significant that the authentic language of the Hague Regulations is French, as 
there are some divergences in English translation, rendered as
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the 
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as 
far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting unless absolutely prevented, 
the laws in force in the country. 14
Limitations on the competence of the occupant were explained in more detail 
in the framing of Geneva IV,l ? whose key provision (Article 64) provides that:
The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception 
that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they 
constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present 
Convention. Subject to the latter consideration and to the necessity for ensuring the 
effective administration of justice, the tribunals of the occupied territory shall 
continue to function in respect of all offences covered by the said laws. The 
Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied territory to 
provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations 
under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, 
and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of 
the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines 
of communication used by them.
Article 64’s emphasis on the criminal justice system reflects the negotiators’ 
concerns about the conduct of previous occupations and their decision that there
13 Trial o f the Major German War Criminals (1946) CMD 6964, Misc No 12, at 65, affirmed in US v 
von Leeb (“The High Command Case”) (1948) 11 TWC 10, at 462; The King v Maung Hmin [1946] 
Ann Dig, Case No 139 (High Court of Burma, 11 March 1946); Taik v Ariff Moosejee Dooply and 
Anor [1948] Ann Dig, Case No 191 (High Court of Burma, 23 June 1948) and Austrian Treasury 
(Postal Administration) v Auer [1947] Ann Dig, Case No 125 (Supreme Court First Division, Austria, 
1 October 1947). Early disputes, for example, the finding of the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East that the Hague Regulations were “good evidence of,” but not necessarily exactly reflective 
of, custom (In re Hirota [1948] Ann Dig, Case No 118 (International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East, Tokyo, 12 November 1948), at 366) have been conclusively overruled for occupation law by the 
ICJ’s view in Legal Consequences o f the Construction o f a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep (Advisory Opinion of 9 July), para 89.
l4Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (Eds), Documents on the Laws o f War, 3rd Edn, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp68, 81. 
l5Pictet, above n6, p335.
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should be but two exceptions to the general principle of non-interference in, or 
continuity of, the domestic legal system: the occupant’s security, as previously 
allowed by Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and which is explicitly included, and 
the “interests of the population which makes it possible to abrogate any 
discriminatory measures incompatible with humane requirements,” in particular 
discriminatory measures contrary to the spirit of Geneva IV.16
Otherwise, the necessities of “the administration of justice” govern 
intervention for the three identified purposes only: again security, “orderly 
government” and the protection of the occupant’s facilities, which also tie directly to 
security. Pictet considered all other interference in the penal system, “in particular, 
merely to make it accord with [the occupant’s] own legal conceptions” prohibited, 
unless domestic judicial officials refuse to continue in office, as permitted by Article 
56 of Geneva IV. In that case expedient intervention in the creation of courts or
17
appointment of judges would be permitted.
2.2.1 The General Legislative Competence o f the Occupant
Neither Geneva IV nor the Hague Regulations employ the term ‘sovereignty’ 
for the powers granted to an occupant, which one would expect if the grant of 
administrative, legislative and judicial power were complete. The “authority of the 
legitimate power” posited by Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and the three 
grounds of legislative competence in Article 64, Geneva IV, are less than the 
“sovereignty” of the original State. That is a natural consequence of the law of 
occupation being a temporary solution to the determination of the locus of 
sovereignty, which would revert to the original State (the reversioner), pass 
permanently to the occupant in case of cession or invest in a new, self-
l6Ibid, p335. The term “penal laws” was intended to include all substantive and procedural laws and 
regulations applying in the occupied area. See also Edi Gnesa, Die von Israel besetzten Gebiete im 
Völkerrecht: Eine besetzungsrechtliche Analyse, Schweizer Studien zum Internationalen Recht Band 
25, Zürich, 1981, p 142. 
l7Pictet, ibid, p336.
lxThe traditional view that the occupied territory may pass to the occupant in the case of debellatio, “a 
complete collapse of the enemy coupled with subjugation, exercised through annexation” must now be 
dismissed, with the characterisation of annexation of land by conquest as unlawful. What is left is 
cession by treaty. See, for example, Allan Gerson, ‘Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel’s 
Presence in the West Bank' (1973) 14 Han> Inti LJ 1, at 6. Gerson also argues that sovereignty may 
pass peacefully by “prescription, a state of occupation which is continuous, uninterrupted, and 
peaceful, provided that all other interested and affected parties have acquiesced in this exercise of 
authorities.” Historically, sovereignty was not thought to transfer until the conclusion of hostilities:
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determinative State on resolution of the conflict or non-belligerent dispute giving rise 
to the occupation. However, the legitimacy of at least some legislation on the part of 
the occupant means that the reversioner “must not abrogate at will” that legislation, 
for example, by purportedly retroactive blanket declaration, although it may rescind 
retroactively particular regulations in the exercise of its sovereign authority.19
While occupation law both confers powers and limits them, the overall effect 
of the Hague Regulations and Geneva IV is proscriptive. The Article 64 grant to 
“maintain the orderly government of the territory” would be extensive but for 
limitations imposed by succeeding clauses which prohibit retro-active “penal 
provisions;” allow the establishment of “properly constituted, non-political military 
courts” (but which are not to be special courts) applying the provisions of law 
applicable “prior to the offence;” limit the death penalty for security offences; and 
prohibit prosecution “by the Occupying Power” for acts committed before the 
occupation. Article 47 of Geneva IV additionally provides that civilians in the 
occupied territory “shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, 
of the benefits of the present convention by any change introduced, as the result of 
the occupation of the territory, into the institutions or government of the said 
territory.”
It has been argued that the limitations on the occupant’s powers are in the 
nature of a trust or usufruct. Both views are problematic. Trusteeship as an ordinary 
principle of common law is the non-beneficial holding of complete authority for the 
benefit of another, and is inconsistent with occupation in which the occupant 
usually asserts a claim of sovereignty on its own part or on the part of a body other 
than the sovereign but is unable to exercise sovereignty of any kind until the status of
Hugo Grotius, de Jure Belli ac Pads Libri Tres, 1625 (translated Francis W. Kelsey, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1925), Book 3, Chapter VIII.1.3; Davis Goodman, ‘The Need for Fundamental Change in the 
Law of Belligerent Occupation’ (1984-5) 37 Stan LR 1573, at 1576.
19Felice Morgenstern, ‘Validity o f the Acts of the Belligerent Occupant’ (1951) 28 BYBIL 291, at 298, 
finding a “remarkable agreement” among commentators but little state practice.
20Articles 65, 66, 68 and 70 respectively; see further Pictet, above n6, pp340-l.
2'Roberts argues that “some idea of ‘trusteeship’ is implicit in occupation law anyway,” for example 
in economic rules in the Hague Regulations (Article 48-56): above n2, at 68; Gerson advocates a 
complete trust-based view of occupation, above nl8, while Kelly and von Glahn prefer usufruct: 
Kelly, above n9, para 509; Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary 
on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation, University o f Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
1957, pp31-7.
22See, for example, P.H. Pettit, Equity and the Law o f Trusts, 8th Edn, Butterworths, London, 1997, 
p24, noting that the beneficiaries of the trust may include the trustee or a charitable purpose. Gerson 
applies a similar concept to the law of occupation, above nl 8.
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the occupied territory is finally resolved. Further, even where occupation law is 
attempted to be applied to UN mandated interventions, sovereignty in the subject 
territory is “in abeyance” until the people are recognised as “an independent state 
[where] ... sovereignty will revive and vest in the new state.”24
Characterising the powers of the occupant as those of a usufructuary is also a 
broad claim, since rights of usufruct encompass rights to exploit.“ Certain 
usufructuary rights are explicitly conferred by Article 55, Hague Regulations for the 
lease or use of public buildings and lands,“ and national natural resources, a typical 
property-based right. This specific inclusion, however, tends to suggest that the 
excluded reference to usufruct in other senses is indicative of their lack of 
application. Further, the rights conferred allow the occupant to make use of certain 
resources for the purpose of its occupation, that is, as an administrator of the 
territory, but not for unconditional self-enrichment.
The better view is that there is limited, temporary and purposive grant of 
legislative authority which relies on the preservation of key aspects of the status quo 
ante pending resolution of sovereignty. It is truly a ‘de facto’ transfer rather than a 
legal transfer of administrative power.“ This accords with the specific construction 
of the Hague Regulations and Geneva IV. Article 68 of Geneva IV, for example, 
makes clear that the occupant does not exercise sovereignty because it prohibits the 
occupant from imposing certain death penalties; while Article 47 “demonstrates 
the intention of the parties that the municipal courts in the occupied country -  and, 
moreover, the occupant’s own courts, shall protect certain rights of the inhabitants 
which are guaranteed to them by that Convention, and shall treat as unenforceable
9 0
laws of the occupant which violate these rights.”
230n which, see further Chapter Four, below.
24International Status o f South West Africa [1950] ICJ Rep 128 (Advisory Opinion of 11 July), per 
Lord McNair at 50; Namibia Case, above n3, at 28-9; Gerson, above nl 8, at 26 et seq.
25L.F.E. Goldie, ‘Title and Use (and Usufruct) -  An Ancient Distinction Too Oft Forgot’ (1985) 79 
AJIL 689, at 693.
26Feilchenfeld, above n9, at 55. Article 55 provides that “The occupying State shall be regarded only 
as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates 
belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of 
these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.”
27Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, above n2, pi.
2xSee further Morgenstern, above nl9, at 302.
29Ibid, at 304.
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In practice, the grant of competence to the occupant is greater than the 
limitations imposed by occupation law in one significant respect. Occupation 
authorities assert a competence to determine which law is in force in the occupied 
area at the moment of occupation, thereby self-defining limits on their capacity to 
intervene. This is not an area of competence explicitly recognised in Article 64, 
Geneva IV, or in the Hague Regulations. On occasion this has caused dispute with 
the domestic legal community, for example Palestinian lawyers have argued that the 
law in force declared by the Israeli administration was not in fact the law in force at 
the time of occupation, but have been unable to persuade Israeli military courts that 
there is a right of review of the declaration.
2.2.2 Rejecting the Full Transfer o f Domestic Legislative Competence
The Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, 
comprising mainly legal officers in the Israeli Armed Forces Reserve, argues that 
“Tautorite du pouvoir legal” in Article 43 is broader than its rendition as “the 
authority of the power of the State,” meaning rather “all the powers deriving from the 
local law of the occupied territory.”31 What the distinction appears to suggest is a 
subtle difference between what international law identifies as rights and law-making 
powers attributable to a sovereign State, only some of which are conferred on the 
occupant, and powers that might already be invested in the government under the 
domestic law of the occupied State, all of which are said to be conferred on the 
occupant because it stands as de facto administrator in the shoes of its predecessor. It
30Israel Defence Forces Proclamation 2/1967 preserved the extant law which did not conflict with 
proclamations or “to the changes resulting from the establishment of the rule” of the Israeli Defence 
Force, clarified to be the British Defence Emergency Regulations of 1945: see further Gerson, above 
nl8, at 13. However, Palestinian lawyers argued that the Regulations were considered repealed in 
1950 and replaced by the Jordanian Criminal Code 1951. A submission to this effect before a military 
court was rejected and the matter supposedly clarified with the issue of another executive order from 
the occupying administration that the Regulations were to be considered the law in force: Raja 
Shehadeh and Jonathan Kuttab, The West Bank and the Rule o f  Law, The International Commission of 
Jurists, Geneva, 1980, p24, citing Article 2, Order 224. For the Israeli view, see Israeli National 
Section of the International Commission of Jurists, above n2, p67.
31 Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, ibid, p2. Schwarzenberger agrees 
that the French has been “freely, if hardly accurately” rendered: G. Schwarzenberger, International 
Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Vol II: The Law of Armed Conflict, Stevens 
and Sons, London, 1968, p i80.
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would permit the exercise of domestic authorities for the occupant’s own benefit, for
32example, the authority to expropriate land.
The Israeli argument would necessarily preclude powers to amend or alter 
laws, for whatever motive, which did not exist domestically, for example in the case 
of a constitutional prohibition on the establishment of special or ad hoc courts or the 
conferral of judicial power on bodies not recognised as courts. This would 
contradict the express authorisation in Geneva IV for the occupant to establish 
military courts administering security offences in the territory, as well as the 
requirement to observe local laws as in force “unless absolutely prevented.” Further, 
the view presupposes the full passage of the sovereign’s domestic authority, yet 
custom is firm that sovereignty does not pass to the occupant. The de facto passage 
of administrative powers,34 recognised internationally, does not reach the same point 
as the Israeli argument seems to assert.
In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Regulation 1, specifically 
drawing on “relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 
(2003), and the laws and usages of war” in its prefatory recitations, claimed 
temporary “powers of government ... in order to provide for the effective 
administration of Iraq.”2,5 There is nothing surprising nor inconsistent with 
occupation law in this pronouncement. The ambit assertion of powers also included 
“all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives, to 
be exercised under relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 
1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war.”36 Nor is this colourable, except to the 
extent that it does not elaborate the limitations on the exercise of such powers which 
are the chief concern of the Hague Regulations and Geneva IV.
32See for example Yaron Butovsky, ‘Law of Belligerent Occupation: Israeli Practice and Judicial 
Decisions Affecting the West Bank’ (1983) 21 Can YBIL 217, at 233, discussing land requisitions for 
Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank.
23For example, the Australian constitution provides that the “judicial power of the Commonwealth” is 
to be exercised only by courts established in accordance with Chapter III, a requirement producing a 
history of confusion regarding the status of disciplinary tribunals for the Australian Defence Force, 
most recently in Lane v Morrison [2009] HCA 29 (26 August 2009).
34Butovsky, above n32, at 218. There is some dispute in Israeli jurisprudence about whether the 
Orders of the military government of the occupied areas are ‘law’ or executive acts, arising from a 
domestic issue of justiciability, however Article 64 at least is clear that the occupant may ‘repeal or 
suspend’ penal laws, and must therefore have a legislative competence, however limited. The central 
Israeli case is Hilu v Government o f Israel (1973) Vol 27, Part 2 Piskei Din, summarised in English in 
(1975) 5 Isr YBHR 384.
35Section 1(1), Coalition Provisional Authority ( “CPA ”) Regulation 7(16 May 2003).
36Section 1(2), CPA Regulation 1.
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2.3 Purposive Limitations on the Competence of the Occupant
Geneva IV, against the background of the Hague Regulations, specifies the 
purposive limitations that define the legislative competence of the occupant. They 
have been held to mean that institutional change in an occupied territory is to
o n
originate in a “concern for security and public safety.” The primary boundaries are 
the subject matter requirements of the occupant’s security and the minimum required 
for the “administration of justice,” which both draw on the specific terms of Article 
64; and the background necessity of “Vordre publique” and the observation of 
existing law “unless absolutely prevented,” which together with the obligation to 
“restore” Vordre publique call strongly to the status quo ante, contrary to a more 
modem mood of humanitarian intervention to change domestic legal structures.
2.3.1 Competence Regarding the Occupant ’s Security
Both Hague and Geneva law explicitly refer to security as a ground for 
legislative competence, but whether it is an enabler or a limit is arguable in some 
respects. The breadth of ‘security’ has been traditionally subjected to a test of 
military necessity, where the need to observe local law “unless absolutely prevented” 
meant amendments to domestic law would be permitted where required by the
o o
necessities of war or for the maintenance of public order. The legislative 
competence conferred by Article 64 of Geneva IV supports this view by permitting 
provisions to “maintain the ‘orderly government of the territory’ in its capacity as the 
power responsible for public law and order” and enact “penal provisions for its own 
protection.”39
The practical problem of a necessity-based view of occupation law is that 
practice has traditionally oscillated around a domestic right of review for specific 
measures said to be required by security. Often, no right of judicial review where the 
measure is prima facie necessary has been upheld, although review may be exercised
yiV v O [1947] Ann Dig, Case No 121 (Court of First Instance, Corfu, 163/1947), where the court 
found that Article 43 only allowed changes to the extant law for the safety of the occupying force; 
Butovsky, above n32, at 222.
38Miliaire v Germany (1923) 2 MAT 715; Ville d'Anvers v Germany (1925) 5 MAT 716, both 
decisions of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, see Kelly, above n9, para 512. More recently, an order 
regarding a property dispute which had no impact on military considerations was rescinded in Sabu v 
Military Governor o f Jaffa [1949] Ann Dig, Case No 166 (High Court of Justice, Israel, 6 September 
1949).
39Pictet, above n6, p337.
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over regulations patently beyond the scope of the occupant’s authority.40 Cases 
arising from German and Allied occupations during World War Two in particular 
took this view; only in some cases, and only obiter, did judges consider that the right 
of review might apply in all cases.41 Although Israel has attempted to overcome this 
difficulty for the rule of law by permitting access to its own courts for review,42 this 
is not required and is not a widespread measure. Further, after cessation of the 
occupation, regulations found invalid nonetheless have led in some cases to the 
accrual of individual rights and binding administrative decisions during the period of 
their supposed validity.43 This must be a consequence of the formalist quest for 
certainty in the rule of law.
Where measures are prima facie related to the occupant’s security, the 
population is obliged to obey them just as they are obliged to continue to observe the 
municipal laws of their state, including those modified by the occupant.44 This too
40Overtuming a decision of the Court of First Instance in Hebron that the Military Commander could 
not make an order allowing Israeli lawyers to appear before West Bank courts, the Ramallah Court of 
Appeal decided that “the occupying power is the proper authority to decide whether or not there exists 
a necessity to make any amendment or addition to the laws in force in the occupied region”: 
Muhammad Amin al-Ja’bari v Ahman Ya’qub ‘Abd al-Karim al-Awiwi (1968) 42 Inti L Rep 484 
(Court of Appeal, Ramallah, 17 June 1968). See further Morgenstern, above nl9, at 306, 320 and the 
references he canvasses; and Butovsky, above n32, at 227.
‘’The Dutch Supreme Court found the legality of legislative acts non-justiciable in In re Jurisdiction 
of the Dutch Supreme Court for Economic Matters [1919-42] Ann Dig Supplementary Volume, Case 
No 161 (Supreme Court, Netherlands, 12 January 1942), and the Dutch government suspended 
members of the Court on its return to authority. A general right of review was asserted in Re 
Contractor Knots [1946] Ann Dig, Case No 144 (Special Court of Cassation, Holland). There is 
supportive Norwegian authority for the proposition in Overland’s Case [1943-5] Ann Dig, Case No 
156 (District Court of Aker, 25 August 1943) but ultimately the court found it unnecessary to 
pronounce on a general right of judicial review since the impugned allodial laws were “obviously in 
contradiction” to Article 43; instead, the court said that the occupant must show a compelling reason 
to set aside domestic law, and may not do so where the purpose can be achieved by another means. 
The Greek Court of Cassation put aside the judgment of a German military court on the basis that the 
laws of Greece had not been respected as required by Article 43: In re S [1943-5] Ann Dig, Case No 
150 (Court of Cassation, Greece, 255/1944), as did the Reichsgericht, setting aside US regulations 
affecting legal relations between citizens in the Rhineland because they were outside the scope of 
Article 43: Armistice Agreement (Coblenz) Case [1919-22] Ann Dig, Case No 305 (Reichsgericht in 
Civil Matters, 10 April 1921).
42Butovsky, above n 32, at 219.
AyKloet v Klok (1947) Nederlandse Jurisprudence, No 38 (Supreme Court of Holland), in the case of 
an ordinance declared invalid on reversion. See further Morgenstern, above nl9, at 313, and the 
similar cases of the same period he discusses. Compare instances where commentators and courts 
have refused to enforce acts of the occupant which are prohibited under the Hague Regulations: 
Morgenstern, ibid, at 320; Butovsky, ibid, at 227; Muhammad Amin al-Ja’bari v Ahman Ya’qub ‘Abd 
al-Karim al-Awiwi (1968) 42 Inti L Rep 484 (Court of Appeal, Ramallah, 17 June 1968).
440ne point of view casts these as separate duties arising from international and municipal law 
respectively’ although this view is not popular and most commentators see no distinction: Major 
Richard B. Baxter, ‘The Duty of Obedience to the Belligerent Occupant’ (1950) 27 BYBIL 235, at 
239-41 and the literature he reviews. Oppenheim, however, sees the inhabitant’s duty as to his own 
laws, which supports an indirect only duty of obedience to the occupant: L. Oppenheim, ‘The Legal
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provides a level of certainty for the inhabitants, favoured by rule of law formalists.45 
However, national judicial practice reserved the right to resist the occupation in the 
aftermath of World War Two,46 and concluded that the authority given to the 
occupant in Article 43 to legislate was not matched by an equivalent compulsion on 
individuals, and so the political charge of collaboration could be met with a defence 
only of force majeure -  the purpose of Article 43, said the Dutch Court of Cassation, 
was to limit the activity of the sovereign not to control the conscience of the 
occupied.47 However, the Special Criminal Court of The Hague found in a separate 
case that where Article 43 powers were exercised “exclusively” for the benefit of the
48subjects of the occupation, obligations might be created.
2.3.2 Competence to Facilitate the Administration o f Justice ”
Aside from its assertions of legislative competence to intervene in domestic 
systems on humanitarian grounds, Article 64 specifically provides that domestic 
tribunals are to be free from interference unless necessary for the application of 
Geneva IV provisions or the “administration of justice.” The latter term is not 
defined in Article 64 itself. Other provisions regarding the administration of penal 
laws suggest a limited, pragmatic competence on the part of the occupant to 
intervene, outside matters directly affecting their own security (for which they are 
permitted to establish military courts).
Relations between an Occupying Power and the Inhabitants’ (1917) 33 LQR 366. Along with concepts 
such as war treason and war rebellion, Baxter concludes that the Geneva Conventions replace the need 
for any notion of a duty of obedience to the occupant, at 266, but there is some value remaining in the 
idea to the extent that it illuminates the validity of the occupant’s interference in the domestic legal 
system, beyond his security needs.
45Baxter, ibid, at 264.
46For example, In re Rauter [1948] Ann Dig, Case No 131 (Special Court (War Criminals), Holland, 4 
May 1948); In re Bruns et al [1946] Ann Dig, Case No 167 (Eidsivating Lagmannsrett (Court of 
Appeal), Norway, 20 March 1946), which found that international law had not been violated by the 
resistance, although it may have violated certain provisions of local law under the occupant; In re 
Flesch (1946-8) 4 War Crimes Reports 115 (Frostating Lagmannsrett, Norway, 12 February 1948); 
and In re List et al (Hostages Case) (1948) 8 War Crimes Reports 34, where the US Military Tribunal 
allowed that armed resistance may permit the occupation authorities to impose a penalty on fighters as 
war criminals, although Baxter allows that its decision is more in terms of a “punishment permitted by 
international law than it is of a punishment imposed by international law.” See Baxter, ibid, at 256-7, 
emphasis original; and Morgenstern, above nl9, at 293-4.
47In re Contractor Worp [1946] Ann Dig, Case No 145 (Special Court of Cassation, Netherlands, 15 
July 1946); In re van Huis [1946] Ann Dig, Case No 143 (Special Criminal Court, The Hague, 15 
November 1946); Baxter, ibid, at 257.
4S//7 re van Huis, ibid; Baxter, ibid.
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Geneva IV provides certain requirements regarding the administration of 
penal laws. Article 71 precludes sentencing except “after a regular trial,” which has 
been said to import a “fundamental notion of justice as it is understood in all civilised 
nations,” including rules such as the presumption of innocence, which are not 
included in Geneva IV but are logically consistent with its approach.49 Article 147 
includes among grave breaches of the Convention depriving protected persons of the 
“rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention” and Article 3 
prohibits the death penalty without “the judicial guarantees which are recognised as 
indispensable by civilised peoples.” In regards to Article 147, Pictet comments that 
the “supervision exercised over the administration of justice in all countries makes it 
difficult to conceive” of the occurrence of such a breach of Geneva IV, instead it 
would be a breach of the specific requirements of the Convention, for example trial 
by an exceptional court.50 Article 3, on the other hand, prohibits ‘summary justice,’ 
since “all civilised nations surround the administration of justice with safeguards 
aimed at eliminating the possibility of judicial errors. The Convention has rightly 
proclaimed that it is essential to do this even in time of war.”51
In summary, Geneva IV requires regularity in criminal justice proceedings, 
based on a notion of justice commonly understood amongst civilised peoples. 
International documents which attempt to distil such principles, however, have been 
criticised as not contemplating circumstances of occupation and therefore not being 
binding, ~ but they shed light on the international communal understanding of terms.
49Pictet, above n6, p353-4.
50Ibid, p600.
1^ Ibid, p39. There is judicial support in the decision of the Military Court of Bethlehem, which 
reserved only the right to question orders which are “on the face of it so unreasonable and 
extraordinary, [are] so contrary to the principles of natural justice and international morality common 
to civilised peoples that it is intolerable and the Military Court must ignore it by virtue of its inherent 
powers, because it was enacted on the basis of considerations deriving from malice and arbitrariness 
and not in order to achieve a lawful purpose:” Military Prosecutor v Zuhadi Salah Hassin Zuhad 
(1968) 47 Inti L Rep 490 (Israeli Military Court, Bethlehem, 11 August 1968). The case concerned a 
traffic matter.
52Kelly discusses the Basic Principles on the Independence o f the Judiciary (adopted by the Seventh 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 26 August-6 
September 1985, Milan, endorsed by UN General Assembly resolutions 40/32 (1985) and 40/146 
(1985)) and the Code o f Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (adopted by General Assembly 
Resolution 34/169 (1979)), finding that they “clearly have no binding application to occupation 
situations. In the first instance they do not express an application to occupied territory or a modifying 
status in relation to the existing provisions of the law of occupation. Secondly, they are clearly aimed 
at indigenous justice administrations and not those instituted by foreign forces.” Thirdly, they have a 
minor legal character as they emanate from the General Assembly only: Kelly, above n9, para 619.
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2.3.3 Restoring “l’ordre et la vie publique ”
The Hague Regulations originally required the occupant to “take all the 
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
safety” (Vordre et la vie publiques). The interpretation of the last phrase has been 
subject to dispute. There are no travaux preparatoires which could assist from the 
1907 or 1899 Hague Conferences, although a comment related to the 1874 Brussels 
Code interpreted it as “des fonctions socials, des transactions ordinaires, qui 
constituent la vie de tous les jours.” Those who espouse a broader view of the 
competence of the occupant trace it to the authentic French of the Hague 
Regulations, arguing that la vie publique is more than the English “public order and 
safety” and has the same meaning as the Brussels Code.54 National courts have made 
a purpose of “public order and safety” a precondition to enforcing private rights 
arising from the legislation of the occupant,55 using it in a ‘law and order’ sense.
There is some evidence to be derived from the Hague Regulations and from 
Geneva IV, exempting certain kinds of laws from change and protecting some fields 
from interference at all, which suggest that the emphasis must be firmly on the 
restoration of the capacity to engage in daily transactions, rather than regulating the 
transactions themselves except as required for the security and maintenance of the 
occupying forces. For example, cultural safeguards for health and hygiene measures 
are set out in Article 27 and 46 of the Hague Regulations, as well as in Articles 27 
and 56, Geneva IV. This would trump any assertion of a right to legislate for 
culturally inappropriate maintenance or ‘improvements’ to these institutions of 
public life.
It is, however, international human rights law which is of greatest 
interpretative assistance. It assists in two ways, firstly by elaborating the content of
5 'Article 2, Actes de la Conference Reuni ä Bruxelles, du 27 Juillet au 27 Aoüt 1874, pour Regler les 
Lois et Coutumes de la Guerre, Nouveau Recueil Generale de Trades, 2nd Series, 1879-1880. 
s4E.H. Schwenk, ‘Legislative Power of the Military Occupant under Article 43, Hague Regulations,” 
(1945) 54 Yale U  393, at 398. See also Israeli National Section of the International Commission of 
Jurists, above n2, p6; J. Westlake, International Law, Vol II: War, 1913, p95. Israel, for example, sees 
it incumbent upon the occupier to “restore and maintain public order and normal everyday life while 
respecting the provisions of local Jordanian law: Israeli National Section of the International 
Commission of Jurists, ibid, pi.
55 V v O [1947] Ann Dig, Case No 121 (Court of First Instance, Corfu, 163/1947); Ko Maung Tin v U 
Gon Man [1947] Ann Dig, Case No 104 (High Court (Appellate Civil), Burma, 3 May 1947); 
Morgenstern, above nl9, at 305.
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occupation law itself, for example, common Article 3(1 )(d) in Geneva IV with its 
reference to “the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by 
civilised peoples,” and secondly, in its direct applicability to the interstices of the 
humanitarian law regime. As to the latter, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), for example, applies in time of war, subject to 
derogation,56 and “is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of 
its jurisdiction outside its own territory.” Other treaties, including the European 
Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 
(“ECHR”) may apply extra-territorially, imposing internal obligations on the
i 58occupant to accord such rights to persons under their effective control.
Human rights law, although permitting derogation of, inter alia, rights to a 
fair trial in case of national emergency, in which security is threatened,59 is argued by 
blueprint theorists of the rule of law to be applicable in its non-emergency form in 
circumstances in which Geneva IV would apply.60 This approach aligns with the 
minimum standard of trial which has been elaborated in some detail in international 
recommendations, and which forms the basis of substantive rule of law theories.
soAdopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200 (1966), A/RES/2200A XXI, 999 UNTS 171, 
entered into force 23 March 1976; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) 1 ICJ 
Rep 239 (Advisory Opinion of 8 July), para 24.
57Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion), above nl3, para 111.
58This was established for the European Convention on Human Rights in, for example, Cyprus v 
Turkey (1975) ECtHR 6780/74 and 6950/75 and Stocke v Germany (1989) ECtHR 11755/85 (both 
recognised applicability to persons under “actual authority”); Loizidou v Turkey (1996) ECtHR 
15318/89 expanded it to persons under “effective control” but this was wound back in Bankovic v 
Belgium (Admissibility Decision) (2001) ECtHR 52207/99 to require a jurisdictional link outside the 
‘juridical space’ of the State party. This could well include military occupation -  for a more detailed 
analysis, see section 3.5.2, Chapter Three below.
“ Section 1.3, Chapter One above.
“ including Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law,’ in Thomas Carothers (Ed), 
Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Washington DC, 2006, pp31-73; Jane Stromseth, David Wippman and Rosa Brooks, Can 
Might Make Rights?: Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2006.
6'For example, Principle 70, United Nations, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1984/4 (1984) (“Siracusa Principles"). Those minimum standards concerned certainty of law, 
presumption of innocence, arrest and accusation, detention pending trial, preparation and conduct of 
defence, minimum duties of the prosecution, examination of the accused, trial in public, retrial (double 
jeopardy), legal remedies including appeals, and punishment: Clauses 1-11, Report of Committee III 
(International Congress of Jurists), New Delhi, 5-10 January 1959, reproduced in Norman S. Marsh 
(Ed), The Rule of Law in a Free Society: A Report on the International Congress of Jurists, New 
Delhi, India, 1959, International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 1959, pp8-ll. It should be noted
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Similarly, Committee 111 of the International Congress of Jurists considered that, 
within certain “minimum [standards] necessary to ensure the observance of the Rule
63of Law,” each state should develop its “own system of law.”
The Human Rights Commission has stated that Article 14 of the ICCPR 
applies to both civil and criminal suits and its requirements are “aimed at ensuring 
the proper administration of justice, and to this end uphold a series of individual 
rights.”64 The Commission clarified that, while special or military courts are often 
intended “to enable exceptional procedures to be applied which do not comply with 
normal standards of justice,” they were not prohibited by Article 14. However, the 
conditions of Article 14 mean that the use of such courts should be “very 
exceptional” and include the full range of protections. This is to be compared with 
Geneva and Hague law, which are both directly concerned with security’s impact on 
the administration of justice and confer a general and explicit authority to establish 
occupation courts for security purposes.
Interestingly, the Israeli National Section appears to argue that la vie 
publique, whose restoration is the object of the occupant’s powers, is not consonant 
with international human rights law. For example, they suggest that prohibiting strike 
action against the occupant would safeguard la vie publique,65 although the right to 
strike is included, as a derogable right, in the ICCPR.66 To take action based on 
security would have to match the occupant’s legal ability to derogate from human 
rights obligations.
Finally, there is dispute about the level of obligation imposed on the occupant 
to deal with Vordre et la vie publique. The overarching competence given to the
that some of these standards are explicitly considered derogable even in times not of national 
emergency, including the right to a public trial: Article 14(1), ICCPR.
62See Chapter One above, especially 1.1.2 et seq.
^International Congress of Jurists, Report o f Committee III, New Delhi, 5-10 January 1959, 
reproduced in Marsh, above n61, p8.
64Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, Article 14 (Twenty-first session, 1984), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.l at 14 (1994), paragraphs 1-2.
65Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, above n2, p79.
66Article 22(1) provides that “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, 
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.” Interpreting the 
same phrase in Article 11, Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (adopted by the Council of Europe, 4 November 1950, Rome, 213 UNTS 221, entered into 
force 3 September 1953), the European Court of Human Rights held that the right to strike was 
internationally recognised: Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey (2009) ECtHR 68959/01.
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occupant to protect his own security through legislative measures, and the imposition 
of a test of military necessity, suggests that intervention in la vie publique is subject 
to security requirements. Dinstein argues alone that even where the occupying forces 
are not directly affected by disorder, they are obliged to create and maintain “law and 
order,” and must not permit a chaotic or lawless environment to continue in the 
occupied area. Kelly prefers a permissive environment, although he acknowledges 
the practical imperative of restoring order to minimise the operational impost of the 
occupation.68
The words of Article 43 are mandatory, but the level of obligation they 
impose is subjective, especially given the general non-justiciability of measures: the 
occupant “shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety.” Article 64, Geneva IV, is less mandatory again, 
providing that penal laws and courts “shall” continue in force, but the occupant 
“may” intervene in certain circumstances. However, Dinstein is taking into account 
human rights law in his analysis, and therefore the extraterritorial obligations of the 
occupant may significantly affect his obligation to intervene in la vie publique, not as 
a matter of occupation law but as a broader international obligation. This is 
complicated by the emphasis in occupation law on the restoration of la vie publique, 
and a traditional emphasis on the status quo ante as opposed to intervention however 
well-intentioned, to change the legal system of the occupied territory.
2.3.4 Restoring the Status Quo Ante vs Humanitarian Intervention
Article 43 is particular in its use of the word “restore” Vordre et la vie 
publique. On its face, this seems a clear imperative that the authority of the occupant 
extends only so far as the restoration of the civil and judicial institutions which 
existed before the particular conflict: the status quo ante. That is the ordinary 
meaning of the word,69 and it accords with the view that sovereignty remains with 
the reversioner or in abeyance pending self-determination. The 1899 predecessor of
67Yoram Dinstein, ‘The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human Rights’ (1978) 8 Isr 
YBHR 104, at 111.
68Article 43 simply requires the occupant to “allow the local population, as far as possible and with 
due consideration to force security, to resume normal life: Kelly, above n9, para 506.
69 Article 31(1), Convention on the Law o f Treaties, adopted 22 May 1969, Vienna, 1155 UNTS 331, 
entered into force 27 January 1980.
70Butovsky, above n32, at 218.
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Article 43 used “re-establish,” placing a stronger emphasis on the previous social 
organisation, and suggesting that the 1907 version was deliberately more generous as 
to how the occupant might achieve order, while remaining concerned with the pre- 
occupation state of affairs. In the context where the reversioner cannot abrogate 
wholesale occupation regulations made lawfully, it is important to ensure that any
79fait accompli is prevented.
Prolonged occupations, particularly Israel’s areas of occupation, raise the 
difficulty of the strict status quo ante approach. A lengthy occupation may cover a 
period of intense change in expectation and aspirations domestically and 
internationally, and unwittingly oblige the occupant to leave the occupied society 
deliberately underdeveloped. Self-determination rather than a return to pre­
occupation rule, as the international community demanded in Cambodia, Namibia 
and Western Sahara,74 is the essential contradiction to too strict a view of Article 43. 
Further, where anarchy preceded the conflict, or there was some other flaw in the 
administrative system affecting civil life, some have argued that the obligation on the 
occupant to act is even further reduced, because there is nought to restore.75
The emergence of Article 64, with its more permissive scope, means 
occupation law is better placed to resolve the problem. It would authorise a variety of 
activities to certain purposes, including meeting rights-based obligations under 
Geneva IV and the specific authority to intervene where necessary for orderly 
government and the administration of justice. This could alter, perhaps irretrievably, 
the status quo ante if taken at its widest. An early proponent of this view phrased it as 
a duty to govern “to the greatest possible extent for the good of the native
71Goodman, above nl8, at 1578.
72Gerson, above nl8, at 39; Roberts agrees on the need to prevent “disruptive changes” ahead of the 
reversioner’s return, or, where there is no reversioner, “to inhibit any unilateral, drastic and permanent 
changes in the political, economic, social and legal orders:” above n2, at 46.
77Roberts, ibid, at 52. To resolve this problem, Falk has proposed the negotiation of a separate treaty 
on prolonged occupations, but it has not yet eventuated: Richard Falk, ‘Some Legal Reflections on 
Prolonged Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank’ (1989) 2 J  Refugee Stud 40.
74Roberts, above n2, at 75-6.
75Kelly, above n9, para 508; Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law o f Occupation, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton (NJ), 1993, pi 1; Gerson also allows a wider scope to act in a non­
belligerent occupation, for example in a trusteeship or a res nullius, because the status quo ante 
“would no longer be relevant” absent a reversionary interest: above nl8, at 40.
81
inhabitants.” Thus, the Israeli High Court of Justice has found that an altruistic 
motivation in passing impugned legislation, such as amending arbitration provisions 
in domestic labour law, can support it. The problem with assessing this by 
reference to measures in force in the home state of the occupant, as Cohn J 
considered important, is that implementing equal legislative treatment in both 
territories is effectively an unlawful integration of the occupied area into the home 
state, and may also separate the occupied area in legal structure from other countries
78with which it has a cultural or legal affiliation.
There is a particular line of Israeli authority, inconsistent with the ‘may’ 
wording of Article 64, which goes further and mandates this kind of humanitarian 
intervention to enhance infrastructure and ensure the provision of essential services 
to a higher standard or to localities where it was previously available, for example
7Q
electricity supply, to ensure the development of normal life of the occupied society.
In that case the occupation had already persisted for eight years, and this appears to 
have influenced the decision. Given the clear wording of Article 64, this view must 
be set aside.
The other main authority for intervention to advance the legal system 
consciously beyond the pre-occupation state of affairs is the Allied suspension, de- 
Nazification and reorganisation of German institutions, including the judiciary, from
76Von Glahn, above n21, pp34 and 224-9. Kelly also considers that activity “to promote the conditions 
of the population” would be permissible, though not obligatory: Kelly, above n9, para 508. See also 
Schwarzenberger, above n31, p i28 et seq.
11 The Christian Society for the Holy Places v The Minister o f Defence (1972) 52 Inti L Rep 512 (High 
Court of Justice, Israel, 14 March 1972). However, in his dissenting opinion, Cohn J found that 
Article 43 did not allow “the occupant ... to impose in the territory ideal public order and civil life ... 
his powers are to restore that public order and civil life which prevailed there previously, and to 
ensure their future maintenance,” at 520. For Cohn J, this was especially so where Israeli law did not 
reflect the change the military administration sought to introduce. However, the majority thought that 
an imperative need allowing legislative intervention could include the welfare of the occupied people 
as well as the security of the occupant: for example, at 514 per Deputy President Sussman. See further 
Gerson, above nl8, at 13, pointing out that the majority decision appeared pragmatic rather than based 
on the text and case law surrounding Article 43. An amnesty said to be for the occupant’s benefit 
alone was characterised as outside the occupant’s Article 43 competence in Re A [1943-5] Ann Dig, 
Case No 162 (Criminal Court of Heraklion, Greece, 106/1945).
7XRoberts, above n2, at 94, discussing the Abu Aita Case (1983), translated in (1988) 7 Selected 
Judgments o f the Supreme Court o f Israel 6.
79The High Court of Justice explicitly rejected a submission that such an obligation was contrary to 
the Hague Regulations: Electrical Corporation for Jerusalem District Ltd v Minister fo r  Defence 
(1975) 5 Isr YBHR 381, at 383 per Landau J. A similar approach, in which the Court declared that, 
absent “special circumstances,” far-reaching change of legislative or other character should not be 
introduced unless “for the benefit of the inhabitants” was taken in Jerusalem Electrical Company v 
Minister fo r Energy (1981) 11 Isr YBHR 354, at 357, but the court there did not impose an obligation 
to do so.
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1945. The program has been argued to be of little precedential value because it 
occurred during a post-surrender, treaty-based occupation, and changes not directly 
arising from military necessity were directed to improving institutions below
O A
international standards. However, Goodman identifies a customary right of 
occupants “to make substantive changes in substandard structures” to bring them to
o 1
the level generally recognised by “civilised countries.” Human rights law is said to 
identify the interstices an occupant might attempt to fill, apparently through 
common Article 3(1 d). There is also international judicial support for the view that 
“positive changes” can be introduced to achieve such goals.
This is where the primary tension with the asserted permission for 
humanitarian intervention in domestic legal systems and institutions arises. The right 
of peoples to self-determination has been recognised as a right erga omnes. A right 
having that character invests an interest in all states in its observation and 
perpetuation, including the occupant where the occupant is a State and including 
international intervening forces, for which each participating state has an interest in 
facilitation. The occupant is therefore bound not to preclude the exercise of self- 
determination in domestic institutional forms.
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, for example, asserted a 
broad humanitarian power when it assumed temporary “powers of government,” 
claiming it “to restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in 
which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future, including by 
advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for 
representative governance and facilitating economic recovery and sustainable
80Goodman, above nl8, at 1579.
8‘ibid, at 1576, 1579. It has been suggested, alternatively, that since there was neither a legitimate 
German government whose sovereignty required protection, or a need to “protect the inhabitants from 
being exploited for the prosecution of the occupant’s war,” the Hague Regulations did not apply as of 
law: see summary in Roberts, above n2, at 48. However, common Article 2 of Geneva IV applies it to 
post-surrender occupations and in any case the emergence of self-determination as a legitimate 
interest to be protected under occupation resolves the first dispute.
82Roberts, above n2, at 48-9.
83Namibia Case, above n3, and see further Roberts, above n2, at 49.
MEast Timor (Portugal v Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep 102, para 29; Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) 
[1975] ICJ Rep 68, para 162; Legal Consequences o f the Construction o f a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), above nl3, paras 88-9.
85Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, at 33. Meron 
argues that many of the norms in the Geneva Conventions, particularly in common Article 3, also 
attract this ius cogens/erga omnes character, imposing a duty on States “not to encourage others to 
violate the norms, and, perhaps, even to discourage others from violating them:” above n9, at 355.
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reconstruction and development” - the criticality of self-determination is evident. 
The obligation to assist in the exercise of self-determination is in stark contrast to the 
asserted obligation, and at a minimum the permission, to intervene in domestic 
institutions and legal forms for the benefit of the inhabitants of the occupied territory. 
This is notwithstanding, but contradictory to, extra-territorial human rights 
obligations, some of which may be ius cogens rights, upon the occupant. The tension 
is resolvable by permitting occupants, in the pursuit of their own rights obligations, 
to intervene to prevent rights abuses in the short-term, perhaps by suspension of 
laws, institutions or activities. However, permanent regulatory change is to be 
reserved pending self-determination.
The CPA sought to achieve this by an expedient means of ‘delegating’ some 
of its claimed legislative competence to a domestic body established under its aegis, 
in this case the Iraqi Governing Council. For example, it “delegated” authority to
87create and empower the Public Integrity Commission to the Governing Council. 
However such measures cannot meet the burden imposed by the erga omnes 
character of the right to self-determination, because the fact of delegation relies on a 
claim of actual competence. In cases where the state of the judicial structure or 
society is the basis for the intervention, it has been argued that “any measures” for 
the benefit of the community, including “the replacement of government and central 
institutions” could be accommodated under occupation law. The view is reconciled 
with self-determination on the grounds that the deposed regime “did not truly
on
represent the sovereign people could therefore be ignored.”
The effects of the fundamental tension between a desire for altruistic 
interventionism and self-determination are demonstrated in succeeding chapters 
when considering the means considered permissible for intervening in domestic 
judicial structures, and the capacity of those measures to achieve the domestic rule of 
law. As the latter is a relationship defined by instrumental rules agreed between the
X6Section 1(1), CPA Regulation 1 (16 May 2003). See also CPA Order 7: Penal Code (10 June 2003), 
which asserted a right to act “on behalf of and for the benefit, of the Iraqi people” (prefatory remarks), 
indicative of opinio iuris on the subject.
H1 CPA Order 55: Delegation o f Authority Regarding the Iraq Commission on Public Integrity (28 
January 2004).
ssBenvenisti, above n75, p i66.
x)Benvenisti, ibid, p i83; Kelly, above n9, para 541.
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subjects of the legal system, it is a core expression of self-determination and 
therefore of legitimacy.
2.4 Conclusion: The Concern of Occupation Law with the Domestic Rule of 
Law
The law of occupation is not fundamentally concerned with the domestic rule 
of law, indeed it does not mention the term at all. Its function is the arrangement of 
authority to permit the restoration and continuation of civil life and orderly 
government, pending a final determination of the locus of sovereignty -  whether that 
is reversion to the previous State, cession to the occupying State, or, more popularly 
now, independence as a new State or by inclusion into a State of choice. The 
legislative competence of the occupant, while less obligatory under Geneva IV than 
the Hague Regulations, nonetheless is limited in certain significant respects to non­
intervention in formal domestic institutions and legal structures, unless there is a 
pragmatic need for it to assure the administration of justice (but not any subjective 
conception of ‘justice’ itself)- The preoccupation is with orderliness, which will be 
seen, along with security, to be a precursor to the formation of the domestic rule of 
law.
Extrapolating the preference of occupation law for non-intervention in 
domestic structures unless positively required, and unless within the discretionary 
scope of the occupant to provide, the rule of law theory it actually supports is the 
relationship theory. In its emphasis on security and order, occupation law is intent on 
preserving for the population the scope to determine the nature of their domestic 
legal relationships.
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 
UNDER THE LAW OF OCCUPATION
As judicial institutions are typically identified as the heart of a rule of law 
society,1 2 the authority of the occupant to intervene in the domestic judiciary or 
change the landscape of the domestic court structure warrants close examination. The 
most recent case of a military intervention attracting the character of occupation is 
the Coalition occupation of Iraq in 2003-4, which engaged in a variety of efforts 
directed towards the rule of law. However it represents only the present culmination 
of a body of state practice illuminating the scope and intent of occupants’ 
intervention in domestic judicial administration.
Article 64, Convention IV Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in 
Time o f War 1949 (“Geneva IV”),3 makes clear that the domestic judicial structure is 
to continue in force. Subject to obligations imposed by the Convention itself and “the 
necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the tribunals of the 
occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all offences covered” by 
extant penal laws. As a de facto administrator only, the occupant does not assume 
control of the domestic courts as organs of its own government.4 However, in two 
prominent occupations, the 1945 Allied occupation of Germany and the 2003 
occupation of Iraq, where it was said that the domestic judicial institutions were so 
lacking in the features accepted by civilised people that they were not properly called
1 See Chapter One above.
2UNSC Resolution 1483 (2003) noted the status of the Coalition as occupants in its prefatory remarks. 
The key judicial structural change introduced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”) as the 
occupation authority was the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, while the judiciary was ‘de-Ba’athified’
(a process by which personnel associated in defined ways with the preceding regime were purged) and 
procedural laws amended for security and human rights-based reasons. These interventions will be 
elaborated in the following discussion.
412 August 1949, Geneva, 75 UNTS 287, entered into force 21 October 1950.
4Felice Morgenstern, ‘Validity of the Acts of the Belligerent Occupant’ (1951) 28 BYBIL 291, at 321.
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courts at all,5 a substantially broader right to intervene to create an altogether new 
judicial administration was asserted. Further, in its prolonged occupation of the 
Palestinian territories since 1967, Israel argues for substantive rights of intervention 
to achieve social ends for itself and for the subject peoples.
Occupation law specifically contemplates the creation of security-related 
offences, tried by occupation military courts.6 7This explicit authority is consonant 
with the derivation of the occupant’s legislative competence from order and security 
as set out in the preceding chapter. Beyond that, it is the definition of “administration 
of justice” and the “necessity” of ensuring its efficacy, either under an expansive 
understanding of security or otherwise, which is the essence of the judicial 
reconstruction debate in the case of occupation. This is to be interpreted against 
Geneva IV and Annexe to 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and 
Customs o f War on Land: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs o f War on 
Land (“Hague Regulations”), and their joint emphasis on preserving the status quo 
for the reversioner.
This chapter considers what meaning can be extracted for these terms from 
the body of circumstances in which occupants have attempted to intervene in 
domestic judicial structures. This has included the use of existing courts for security 
purposes; creation of courts using extant authority under municipal law or to replace 
existing jurisdiction lost by fact of occupation; creation of altogether new courts; 
ideological or policy-based intervention in the selection of judicial personnel; or by 
making substantive changes to judicial process. It is these aspects of court 
institutions and personnel, primarily in the field of criminal justice, which are argued 
by interventionists to comprise the rule of law. However, what stands in issue is not
5For example, the lack of an “independent judiciary” was identified by the CPA in Iraq as “one 
fundamentally malign feature of the former regime that undermined the rule of law.” The CPA sought 
to ameliorate it by making amendments to the regulations governing the judiciary, with a view to 
creating an “independent judicial administration:” CPA Memorandum 12 -  Administration o f 
Independent Judiciary, entered into force 8 May 2004 and implementing the “independent judiciary as 
provided for in CPA Order No. 35 and the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the 
Transitional Period,” recitals and see section 1. The legal system under the Nazi regime in Germany, 
1933-45, was judged criminal in United States o f America v. Altstötter et al, (1948) 3 T.WC 1 
(“Justice Trial ”)■
6Articles 64(2) and 66, Geneva IV.
718 October 1907, The Hague, (1908) 2 AJIL Supplement 90-117, entered into force 26 January 1910. 
xSee the ‘blueprint’ analysis discussed in Chapter One above: for example, Rachel Kleinfeld, 
‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law,’ in Thomas Carothers (Ed), Promoting the Rule o f Law 
Abroad: In Search o f Knowledge, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC,
87
the rule of law but the conception of security. More recent practice, especially in Iraq 
and the Palestinian areas suggests that an occupant appointing itself to the 
construction of the ‘rule of law’ above the indigenous population generally 
encounters hindrances from the lack of basic security. Indeed, they may find the 
security situation worsening, notwithstanding avowals of a security purpose behind 
the intervention itself. Security must precede the formation of the rule of law, which 
can occur only after the occupation.
3.1 Use of Domestic Criminal Courts to Try Occupation-Related Security 
Offences
An occupant has full powers to establish separate, special courts and 
processes to resolve security offences committed against its forces in the course of 
the occupation, so long as they are “properly constituted, non-political, military 
courts” and sit in the occupied area.9 German occupation courts in the Second World 
War were subsequently upheld by Greek judicial review as “lawfully established 
local courts.” 10 The authority under law for special courts means they are not of 
themselves contrary to human rights law. 11
2006, pp31 -73; Jane Stromseth, David Wippman and Rosa Brooks, Can Might Make Rights?: 
Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006. 
l) Article 66, Geneva IV, using the Article 64 jurisdiction to establish security offences. Courts of 
appeal need not necessarily sit in the occupied area. See further Michael Kelly, Peace Operations: 
Tackling the Military, Legal and Policy Challenges, Australia Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, 1997, para 539; Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on 
the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1957, 
pi l l .  For example, Israel has established such courts in the West Bank (Order Concerning Security 
Provisions, 378/1970), applying Israeli procedure and evidence: The Rule of Law in the Areas 
Administered by Israel, Israel National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Tel Aviv, 
1981, pp25-27, 31. In West Bank cases involving security issues, or in which the accused is an Israeli 
citizen, military jurisdiction is compulsory: section 2, Order for Closing Files 841/1980, and see 
Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, ibid, p32.
l0German Military Courts in Greece Case [1945] Ann Dig, Case Nr 149 (Athens Court of Appeal, 
Greece, 645/1945).
"Article 14(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, adopted by General 
Assembly Resolution 2200 (1966), A/RES/2200A XXI, 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 
1976 (“ICCPR”); Article 8, American Convention on Human Rights, adopted by the Organisation of 
American States, 2 November 1969, San Jose, 1144 UNTS 123, entered into force 18 July 1978 (also 
known as the Pact of San Jose) (“ACHR”); Article 6(1), Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted by the Council of Europe, 4 November 1950, Rome, 213 
UNTS 221, entered into force 3 September 1953 (“ECHR”) all require that no one be tried in a court 
not established by law, as opposed to, for example, a tribunal established by executive decree. Article 
8, ACHR, further specifies that it should be “previously established by law.”
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Some commentators suggest that Article 73, Geneva IV, provides an 
administrative means to rely on the domestic courts of the occupant for appeals from 
military courts, establishing appeal rights to the “competent authority” of the 
occupant where not otherwise specified. “ In cases where no appeal mechanism is 
identified, however it prescribes no means by which courts governed by a dualist 
understanding of the application of international law (Geneva IV) may recognise and 
hear the petition. In such cases, the occupant would need to make provision for 
appeals; Article 66 provides for “preferable” local sitting of courts of appeal but its 
construction is based on the assumed existence of courts of appeal somewhere. It 
may be concluded from this provision that occupation law envisages the existence of 
a review mechanism as an essential element of judicial institutions. It follows that 
Israeli Proclamation 378 in the West Bank, conferring temporally unlimited criminal 
jurisdiction on military courts with no right of subject-initiated appeal contravenes an 
essential requirement, notwithstanding review by the Area Commander.14
3.1.2 Endowing Municipal Courts with the Occupant ’s Security Jurisdiction
The alternative means to prosecute security offences in practice, where 
separate military courts are not established, is to endow extant or newly created 
domestic courts with jurisdiction over security offences against the occupant. The 
Coalition in Iraq did so through the Central Criminal Court of Iraq in al-Karkh, 
Baghdad, (“CCCI-K”)15 a court it had itself established as a novel Iraqi federal
12Von Glahn, above n9, pi 17; Jean Pictet, The Geneva Conventions o f 1949: Commentary: Geneva 
Convention IV Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War, International Committee 
of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1958, p358; Israeli National Section of the International Commission of 
Jurists, above n9, p28. Article 73, Geneva IV, provides that: “A convicted person shall have the right 
of appeal provided for by the laws applied by the court. He shall be fully informed of his right to 
appeal or petition and of the time limit within which he may do so. The penal procedure provided in 
the present Section shall apply, as far as it is applicable, to appeals. Where the laws applied by the 
Court make no provision for appeals, the convicted person shall have the right to petition against the 
finding and sentence to the competent authority of the Occupying Power.”
'^Dualism being the state of domestic jurisprudence in which international law expressed in treaties is 
not considered part of domestic law unless positively incorporated (dual systems). Australia takes this 
general position: Nulyarimma v Thompson; Buzzacott v Hill [1999] FCA 1192. 
l4Article 50, Order Concerning Security Provisions 378/1970.
l;,The Central Criminal Court of Iraq (“CCCI”) was first established in 2003 in the Baghdad suburb of 
al-Karkh; a second facility was later opened in 2007 in different circumstances and to a slightly 
different purpose in the suburb of al-Rusafa. The two courts are now known respectively as the CCCI- 
Karkh and the CCCI-Rusafa and need to be distinguished, at least until the expiry of UN Security 
Council authorisation to the Multi-National Force -  Iraq (MNF-I) on 31 December 2008, which is the 
period with which this study is concerned. It had been extended to that date in UNSC Resolution 1790 
(2007).
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criminal court in June 2003;16 a point to be addressed further below. The CCCI-K 
was given “nationwide discretionary investigative and trial jurisdiction over any and 
all criminal violations, regardless of where those offenses occurred,” including the 
jurisdiction of all local felony and misdemeanour courts, but was directed to 
“concentrate” on terrorism, organised crime, governmental corruption, 
destabilisation of Iraqi democracy, discriminatory violence, and instances in which a
1 7criminal defendant may not able to obtain a fair trial in a local court.”
In establishing the CCCI-K, the CPA asserted reliance on its “duty to restore 
and maintain order and its right to ensure its security and fundamental standards of 
due process” and its scope to act “on behalf, and for the benefit of the Iraqi
1 o
people.” Further, Administrator Bremer asserted in his press release that its purpose 
was “the urgent security needs of the people of Iraq and Coalition Forces.”19 Thus it 
appears that the CPA interpreted its overarching obligation to restore order and 
security as sufficient justification to confer its accepted but separate security 
jurisdiction directly upon domestic courts. This is apparent from the nature of the 
CCCI-K’s subject matter jurisdiction; the Administrator’s retention of a direct 
element of control over the court’s docket with a right to refer cases with priority, in 
addition to the CCCI-K’s self-seised matters;20 and, finally, Coalition participation 
directly in CCCI-K process, including investigation, case preparation, ‘bringing
cases’ and even appearance at hearing,21 which is prohibited for persons not
22registered to practice in Iraq, without permission of the Minister of Justice.
l6Jackie Spinner, ‘Iraq’s New Forum of Justice Seems to Satisfy Few,’ The Washington Post, 4 
August 2004, p.A12, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A378152004Aug371anguage
=printer, viewed 23 March 2008.
l7Section 18, CPA Order 13 -  The Central Criminal Court o f  Iraq (Revised) (Amended), entered into 
force 22 April 2004 (“CPA Order 13”).
'^Prefatory remarks, CPA Order 13.
l9Office of the Administrator of the CPA, Baghdad, Iraq, Public Notice Regarding the Creation o f a 
Central Criminal Court o f Iraq and Adjustments to the Criminal Procedure Code, 18 June 2003. 
20Section 19(1), CPA Order 13.
2'By Christmas 2004, “U.S. military officials [had] brought 200” of a total of 900 cases, according to 
a military lawyer posted to Task Force 134, the unit associated with the CCCI-K. That official, 
McLaughlin, also commented that “We do 98 percent of the work. We package the cases, then they’re 
presented by an Iraqi prosecutor at trial:” Joseph Giordono, ‘Trying Insurgents in Iraqi Courts Seen as 
Big Step in Rebuilding Legal System,’ Stars and Stripes (Mideast Edn), 26 December 2004, 
http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SS_122704_Court,00.html, viewed 13 October 2009; 
see also Michael Moss, ‘Iraq’s Legal System Staggers Beneath the Weight of War,’ The New York 
Times, 17 December 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/17/world/middleeast/17justice.html? 
ei=5090&en=7fa73a4895399700&ex= 1324011600&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all, 
viewed 13 October 2009. Perceptions differ, however. Chief Judge Luqman Thabit stated that the only
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From a legalist perspective, the appearance of occupation military lawyers, 
whether to resolve a local shortage of prosecutors or to maintain oversight of matters 
in which the occupant has an interest (as is the case, by definition, in security 
offences against the occupant), has two draw-backs: the apparent subordination of 
the occupier to local law and procedures, contrary to international law; and the 
possible appearance of partiality for a judge deferring to the military lawyer, 
representative of the occupying power and superior authority. Significantly, there 
was no Coalition legal involvement before the CCCI-K in the provision of defence 
counsel, notwithstanding that it was heavily criticised for the lack of effective 
defence, through inadequate provision for legal aid on a cost-per-file basis, a lack of 
time to prepare and in some cases reticence on the part of Iraqi counsel. The essential 
cause appeared to be lack of security.24
If security needs were its asserted justification, the CCCI-K tended to satisfy 
neither the occupant nor the occupied. Among both Coalition forces and Iraqis, many 
did not consider the proceedings ‘fair,’ a key rule of law measure, each because of
9 rthe involvement of the other in the process and establishment of the court.“ 
Coalition forces in the field objected to the allegedly minimalist sentencing practice 
of the CCCI-K with detention served in Iraqi prisons for offences affecting their own 
security. They criticised the CCCI-K’s “results-oriented jurisprudence” and the 
“absurdities” in its proceedings, apparently because the court did not produce the 
conviction rate and average sentencing which equalled the justice ‘deserved’ by US
Coalition role in proceedings was to provide an interpreter for foreign witnesses and that the Court 
was “fully independent:” Spinner, above nl6.
22Iraqi Bar Association, al-Mansour, Baghdad, August 2007, http://iraqilawyers.net/index.php, viewed 
29 March 2010. The registration of lawyers is governed by the Lawyers Code 173/1965. Foreign 
lawyers may be given permission to appear by the Minister of Justice and the Bar Association, if 
retained.
23Interview with Major Bernard Bercik, Karbala, August 2003, reported in Center for Law and 
Military Operations (CLAMO), Rule o f Law Handbook, Charlottesville (VA), 2007, p 188.
24“Most defense lawyers are appointed by the court and paid $15 per case. Even if they are so 
inclined, they are largely unable to gather evidence because of the threat of violence. One American 
lawyer said that in 100 cases he handled, not one defense lawyer had introduced evidence or 
witnesses:” Moss, above n21.
25Spinner, above nl6.
26Ibid. The range for terror-related convictions reported in the American military press was six months 
to 30 years: Giordono, above n21. This is on top of an approximate 50% conviction rate after 3000 
proceedings before the CCCI-K: Moss, above n21. Confusingly, in 2004, Coalition military lawyers 
claimed that the CCCI-K’s conviction rate was over 90%, while it appeared anecdotally that as many 
as one quarter of detainees were released without trial: Giordono, ibid. This would make the overall 
conviction rate more like 67%.
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military personnel.“ The essence of this criticism is that the employment of domestic 
courts to prosecute security offences could not achieve retribution, unlike military 
occupation courts as conceived by Geneva IV. Although the CCCI-K was 
established with a security rather than a retributive purpose, its inability to satisfy the 
perception of justice for occupying forces was said to lead to a preference for killing 
rather than capturing insurgents who attacked US forces,“ directly affecting security 
in Iraq and contrary to the principle of unnecessary suffering which is “cardinal” for
i n
humanitarian law. The Iraqi judges, however, considered part of the problem to be 
reliance on arrest and evidence given by untrained Coalition soldiers which did not
o 1
meet minimum requirements for conviction under Iraqi law.
Finally, the lack of security affected the CCCI-K’s ability to effect release of 
acquitted detainees held in Coalition custody, who could be retained in detention on 
post-trial administrative review if the Coalition considered them a security risk - 
Iraqi defence counsel complained that they were not allowed to attend the review 
hearing, and neither was the detainee. “ The existence of this process contradicts the 
avowed purpose of utilising the CCCI-K to hear these offences in order to respond to 
the security situation in Iraq. Nor is a parallel system of administrative detention 
reconcilable with an interest in the rule of law, as discussed further below.
27
27The procedural features which Frank labels ‘absurdities’ include: the exemption of the defendant 
from the requirement to testify on oath, which Frank admits may originate in Islamic prescriptions; 
the requirement for two eye-witnesses to the elements of the offence, similarly Islamic in origin, 
which he says “inhibits justice in that it virtually begs for the crafting of exceptions, particularly in 
cases where the application of such a rule would result in the release of dangerous terrorists;” the 
absence of plea bargaining; closing of the prosecutorial record after the investigative hearing, so that 
rebuttal evidence cannot be called to the non-disclosed defence case; absence of cross-examination of 
defence witnesses in particular, compared to “hostile” cross-examination of US prosecution witnesses; 
the setting of too high a bar for conviction for attempted murder; refusal to convict for the crime of 
conspiracy; and “disdain” for mandatory minimum sentences as legislated by the CPA: Michael 
Frank, ‘Trying Times: The Prosecution of Terrorists in the Central Criminal Court of Iraq’ (2006) 18 
Florida J  o f Inti Law 1, in Part III. It can be seen that many, but not quite all, of these criticisms are 
rooted in the author’s stated preference for a common law criminal system rather than civil law, see 
p21 where he describes civil law training as a “flaw” in Iraqi judges. Oddly from a rule of law 
perspective, he found some of the requirements of the Iraqi codes “more burdensome” because US 
prosecutors were not familiar with them and unduly restrictive because Iraqi law ‘handicapped’ US 
attorneys by not granting them standing to appear at trials or file appeals: see respectively p96 and 53 
for example.
28Ibid, at 103-4.
29Ibid, at 83.
30Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons (1996) 1 ICJ Rep 239 (Advisory Opinion of 8 
July), para 78.
3lQasim Hassan al-Aboudi, the manager of legal and media affairs for the Higher Judicial Council in 
Iraq, stated that this procedural insufficiency mandated acquittal: Moss, above n21.
32M oss, ibid.
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The utility of domestic courts in hearing occupation-related security offences 
is limited. The primary example, the CCCI-K, demonstrates a failure of the court’s 
activities to improve security, and indeed its inefficacy was popularly linked to the 
worsening security situation. It follows that this is an ineffective means of achieving 
security and order, and it is difficult to see that it is a necessary act for the 
administration of municipal justice, since Geneva IV contemplates a separate system 
of military courts to resolve offences against the occupant.
3.2 Completing the ‘Administration of Justice:’ Adding to or Adjusting the 
Domestic Court Hierarchy within the Contemplation of Municipal Law
Although the occupant clearly has not the full domestic competence 
previously exercised by the sovereign, but only de facto administrative authority, it 
may be seen as ‘necessary’ for the administration of justice to exercise an extant 
authority in domestic law to create courts. For example, the CPA established regional 
Courts of Appeal in Maysan and Muthanna provinces in Iraq “pursuant to Article 
16(3) of the Judicial Organisation Code, Law 160/1979.”33 The courts were 
consistent with the existing provincial hierarchy and the authority to create them was 
deliberately not exercised under the previous regime, it was said, as part of a 
discriminatory, destabilising scheme. The CPA explicitly relied on the necessity of 
the administration of justice as its authority.34 Further, since discriminatory practice 
is contrary to requirements of Geneva IV in common Article 2, Article 64 would also 
authorise the creation of these courts. Earlier authority, in which Burma upheld 
domestic courts established under Japanese occupation, simply requires that such 
courts be constituted “in accordance with the municipal law of the occupied country’’ 
and must administer “municipal law.”35
section 1, CPA Order 58 -  Maysan and Muthanna Courts o f Appeal, entered into force 10 February 
2004 (“CPA Order 58”).
34In its prefatory remarks, CPA Order 58 recognises inter alia “the importance of the proper and 
efficient administration of the court system” and that “the former regime manipulated the court system 
against disfavoured regions and peoples of Iraq by denying them access to justice.”
1,5The King v Maung Hmin [1946] Ann Dig, Case No 139 (High Court of Burma, 11 March 1946), at 
337, and also Maung HU Maung v Ko Maung Maung [1946] Ann Dig, Case No 141 (High Court of 
Burma, 20 December 1946); and see Yaron Butovsky, ‘Law of Belligerent Occupation: Israeli 
Practice and Judicial Decisions Affecting the West Bank’ (1983) 21 Can YBIL 217, at 225.
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By contrast, in the Allied occupation of Germany from 1945, the restructure 
of the German judicial system was based on reversion to an earlier regional judicial 
system which had been adjusted under Nazism, and abolition of the special court
'y s
system which characterised Hitler’s regime. Notwithstanding dispute as to the 
applicability of occupation law to Germany, this is consistent with an interpretation 
of Article 43, Hague Regulations, in which ‘restoring’ la vie publique equates to 
restoring the last state of affairs which the occupant considers consistent with une vie 
publique. Establishing courts provided for but never set up under municipal law still 
extant is not a case of restoring anything at all, but must draw directly on the Geneva 
IV “necessity,” a mandatory phrase, for “ensuring the effective administration of 
justice.” Where the Iraqi system was regional, and two identifiable regions lacked an 
essential level in the judicial hierarchy, the action is within the contemplation of 
Geneva IV, particularly where directed to the removal of discrimination contrary to 
Geneva IV.
3.2.1 Intent to Inculcate Values in the Revived Municipal Court Structure
The Allied reversion to earlier German structures is broadly consistent with 
the purpose of Geneva IV regime, as it could be argued that where the deposed 
regime or judicial structure was judged criminal, it could never have been part of la 
vie publique. Therefore, the natural point of restoration is reversion to the previous 
system. The Nazi judicial system was formally determined as such by the subsequent 
Nuremberg military tribunals. However, the stated purpose of the German 
reorganisation was explicitly to introduce “democracy, civilization and justice” to the 
judicial system. As discussed in Chapter Two, the legislative competence of the 
occupant, while less obligatory under Geneva IV than the Hague Regulations, 
nonetheless is limited in certain significant respects to non-intervention in formal 
domestic institutions and legal structures, unless there is a pragmatic need for it to
36The People’s Court, NSDAP (party) Courts and Special Courts were abolished in Article 3, Control 
Council Proclamation 3: Fundamental Principles o f Judicial Reform, CONL/P(45)48, amended by 
CONL/II(45)9, Berlin, 20 October 1945 (“Control Council Proclamation 5”). The judicial system was 
then ‘reorganised’ and the provincial Amtsgerichte, Landgerichte and Oberlandesgerichte were 
‘reestablished’ “in conformity with the Law concerning the Structure of the Judiciary of 27 January 
1877, Edition of 22 March 1924.” The jurisdiction of the re-established courts was “in general [to] be 
determined in conformity with the law in force on 30 January 1933,” just prior to Hitler’s seizure of 
power: Articles 1-2, Control Council Law 4: Reorganisation o f the German Judicial System, 
CONL/P(45)50, Berlin, 30 October 1945 (“Control Council Law C).
37 US v. Altstöt ter et al (1948) 3 TWC 1 (“Justice Trial').
3sPrefatory remarks, Control Council Proclamation 3.
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assure the administration of justice (but not any subjective conception of ‘justice’ 
itself). The preoccupation is with order and security. Proponents of democratic peace 
theory might argue that the inculcation of democratic values is directed to 
achieving security, at least between states, but this does not assist in creating security 
for the occupant because the presence of the occupant is itself undemocratic. It must 
follow that the reversion of the court structure to the pre-Nazi hierarchy is acceptable 
for the necessary administration of justice, and avoidance of discriminatory treatment 
precluded by Geneva IV, however the intended purpose of instilling certain values is 
not coterminous.
3.2.2 Amendments to Extant Municipal Jurisdiction, Especially Civil 
Jurisdiction
Where the adjustment of extant court jurisdiction occurs through procedural 
amendments to municipal law, authority becomes more clouded. This tends to be the 
result of the protracted occupation or purported annexation. In the West Bank, 
Palestinian lawyers argue that Israeli occupation authorities altered the effective 
jurisdiction of Shariah personal status courts for Muslims, by refusing to allow their 
decisions to be enforced in the execution departments of the non-religious court 
structure, as permitted under Jordanian law.41' In east Jerusalem, these courts and the 
Christian Ecclesiastical Courts were effectively abolished on annexation because 
succession is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Court under Israeli 
law.41 While the unlawfulness of annexation distinguishes the latter, Article 64 does 
not provide a complete answer to the problem because it provides only that the 
“penal laws” and tribunals enforcing them in the occupied territory shall continue in 
force. However, the background of la vie publique in the Hague Regulations, Article
?9For example John Norton Moore, ‘Toward a New Paradigm: Enhanced Effectiveness in United 
Nations Peacekeeping, Collective Security and War Avoidance’ (1997) 37 Virg J  Int 7 L 811 and see 
section 1.3.3 above.
40The Shariah courts had been under the control of the Qadi al-Qudaa (Chief Judge), a statutory 
appointment at ministerial level. Shehadeh and Kuttab argue that the intervention was in response to 
the failure of the courts to submit to the occupant’s desire to control judicial appointments and to levy 
revenue stamps against religious courts, which was not previously required: Raja Shehadeh and 
Jonathan Kuttab, The West Bank and the Rule o f Law, The International Commission of Jurists, 
Geneva, 1980, pp21-2. Article 105 of the Jordanian Constitution provided that all matters of personal 
status for Muslims and Christians were within the jurisdiction of the Shariah and Ecclesiastical courts 
respectively.
4'The Jordanian Constitution in Article 99 provides for three categories of courts: regular courts, 
which in practice have a broad criminal and administrative jurisdiction, religious courts for matters of 
personal status, including succession, and special courts: Shehadeh and Kuttab, ibid, pp20-l.
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43, strongly suggests that interference of this kind, fundamentally changing the status 
quo ante without obvious benefit to the population, would be unlawful, nor is it 
consistent with the domestic rule of law in which one would expect the organisation 
of instrumental rules about personal status determination to be settled indigenously.
3.2.3 Creation o f Municipal Court Access to Replace Capacity Lost by 
Fact o f Occupation
Given that only a part of a state may be under occupation,42 it is conceivable 
that the fact of occupation itself may prevent access to some levels of the indigenous 
court structure. Must or may the occupant take expedient measures to make good 
such structural problems? For example, the British occupation of the provinces of 
Baghdad, Basra and Mosul in 1915 precluded access to the supreme Court of 
Cassation in Istanbul. The situation remained unresolved until the post-war formation 
of Iraq and the creation of a new Iraqi Court o f Cassation under Article 81 of the 
1925 Constitution.43 Similarly in the West Bank the Court of Cassation, the highest 
appeal court, remains outside the boundaries of the occupied area in Amman 
(Jordan). Whether it has been ‘abolished,’ as claimed by Palestinian lawyers, or is 
simply ‘inaccessible’ since the commencement of occupation,44 the result is a gap in 
the indigenous court structure. Israeli military lawyers recognise no obligation to 
create a new superior court, and question the existence of authority to do so 
anyway.45 Interim measures were taken for cases already listed before the courts,46 as 
required for the ‘administration of justice’ under Article 64(2).
42Article 2, Geneva IV.
43Chief Judge Medhat al-Mahmoud, ‘The Judicial System in Iraq: A Review of the Legislation 
Regulating Judicial Affairs in Iraq,’ Iraqi Judicial Forum: The Judicial System in Iraq, Facts and 
Prospects, Baghdad, 2004, pp7-8. Originally a system of independent city-states of which one o f the 
largest was biblical Babylon, the area of modem Iraq had, since the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, fallen under the rule of the Ottomans not as one but as three provinces: Mosul, Baghdad and 
Basra. Tripp describes the provinces as “frontier lands” between the Sunni Ottoman empire, and the 
Shi’ite Safavid shahs of Persia: Charles Tripp, A History o f  Iraq, 3rd Edn, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007, p8.
44Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, above n9, p22; Yoram Dinstein, 
‘Belligerent Occupation and Human Rights’ (1978) 8 Isr YBHR 104, at 115; C. Fairman, ‘Asserted 
Jurisdiction of the Italian Court of Cassation over the Court of Appeal o f the Free Territory of Trieste’ 
(1951) 45 AJIL 541, at 548, in support of the proposition that an occupant is not required to continue 
dependence on courts not under its control. Compare the objection of Palestinians Shehadeh and 
Kuttab that access to the High Court of Justice depends on the consent of the Attorney-General, which 
can be withdrawn at any time, leaving the West Bank with no final court o f appeal: above n40, p26. 
45Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, ibid, p22.
46Order Concerning Jurisdiction in Criminal Offences 30/1967.
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Requiring an occupant to facilitate access to a court previously part of the 
social and legal order, now external to the occupied territory, would amount to 
“dependence on the enemy,” and is not required by humanitarian law.47 
Alternatively, any obligation to ensure access would be subject in this situation to the 
defence of impossibility in Article 61 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 1969. The situation is to be distinguished from the removal of the West 
Bank regional Court of Appeal from annexed Jerusalem to Ramallah,49 for example, 
since the annexation of Arab East Jerusalem was unlawful, and therefore 
inaccessibility was not a direct consequence of occupation.
The Israeli solution is access to the Israeli High Court of Justice as a final 
appeal court, and also a court of limited review of the occupying administration, by 
consent of the Israeli Attorney-General. It is justified as necessary for the “rule of 
law” in the West Bank by promoting transparency and legality in the occupation 
administration and impartial review,50 and also to the Israeli rule of law and its 
“liberal norms.”51 Israel asserts two imperatives on the occupant: to ensure the 
international rule of law through facilitation of judicial access but also to comply 
with its own domestic requirements for the rule of law. The tension reflects the 
broader tension between an international rule of law and inconsistent domestic rule 
of law systems.
The problems with the approach in practice are manifold. In the first place, 
the internal Israeli problem of adjusting domestic jurisdiction to account for matters 
arising extra-territorially from an occupied area are substantial and have been got 
around in this case simply by absence of objection from the Attorney-General of 
Israel. The court’s extraterritorial jurisdiction over the activities of “all organs of
47Dinstein, above n43, at 115.
48Adopted 22 May 1969, Vienna, 1155 UNTS 331, entered into force 27 January 1980 (“Vienna 
Convention”). However, Article 61(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that “Impossibility of 
performance may not be invoked by a party as a ground for terminating, withdrawing from or 
suspending the operation of a treaty if the impossibility is the result of a breach by that party either of 
an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the 
treaty.”
49Military Proclamation 39/1967. See further Shehadeh and Kuttab, above n40, p20; Butovsky, above 
n35, at 225.
50Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, above n9, p42.
5‘ibid, p99.
52Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories,’ (1970) 1 Isr 
YBHR 266, at 273. The Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists notes that 
access to Israeli courts “was made possible by a decision of the Government of Israel not to oppose
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the Government of Israel,” regardless of the location of their acts or omissions, 
which would cover appeals from the military courts and petitions against the Military 
Commander, does not replicate the appellate nor the original jurisdiction of the 
Amman Court of Cassation.54 There is also the problem of approval of access to the 
Israeli court, both in Israel and the Palestinian territories, disputed by both sides,55 
not unlike the public rejection of the CCCI-K. However, if the failure of locals to 
make use of occupation or Israeli national courts is due to terror and intimidation, as 
Cohen suggests, 56 it might reasonably be concluded that the occupation authority has 
failed in its primary obligation to restore the public order to the extent necessary for 
the populace to feel able to use the court structures available. As it is, the attitude of 
neither party is conducive to a mutual rule of law relationship.
If the role of the Israeli High Court is essential for the maintenance of the rule 
of law, then two additional criticisms carry substantial weight. It must be questioned 
whether the provision of a final appeals and petitions court based on the British- 
derived common law adversarial system practised in Israel, at the apex of a Jordanian
CO
inquisitorial system, represents any cohesive rule of law system. Equally as 
importantly, petitions originating in the occupied area as opposed to Israel are judged 
according to separate standards: in the latter, a dualist view means that the impugned 
act of government is assessed under the authorising statute, whereas Palestinian 
petitions are decided on a two-stage test: “(a) according to the existing laws, 
including Jordanian law and Orders of the Regional Commander; (b) according to 
the rules of international law which have been incorporated in Israeli law, ie,
applications and claims by raising legal arguments regarding the right of Israeli courts to judge such 
suits. The decision applied to both civil suits in the ordinary courts and to petitions to the Supreme 
Court sitting as a High Court o f Justice:” ibid, p35.
53See further section 7, Courts Law 1957\ Justice Haim Cohen, ‘Introduction,’ in Israeli National 
Section of the International Commission of Jurists, ibid, p.x.
54For example, the Court o f Cassation in Amman could constitute itself a board to determine 
references from the government for interpretation of “any law o f general importance:” Shehadeh and 
Kuttab, above n40, p i9.
55There is a link between differing levels o f Israeli public support and the current docket of the court, 
specifically the inclusion o f cases seen as political: Israeli National Section o f the International 
Commission of Jurists, above n9, p35. Further, many Palestinians see it as an occupation court and 
therefore biased and to be avoided: Cohen, above n52, p.xi.
56Cohen, ibid.
57It is also identified as a cause for the increase in matters and therefore slow-down and poorer quality 
of decisions in the Court of Appeal in the West Bank. Palestinian commentators argue that the Court 
of Appeal has tried to take up the slack caused by the absence of the Court o f Cassation, by adopting a 
form of jurisdiction as a High Court of Justice for which its members are not trained or experienced. 
This is in addition to, not in lieu of, its appellate jurisdiction: Shehadeh and Kuttab, above n40, p i 9. 
58Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, above n9, p36.
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customary international law. The court is also prepared to consider rules of 
conventional international law which have not been so incorporated.”59
Expediency takes another face when the reason for the non-availability of 
indigenous review is the refusal of local courts to act while the territory remains 
under occupation. For example, when Israel seized the Syrian Golan Heights in 1967, 
judges and lawyers fled en masse, taking with them most of the printed laws of the 
areas. In their place, Israel established a civil court staffed by an Israeli judge, 
applying Israeli law in the absence of copies of the Syrian law.60 Although the 
employment of Israeli law is objectionable under occupation law, where municipal 
law is available, Article 64 provides for ‘necessary’ administration of justice, and 
therefore if the measure was immediately necessary and interim, it could be 
acceptable.
Where indigenous courts refuse to continue acting, it is part of the occupant’s 
obligation to restore public order either to create military courts applying existing 
local law, or to create another system of civil courts to provide for the continued 
functioning of the legal system, but only as a temporary solution.61 This is consistent 
with the authority given for the appointment of judges, where the original judges 
(legitimately) refuse to act under the occupant.
Further, the “administration of justice” in Article 64 would facilitate interim 
measures to ensure the continuation of the domestic judicial structure where affected 
by the occupation (or preceding armed conflict), for example by appointing new 
judges or recalling former judges, or setting up special courts, so long as municipal
59Israeli National Section o f the International Commission of Jurists, above n9, p38, citing in support 
of point (b) the case of Hilu v Government o f Israel (1973) Vol 27, Part 2, Piskei Din, summarised in 
English in (1975) 5 Isr YBHR 384.
60Similarly in the Gaza strip and in the Sinai, indigenous Palestinian jurists were appointed to the 
place of the former Egyptian court: Edi Gnesa, Die von Israel besetzten Gebiete im Völkerrecht: Eine 
besetzungsrechtliche Analyse, Schweizer Studien zum Internationalen Recht Band 25, Zürich, 1981, 
pl41.
6'Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, above n9, p30. This practice is 
supported by the Thrace Court of Appeal who held that Article 43 of the Hague Regulations allowed 
the occupant “provisionally to establish courts. These are competent to perform the functions of 
national tribunals.” This is in the course of his obligation to ensure the regular functioning of the 
administration of justice including if the national judges leave the country or refuse to act: L v N  
(Bulgarian Occupation o f Greece) [1947] Ann Dig, Case No 110 (Thrace Court of Appeal, 21/1947), 
at 243. The element o f provisionality must be emphasised in this judgment -  they are intended for the 
duration of the occupation only.
62Article 66, Geneva IV.
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law is applied in accordance with domestic systems. The limit is that such changes 
cannot be directed to fundamental alteration of the domestic system, nor can they 
purport to be permanent measures. These forms of intervention, within these limits, 
are premised on the existence of a reasonably sufficient domestic administration of 
justice. Existing practice seems to consider such a system to include a hierarchy of 
courts, including appeal courts, staffed with judicial personnel and equipped with 
copies of the law. It gives voice to the Article 64 requirement, embodied in the words 
“necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice” -  which does not 
mandate the facilitation of access to the full range of municipal courts, simply a 
system reflecting the primary characteristics of those courts where they are 
inaccessible during occupation.
3.3 Creating the Domestic “Administration of Justice” Outside Extant 
Municipal Law and Structures
Kelly argues that Article 64(2), Geneva IV, is permissive as regards the 
“administration of justice” and broad in its scope of application, allowing the 
occupant to take action in case of lacunae in domestic law or where the existing 
structures for the administration of justice are dysfunctional or unreliable in the 
prevailing security climate.64 The effect of Geneva IV, he says, would be to permit 
the occupant, at their discretion, to intervene “selectively at points of weakness, 
establish an ad hoc legal regime or leave all matters concerning the civilian 
population to existing and functioning legal regimes.”65 The only limitation on this 
view would be the explicit prohibition on the occupant applying its own law or legal 
system to the occupied area.66 State practice to the contrary, for example Israel in
63Pictet, above nl2, p336.
64Kelly, above n9, para 537.
<>5Kelly, ibid, para 539-40. In the Justice Trial, for example, the United States Military Tribunal 
constituted under Control Council Law 10: Punishment o f Persons Guilty o f War Crimes, Crimes 
Against Peace and Against Humanity, entered into force 20 December 1945 (“Control Council Law 
10"), itself a product of occupation, found that German municipal law on treason could not be applied 
in the unlawfully annexed part of occupied Poland to acts committed by Polish nationals. To do so 
was an international crime. Nazi authorities had termed the offence Kriegsverrat, defined it as all acts 
detrimental to occupation forces, and administered it through certain Special Tribunals: Justice Trial, 
Opinion and Judgment, p i028.
66Von Glahn, above n9, p94.
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East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, can be distinguished on the grounds that the 
occupant’s law was applied pursuant to a purported annexation of the territory, itself 
unlawful.68
There are two problems with Kelly’s interventionist view. Firstly, where 
practical shortcomings affect the administration of justice, for example 
dysfunctionality as a result of occupation, absence of judicial staff or inadequacy (but 
not necessarily perceived inefficiency) of facilities and record-keeping, Article 64 is 
not permissive as regards intervention. Instead, it mandates it under the guise of a 
“necessity” to maintain the administration of justice. In circumstances where the 
status quo is preserved “subject to .... the necessity” for efficacy, it is difficult to 
justify a permissive view of intervention. Article 64 must be seen as imposing an 
obligation to intervene, but in limited circumstances. Although Kelly takes the 
opposite view, it is the mandatory strictures of occupation law which have been said 
to dissuade the public adoption of it in interventions, in favour of the different rules 
applicable under authority of the UN Security Council. This is the subject of the next 
chapter. Secondly, Article 64 does not authorise permanent and far-reaching change 
to judicial institutions in pursuit of justice or the rule of law. Kelly’s middle course 
of establishing ad hoc domestic legal regimes, beyond the specific authority to create 
occupation courts to hear security offences, goes beyond the current state of the law.
State practice to the period of the CCCI-K addresses judicial intervention 
through establishing ad hoc tribunals for ‘transitional justice,’ tolerance of or 
acquiescence in the formation of extra-judicial ‘courts’ by powerful groups in the 
occupied society (although not actively interventionist, imposing such a requirement 
would be the corollary of recognising rights or obligations to intervene positively in 
the ‘rule of law’), or establishing parallel administrative tribunals dealing with legal 
concerns other than criminal justice. The final means imposes the greatest level of 
direct judicial intervention: the creation of altogether new courts, for example
67The Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No 11) Law 1967 permitted the extension of 
Israeli legal jurisdiction into any area “of Eretz Israel” prescribed. The following day East Jerusalem 
was prescribed, effecting annexation, by Administrative and Judicial Order No 1. Israeli law was 
applied to the Golan Heights via the Golan Heights Law (1981): see Allan Gerson, ‘Trustee- 
Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel’s Presence in the West Bank’ (1973) 14 Harv Inti U  1, at 11.
68Declaration on Principles o f International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter o f the United Nations, adopted by UN General 
Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (1970), UN Doc. A/5217 25 GAOR Supp (No 28) (1970); UNSC 
Resolution 242 (1967) in the Israeli/Palestinian context.
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introducing a federal court to a regionally-organised criminal justice hierarchy. These 
are considered in turn.
3.3.1 Establishing Ad Hoc Tribunals to Administer Transitional Justice
In the significant occupations following deposition of a regime said to be 
unlawful or unjust in Germany (1945, although in different circumstances in 1918), 
Japan (1945) and Iraq (2003), the occupant has taken measures to impose 
accountability for regime crimes, particularly but not only against the forces of the 
eventual occupant. However, in the case of Germany and Japan the measures were 
purportedly ‘international,’ dealing with international crimes including the crime of 
aggression, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity through the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg and the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). This is a different justification to the effort of an 
occupant to exercise an occupational, or would-be municipal, authority to try crimes.
In Iraq, the UN Security Council called generally for “accountability” for the 
crimes of the Saddam Hussein regime in Resolution 1483,69 but did not employ its 
own powers to establish an ad hoc international tribunal, with or without state 
consent. Partly in response to Resolution 1483, partly to facilitate the request of the 
Iraqi Governing Council and partly “to prevent any threat to public order ... and to 
promote the rule of law,” the CPA delegated authority to the Governing Council to 
establish a Statute for an ad hoc Special Tribunal. However, the proposed statute 
was attached to CPA Order 48, along with limitations on the nationality of possible 
defendants. Most importantly, while in occupation, the CPA was to “prevail” in 
case of conflict between the Governing Council, the CPA and/ or the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal. Similar methods of direction to the Japanese Imperial Government were 
generally employed by the occupants of Japan in 1945 through a preference for 
indirect rule.74 As the occupant holds de facto administrative authority pending
69Prefatory remarks, UNSC Resolution 1483 (2003).
70Compare the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, established 
by UNSC Resolution 827 (1993) and 955 (1994), respectively.
71 Prefatory remarks and section 1, CPA Order 48 -  Delegation o f Authority Regarding an Iraqi 
Special Tribunal, entered into force 10 December 2003 (“CPA Order 48").
72Iraqi nationals or residents only: section 1, CPA Order 48.
73Section 2(3), CPA Order 48.
74For example, the Imperial Government was “hereby ordered” to purge the public service of 
militaristic nationalists: General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers:
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transfer of sovereignty to the reversioner or new sovereign, any interim or puppet 
government must lack capacity to take such action on a permanent legislative basis, 
and in any case, is likely in fact to be acting under the dictation of the occupant. By 
comparison, after toppling his regime in Cambodia, the intervening Vietnamese 
authorities handed over to an indigenous administration, whose first act was to 
establish a limited Special Revolutionary Court to try Pol Pot and Ieng Sary for 
genocide.75
Despite the delegation, the Iraqi Special Tribunal was purportedly an 
instrument of occupation law. Without specific authority of the Security Council to 
create the tribunal, the CPA asserted, when dealing with the Governing Council, that 
occupation law permitted it act to maintain order, which is undoubted, and to 
“promote the rule of law.” However, it has been demonstrated that occupation law 
is disinterested in the rule of law as popularly theorised, and accommodates the need 
for legal self-ordering. The appeal to security suggests that the Geneva IV acceptance 
of extraordinary military courts for security related offences is indicative of a broader 
right to create extraordinary courts for security-related purposes. This is part of the 
general relationship between the rule of law, judicial intervention under occupation 
and security. However, not unlike the CCCI-K, the 1ST was beset by security 
problems, including the assassination of judicial and legal participants.77
If the purpose of the occupation court is to improve security by self-seeking 
transitional justice, then this seems not to be borne out in practice. In addition to the
Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government, Subject: Removal and Exclusion o f Undesirable 
Personnel from Public Office, SCAPIN-550, 4 January 1946. Further, the Imperial Government was 
directed to abrogate certain laws: General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers, Memorandum for: Imperial Japanese Government. Through: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo. 
Subject: Removal o f Restrictions on Political, Civil, and Religious Liberties, SCAPIN-93, 4 October 
1945.
75Decree Nr 1 (15 July 1979), issued by the Conseil populaire de la Revolution du Kampuchea. 
76Prefatory remarks, CPA Order 48.
77For example, the assassination of defence counsel, Saadoun Sughaiyer al-Janabi and Adil 
Muhammad al-Zubaidi, on 20 October and 5 November 2005 respectively led to the suspension of 
proceedings until 5 December and then again until 21 December: UN AMI Human Rights Report I 
November -  31 December 2005, para 15, available at http://www.uniraq.org/documents/HR%20 
Report%20Nov%20Dec%2005%20EN.PDF, viewed 20 April 2008. Another defence lawyer, Khamis 
al-Obaidi, was abducted on 22 June 2006, and later found murdered: UNAMI Human Rights Report I 
May-30 June 2006, para 20, available at http://www.uniraq.org/documents/HR%20Report%20May 
%20Jun%202006%20EN.pdf, viewed 25 April 2008. The body of a defence assistant, Abdul Monem 
Yassin Hussein, was found in Baghdad on 3 September 2006, and the brother of the Chief Prosecutor 
was shot dead by gunmen in front of his family on 16 October: UNAMI Human Rights Report I 
September-31 October 2006, paras 39-40, available at http://www.uniraq.org/documents/HR%20 
Report%20Sep%200ct% 202006%20EN.pdf, viewed 26 April 2008.
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delays, the trial came under significant criticism internationally, including from the 
UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, for its lack of 
procedural fairness (in part a response to the security situation), lack of independence 
and “its doubtful legitimacy and credibility” deriving from the fact of an occupation
7 0
seen as illegal, appointment of judges by the occupant and foreign funding.
3.3.2 Acquiescence in, or Failure to Suppress, Extra-Judicial ‘Courts ’
A clearer example of the impact of security is an occupant’s acquiescence in, 
or failure to eliminate, extra-judicial ‘courts.’ This failure amounts to a significant 
failure to restore and maintain public order, required by the Hague Regulations and 
Geneva IV, because their existence and operation with impunity is symptomatic of a 
lack of control and absence of authority. The persistence of militia-backed summary 
courts outside the formal judicial structure emerged strongly during the Coalition 
occupation in Iraq, They were especially prominent in 2004 as instruments of Sadrist 
Shi’ite militias in Baghdad, asserting a right to try, sentence and execute 
‘collaborators,’ and relying on Shariah law. Efforts to restore security generally 
will meet the obligation on the occupant to restore order, because they will of 
themselves tend to preclude the emergence or continuation of such bodies during the 
occupation.
However, the occupant should take care in the course of such operations that 
the formalising of domestic systems of adjudication in pursuit of a rule of law 
relationship are not ended. There is no requirement for a domestic system of law that 
it not include elements of community justice, such as allowing forms of tribal justice 
to be administered in Iraq or recognising various community justice processes in
O A
Australia. The difference should be apparent on the facts: systems which seek to 
form a rule of law relationship will have discernible instrumental rules on which they 
operate, including recognition of sources of law (for example of a religious or tribal
7xMr Leandro Despouy, reported in Agence France Press, ‘Saddam Trial Not Independent or 
Impartial: UN Official,’ 7 November 2006, available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/ 
20061 l/sl782551.htm, viewed 13 October 2009.
79Such ‘trials’ were reported to be regular: Melinda Liu and Babak Dehghanpisheh, ‘Questions of 
Justice: The Abu Ghraib Abuses are Part of a Deeper Crisis,’ Newsweek (US Edition), 17 May 
2004, http://www.keepmedia.com:/Register.do?oliID=225, viewed 22 February 2009.
S0For example, taking account of Aboriginal community sentencing or ‘payback’ in formal judicial 
sentencing: see Australian Law Reform Commission, Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws, 
Report No 31 (1986).
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leader applying revealed law or recognisable tribal tradition), whereas unlawful 
courts will operate on an ad hoc basis.
Other special or extra-judicial courts may exist at the commencement of 
occupation. The Allied occupation of Germany in 1945 and the Coalition occupation 
of Iraq shared a concern in eliminating special courts established by the previous 
regime -  in Germany, the notorious People’s Court, in Iraq a range of special and ad 
hoc courts which were outside, and not part of, the traditional court hierarchy and 
primarily dealt with internal and national security. Unsurprisingly, the existence of 
such courts undermines the objectivity of the judiciary (especially where trained 
judges are not appointed to oversee the trials), and destroys public confidence in the 
administration of justice. In these cases, the competence of the occupant to 
intervene where necessary for the “administration of justice,” as well as to restore 
public order and safety, would permit the immediate suspension of these courts. It 
may not, however, allow their permanent abolition pending the revitalisation of 
sovereignty, since that would be effecting a fait accompli for the reversioner.
3.3.3 Court Interventions Unrelated to Criminal Justice
Typically, occupants will establish some form of administrative claims board 
to resolve claims against themselves for damages caused by the occupation. They 
may also seek to intervene as necessary for the administration of justice or to restore 
Vordre et la vie publique in the civil court process. The persistence of unresolved 
land and property disputes, which may have arisen out of the occupation, can be a 
significant destabilising influence on society, as can economic uncertainty, and
81 See for example United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 104: Establishing the Rule o f Law 
in Iraq, April 2003, pp5-6, and Stanley Roberts, ‘Socio-Religious Obstacles to Judicial 
Reconstruction in Post-Saddam Iraq’ (2004) 33 Hofstra LR 367, at 383. They included, after 1968, a 
system of separate military courts (Mahkamat al-Khasa and Mahkamat al-Da’imiyah, which 
paralleled the civilian structure with the first court for misdemeanours, the second for “more serious 
offences,” and above them a Military Court of Cassation), the Mahakim Qi-wa al-Amn al-Dakhili 
(internal security courts) and, most infamously, the Revolutionary Court, which dealt with national 
security and corruption and was staffed by non-legally trained party members. There was no appeal 
from the court and it was not bound by Riles relating to habeus corpus. Its president at the time of US 
intervention was Awad Hamad al-Bandar, who was convicted of crimes against humanity and 
sentenced to death: Case Nrl/9 First/2005 al-Dujail Case, Iraqi High Tribunal, 2006 (“Dujail Trial'), 
judgment translated unofficially from Arabic to English by Mizna Management LLC, available at 
http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujaiEopinion.asp, viewed 6 October 2009. See further Roberts, ibid, 
at 384-5.
82Roberts, ibid, at 385.
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‘justice reconstruction’ should include measures to deal with them. Temporary 
measures directed to the resolution of the latter would be permitted under Article 64, 
Geneva IV. It is also consistent with the criminal justice approach of allowing 
intervention to permit judicial administration upset by fact of occupation.
Although not required by any provision of customary or treaty law, the 
creation of claims tribunals is common in formalised occupations, and in armed 
conflict more generally. This is in some ways a pragmatic response to dispute 
resolution as international law not only does not allow, but in fact prevents, the use 
of the domestic court structure against the occupant, since the occupant is not subject
o  r
to the domestic legal regime. Nor is it always possible to allow the occupied
O /
population access to the occupant’s own courts to resolve claims. There is no 
mandatory form, since such processes are not mandated, but administrative systems 
often include an administrative review board effectively providing an appeal against
87assessment.
These changes are to be distinguished from further intervention in the 
organisation of administrative review in occupied territories. Temporary measures to 
resolve the paralysis of administrative boards under the domestic structure, for 
example the inherent jurisdiction in West Bank local courts and tribunals to review 
Jordanian government administrative decisions cannot be exercised since the 
Jordanian government is not in authority and the Israeli occupants are not subject to
^Michael Kelly, ‘Military Force and Justice’ in William Maley, Charles Sampford and Ramesh 
Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities in Failed States, 
United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (p229), p250.
84For example, the establishment of Labour Courts to settle labour disputes and the ‘reorganisation’ of  
Administrative Courts in post-1945 occupied Germany: Control Council Law 21: Law Concerning 
German Labour Courts, CONL/P(46)23(fmal), Berlin, 30 March 1946, and Control Council Law 36: 
Administrative Courts, CONL/P(46)67 (final), Berlin, 10 October 1946.
85Von Glahn, above n9, p3; and see also Israeli National Section o f the International Commission o f  
Jurists, above n9, p 13 and the references there cited.
86In Canada, for example, no domestic action can be brought for the benefit o f enemy aliens: Dangler 
v Hollinger Gold Mines (1915) 34 OLR 78 (High Court) and Bassi v Sullivan (1914) 32 OLR 14 
(High Court). By contrast, access to Israeli Civil Courts is permitted for, inter alia, claims for damages 
caused by the IDF: Israeli National Section o f the International Commission of Jurists, ibid, pi 6.
87For example in the West Bank, a scheme was introduced in which claims were decided by the Staff 
Officer Claims, with an appeal to the Claims Appeal Board: Order Concerning Claims 271/1968. This 
scheme is questionable in some respects because the Staff Officer Claims has purportedly been given 
administrative review powers under Jordanian law, amending the limited ex gratia scheme for tort 
liability under the Civil Wrongs Ordinance 73/1953. Since the occupant is a de facto temporary 
administrator and not the government of the day with full domestic regulatory authority, this kind of 
activity is probably beyond its competence, notwithstanding the assertion that the change was not 
permanent in nature.
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the domestic tribunals.88 The Israeli administration created Appeal Boards were to be 
chaired by civilian lawyers expert in the relevant field of jurisdiction, including 
abandoned and government property, customs and excise, acquisition of land for
O Q
public purposes, income tax and pensions. This is a pragmatic measure for the on­
going administration of disputes, rather than directed to a higher rule of law 
principle.90 Similarly, temporary intervention in the organisation of responsibility for 
legal matters within the domestic structure may be permissible if necessary for the 
preservation and pursuit of claims.91 The purpose of such interventions must be 
clearly pragmatic and facilitative, and most significantly limited to the occupation 
period, to be justified under occupation law.
3.3.4 Establishment o f Altogether New Permanent (Criminal) Courts
A similar basic approach applies to the creation of new courts or the 
attempted expansion of military jurisdiction into the civil sphere, where it is not in 
response to urgent structural shortcomings caused by the occupation itself. Where the 
new courts are in fact military courts, purportedly granted broad criminal jurisdiction 
under municipal law, then the occupant has acted contrarily to the words of Article 
65, Geneva IV, that the occupant shall not exercise retrospective criminal 
jurisdiction, and the World War Two principle that the capacity of the occupant does 
“not comprise criminal acts committed by the local population that had no military 
aspect and did not affect the safety of the occupation army.” It also poses a rule of 
law problem, since military judges remain susceptible to military discipline and 
command, and their independence in the cause of an occupied people may not be
88Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, above n9, pi 6.
89Ibid, p i7.
90Compare the Palestinian complaint that the process undermined the judicial structure to the 
detriment of the rule of law: Niall McDermott, ‘Introduction’ to Shehadeh and Kuttab, above n40, p8. 
The work of the Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, above n9, was 
published in direct response to this work, taking the view that the intervention was to strengthen the 
rule of law.
9lFor example, authority to conduct international litigation in claims involving Iraq was moved from 
the Legal Department of the Office of the Council of Ministers to the Ministry of Justice, where it 
would be conducted in “coordination” with the CPA: section 2, CPA Order 32 -  Legal Department of 
the Ministry o f Justice, entered into force 4 September 2003. The requirement for ‘coordination’ may 
overstep the bounds of occupation law, depending on the character of control in individual cases, 
since the occupant cannot have the legal capacity to conduct foreign affairs on behalf of the occupied 
territory, a characteristic of sovereignty.
92Public Prosecutor v X  [1919-42] Ann Dig Supplementary Volume, Case No 160 (Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, Norway, 22 June 1940); Butovsky, above n35, at 226. Based on this authority and 
the wording of Article 64, Butovsky considers the jurisdiction of the West Bank Military Courts 
“questionable.”
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apparent. Israel has attempted to do so in the West Bank, giving its occupation 
military courts criminal jurisdiction for offences prior to the commencement of the 
occupation, or offences between civilians.94 Butovsky rejects this as “improper” 
because it effectively ousts local criminal jurisdiction, which Article 64 clearly 
preserves; he would allow jurisdiction only on a case by case basis where Israeli 
citizens or security were involved.95
The Coalition creation of the CCCI-K in Iraq in June 200396 is the most 
adventurous example of this kind of intervention, evidence of the growing modem 
trend towards rule of law intervention as a good to be sought. It is in essence a 
federal criminal court, imposed on a traditionally regional-based criminal justice
97system, shown in Figure 1.
The civil structure was similar, including the initial Mahkamat al-Bidayah, 18 
regional Appeal Courts and at the top the same Mahkamat at-Tamyeez. Religious
98courts for personal status remained separate.
93Butovsky, ibid, at 228, discussing Military Prosecutor v Zuhadi Salah Hassin Zuhad (1968) 47 Inti 
LR 490 (Israeli Military Court, Bethlehem, 11 August 1968).
94West Bank military courts have concurrent but primary jurisdiction over all criminal offences in the 
West Bank dated before or during the occupation, although they focus on security offences and 
accusations against Israelis: Article 2, Order Concerning Jurisdiction in Criminal Offences 30/1967 
and section 7, Order Concerning Security Provisions 378/1970, as affected by section 2, Order for 
Closing Files 841/1980. Their convictions and sentences must be authenticated by, and can be varied, 
quashed or upheld by, the Area Commander, and there is no right of appeal: Article 50, Proclamation 
378.
95Butovsky, above n35, at 226.
96CPA Order 13; see also Spinner, above nl6.
97Criminal and civil Nizamia courts based on administrative districts replaced a Shariah court system 
in 1880. At about the same time the Ottoman Criminal Code was introduced, which was “mostly 
copied” from the contemporary French code, giving what is now modem Iraq an inquisitorial system 
of law based on provincial organisation. The introduction of circuit or district courts more familiar to 
Western jurists continued via the Hokkam a ’Solh (Magistrates) Act 1913, and the proclamation of the 
Baghdad Court of First Instance, with civil and criminal divisions, in 1917. All these courts, in 
addition to their own Appeal Courts, allowed appeals to the Istanbul Court of Cassation. The 
underlying organisational principle remained the administrative provinces: Chief Judge Medhat al- 
Mahmoud, above n43, pp7-8. The administrative regions remained the same under Saddam Hussein, 
although the Ba’ath party made some structural changes or omissions to affect the equal 
administration of justice in the extant regions, such as in Maysan and Muthanna provinces as 
discussed above: Roberts, above n81, at 393.
98United States Institute of Peace, above n81, April 2003, pp5- 6. Each criminal court included an 
Investigative Panel, comprising judges, who would investigate and dismiss or refer cases to the Trial 
Panel, which, where large enough, could also sit as an Appeal Court.
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Mahkamat at-Tamyeez 
(Court of Cassation)
Figure 1: Iraqi Criminal Justice Hierarchy Prior to Coalition 
Intervention, 2003
The CCCI-K followed the internal organisation of a civil law domestic 
criminal court with investigative and trial chambers, staffed with Iraqi judicial 
officials, which were to operate in accordance with local law as modified by the 
CPA." It was subject to the Court of Cassation, “in accordance with the applicable 
law,” 100 although it is not quite clear how this was expected to apply to a novel 
federal criminal court, and all felony appeals lay to that court. 101 The CCCI-K was 
given “nationwide discretionary ... jurisdiction over any and all criminal violations,” 
including the jurisdiction of all local felony and misdemeanour courts, but was 
directed to “concentrate” on certain serious criminal offences arising from
"Sections 1-4, CPA Order 13. However, the Investigative Court in both chambers was limited in its 
civil jurisdiction to victim compensation claims associated with a criminal proceeding. 
l00Section 9(2), CPA Order 13.
101 Section 21, CPA Order 13.
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1 09insurgency operations or besetting occupation authorities. “ It could seize itself of a
1fHmatter on the application of the defendant or by reference from a local court, 
placing it effectively between the Court of Cassation and the regional criminal courts 
in the judicial hierarchy, although it included a Court of First Instance. This required 
consequential amendments, including CPA direction to local courts to comply with 
CCCI orders to carry out certain judicial functions104 and innovatively allowing 
evidence to be taken by video conferencing or a similar remote method. 105
The CPA argued that occupation law, comprising its “duty to restore and 
maintain order and its right to ensure its security and fundamental standards of due 
process” and its scope to act “on behalf, and for the benefit of the Iraqi people,” 
authorised this kind of intervention. 106 Statements to the press also relied on “the 
urgent security needs of the people of Iraq and Coalition Forces.” Occupation law, 
however, has specifically considered the security needs of the occupant and the 
occupied society in allowing the creation of extraordinary military courts for the 
duration of the occupation and mandatory interim measures to ensure the 
administration of justice. 108 What the CCCI-K sought to establish was a much 
broader claim of security-based authority to create an altogether new system of 
indigenous criminal justice.
However, the Coalition, Iraqi leaders and the press assessed the CCCI-K in 
rule of law rather than security terms, suggesting that the court was innovative and 
beneficial as “a fair tribunal that gives defendants due process.” 109 The new court 
was intended to foster better transparency through open trials, leading, it was said, to
‘“ Section 18, CPA Order 13.
‘“ Section 18(3-5), CPA Order 13.
‘“ Primarily investigative functions such as witness or crime scene examination: section 8, CPA Order 
13.
'“ Section 10(6), CPA Order 13.
‘“ Prefatory remarks, CPA Order 13.
‘“ Office of the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq, Public Notice 
Regarding the Creation o f a Central Criminal Court Of Iraq and Adjustments to the Criminal 
Procedure Code, 18 June 2003.
l08This reliance on security can be compared to Yugoslav occupiers in Hungary, who were specifically 
held to be permitted to “create new organs in so far as this was necessary for safeguarding public 
order and the economic well-being of the territory:” Kemeny v Yugoslav State [1927-8] 19 Inti LR 
614, and see Butovsky, above n35, at 229.
'“ Spinner, above nl6; Hashim al-Shibli, Minister of Justice stated that “no one is above the law in the 
new Iraq,” quoted in CPA Office of Strategic Communications Press Release, ‘Iraq’s Central Criminal 
Court Convicts Two Oil Smugglers,’ 14 October 2003, http://www.cpairaq.org/ 
pressreleases/20031014_OCT-14-Conviction.htm, viewed 23 March 2008.
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domestic legitimacy.110 In a telling reflection on the rule of law relationship, 
however, the court was rejected by the public because of its US backing, “American- 
style justice,” and administration of CPA Orders instead of Iraqi law, 
notwithstanding the local staffing and imposition of international standards on the 
independence of the judiciary.* 111 At its most basic level, some Iraqi judges objected 
to the view that judicial reconstruction or training was required at all, especially from 
an occupant. This is to be compared with the ex post facto acceptance of the court 
and its process as valid and binding by the Iraqi authorities on conclusion of the 
occupation, in face of continued public disquiet indicative of a normative legitimacy 
problem. Western criticism of the measurable outcomes of the court was heavier 
again, addressing minimal case resolution rates, delays between detention and trial 
and, conversely, the rapid conduct of trials and sentencing once commenced.114 
Some of these criticisms were in fact about shortness of trials in the inquisitorial 
process generally, others explicable by the short Iraqi workday (9am-2pm),'15 slow 
materialisation of promised computer systems for court registries and national 
databases and lack of facilities.
Despite its intended rule of law effect, the actual impact of the CCCI-K on 
the rule of law in Iraq was dramatically affected by security when measured by 
practical outcomes. For example, despite the CPA direction for open trials in 
accordance with Iraqi law, the public was kept from hearings because of security
110Giordono, above n21.
11'The CCCI bench was directed to act “independently and impartially,” and without discrimination 
on the basis of “race, nationality, ethnicity or religion and in accordance with their impartial 
assessment of the facts and their understanding of the law, without improper influence, direct or 
indirect, from any source,” and judges were barred from other paid employment or political positions: 
section 6(1-3), CPA Order 13. Section 8 provided for the disqualification of judges by the 
Administrator from particular matters in case of actual or apprehended breach of these requirements. 
Disqualification could be directed or at the judge’s request to be excused, except that it was to be 
permission of the CPA Administrator for the duration of the occupation: section 8(4). For public 
perceptions of the CCCI-K, see Spinner, above nl6; Giordono, above n21.
ll2Jim Krane and Donna abu-Nasr, ‘Iraq gets court reform; US soldier dies,’ The Times Leader 
(Pennsylvania, USA), http://www.timesleader.com/mld/timesleader/6103225.htm, posted 17 June 
2003, reproduced at http://www.redorbit.com/news/general/2838/iraq_gets_court_reform_us_soldier_ 
dies/, viewed 23 March 2008.
1 l3See further Chapter Four, section 4.3.1 et seq.
1 l4Reportedly, only 37 cases involving 55 defendants were finalised in 2003: American Forces Press 
Service, ‘Iraq’s Central Criminal Court Convicts Insurgents,’ Washington, 2 August 2004, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B06E4DDlF3DF932A3575BC0A9629C8B63&sec 
=&spon=&pagewanted=all, viewed 13 October 2009.
"^Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘The Reach of War: The Law; Making Wheels of Justice Turn in a Chaotic 
Iraq,’ The New York Times, 1 August 2004, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B06E4 
DDlF3DF932A3575BC0A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all, viewed 13 October 2009.
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concerns.116 Threats of assassination and “political interference” were also reported, 
by Iraqi and Coalition forces alike, as a significant influence on judicial outcomes, 
exacerbated by the lack of secure housing forjudges.117 The system of administrative 
detention, even following acquittal by the CCCI-K has been introduced above. 
Rather than fostering security, the court was itself unable to function effectively 
because of the lack of security under occupation -  a failure of the occupant to restore 
order and la vie publique.
3.4 The Character of the “Administration of Justice:” Authority to 
Intervene in Judicial Personnel Policy
Intervention in the domestic judicial structure is not limited to the court hierarchy 
itself, but can be equally affected by the intervention in the judiciary through 
personnel policy. In perhaps the order most consistent with the emphasis of Article 
43 on the restoration of the last position consonant with the administration of justice, 
CPA Order 35: Re-Establishment o f the Iraqi Council o f Judges, took effect on 15 
September 2003. Under Saddam Hussein, the judicial system had been under 
Ministerial control resulting in direct executive influence on the judiciary.119 The 
Order ‘recognised’ that “a key to the establishment of the rule of law” is a free and 
independent judiciary. “ However, historical experience also demonstrates that
ll6Section 10(4), CPA Order 13, except for Felony Court verdicts which were always to be public 
(section 10(5)); Moss, above n21.
ll7At December 2006, only 12 of the 30 judges had been found secure accommodation in the Green 
Zone: Moss, ibid.
ll8However, the level of detail in CPA Order 35 -  Re-Establishment o f the Council o f Judges, entered 
into force 15 September 2003, is surprising for a regulation purporting to restore a system that was, 
including details of the relationship of the Council to the Iraqi executive, its budgetary, property and 
staffing organisation, its permitted “administrative oversight” of the Iraqi judicial system except the 
Supreme Court, misconduct investigations, appointments and promotions, and the meetings, 
composition and appeal structure of the Disciplinary and Professional Standards Committee: sections 
2-6. The appointments authority included power to “assign or reassign judges and prosecutors to hold 
specific judicial and prosecutorial posts as provided for in the Law o f Judicial Organisation 160/1979 
and the Law of Public Prosecution 159/1979):” section 3.
U9The Ministry o f Justice Act 101/1977 had brought the Council of Judges, the supervisory judicial 
body, for the first time under Ministerial control, “ending the independence of the judiciary” under 
any true separation of powers. The restructure was reinforced in the Law of Judicial Organisation 
160/1979 and Law o f Public Prosecution 159/1979. In 1970, shortly after the Ba’athist seizure of 
power, Iraq had adopted its fifth interim Constitution since 1925, which gave “ultimate authority to 
the Ba’ath Party: Medhat al-Mahmoud, above n43, pp22, 33.
l20See also prefatory remarks, CPA Memorandum 12 -  Administration o f Independent Judiciary, 
entered into force 8 May 2004 (“CPA Memorandum 12“), which drew on the “laws and usages of war 
and .... relevant UN Security Council resolutions,” including Resolutions 1483 and 1511 (2003). CPA
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authority to control or influence judicial personnel policy has a significant impact on 
the character of the resulting judicial system. Further, the assertion of an interest in 
the rule of law goes substantially beyond the concerns of occupation law; while it 
correctly asserted that arrangements implemented during the Saddam regime were 
“suspended” “  rather than abolished, the reorganisation of the Council of Judges was 
accompanied by direct CPA action in the removal and (re)appointment of judicial 
officers. This was the most recent episode in a twentieth century emphasis on the 
purging of judiciaries said to be involved in, or tainted by, internationally criminal 
regimes by occupants.
3.4.1 Removal o f Judicial Officials
Article 54, Geneva IV, permits occupants to “remove public officials from 
their posts,” for reasons of their own, although they may not alter the status, penalise
1 9
or coerce judges who refuse to act under the occupant for reasons of conscience. 
This right is limited to the period of occupation.124 There is sense in the pragmatic 
Israeli argument that there must be power to appoint replacements for judges who 
lawfully refuse to act, or to fill vacancies, " which flows from the Article 64 
“necessity” of maintaining the administration of justice. In the West Bank, for 
example, 31 of 39 judges at the time of occupation refused to act under Israeli
Memorandum 12 was specifically intended to implement the “independent judiciary as provided for in 
CPA Order No. 35 and the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period:” 
recitals and see section 1.
121 It is significant in this respect that the existence of an “independent judiciary,” in terms of 
independence from the executive, has been traced to the British occupation under mandate of the area 
which forms modem Iraq: United States Institute of Peace, above n81, p5.
l22For example, section 6(2). Similarly, the Council of Justice, the Ba’athist replacement for the 
Council of Judges, was not abolished but stripped its jurisdiction over judges and prosecutors: section 
6(2). Compare Israeli amendments to Jordanian Law No 2 on the Independence o f the Judiciary 
including the replacement of the Judicial Council by a committee appointed by the Area Commander: 
Shehadeh and Kuttab, above n40, p34, citing amendments in Military Order 310. A range of other 
civil registry functions were conferred on members of the occupation, including the powers of the Bar 
Association to conduct, supervise and accredit legal training: ibid, pp29-30 and the references there 
cited.
l23Pictet, above nl2, p308. 
l24Butovsky, above n35, at 229-30.
l2SIsraeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, above n9, p22; M. Greenspan, 
The Modern Law o f Land Warfare, University of California Press, California, 1959, p260; The Law of 
War on Land being Part III o f the Manual o f Military Law, The War Office, London, 1985, pi 62, 
which oddly referred to “judicial functionaries” rather than judges.
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administration; without replacement, the judicial system would have been 
ineffective.126
Practice to date consists of dismantling state ideologies deemed contrary to 
justice, or to international law, including the Allied purges of local German and 
Japanese officials in 1945 and de-Ba’athification in Iraq. In Japan and Iraq, the 
instruments authorising removal of officials did not refer specifically to the judiciary, 
including them merely as part of the body of public officials to be purged. " The 
Allied Powers in Germany in 1945 had a much more detailed program, specifically 
identifying for “compulsory exclusion,” at number 88 in their list, senior judges, 
prosecutors and employees employed since 1 March 1933 in certain general courts, 
and, at number 87, lawyers and judges involved as position-holders in certain named
19Rinstitutions and special (Nazi) courts.
In both Japan and Iraq, civil service purging was conducted through an 
indigenous authority: the Imperial Japanese Government, under ‘orders’ to remove 
officials with “undesirable” views about or membership in organisations concerned 
with “military nationalism and aggression” in order ‘to drive’ “irresponsible 
militarism ... from the world,” and the Iraqi Governing Council by ‘delegation,’ 
and later the Iraqi De-Ba’athification Council, to achieve representative government 
by removing Ba’ath party members from government. The Iraqi purge was based
126Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, ibid, p23. However, Shehadeh 
and Kuttab attribute the “low standard” of decisions in West Bank Courts to, inter alia, the 
appointment of inexperienced or insufficiently trained magistrates by Israel: above n40, p44.
I27ln Japan, all civil servants ranked chokunin or higher were reviewed: article 3, General 
Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Memorandum for Imperial Japanese 
Government, Subject: Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office, SC AP IN- 
550, 4 Jan 1946 (“Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel, SCAPIN-550.” In Iraq, judges appear to have 
been included among “the top three layers of management in every national government ministry, 
affiliated corporations and other government institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals)” to be 
interviewed for removal of full Ba’ath party members: sections 3 and 1, respectively, CPA Order l -  
De-Ba ’athification of Iraqi Society, entered into force 16 May 2003 (“CPA Order / ”). 
l28The extensive list of criminal and civil courts included both special courts, such as the party courts 
and the Volksgerichtshof (People’s Court), as well as those in the traditional German court hierarchy, 
including the Oberlandesgerichte and Landgerichte: article 10(87-8), Control Council Directive 24: 
Removal from Office and from Positions of Responsibility of Nazis and of Persons Hostile to Allied 
Purposes, 12 January 1946 (“Control Council Directive 24'j.
Prefatory remarks and article 2, Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel, SCAPIN-550.129
l30Section 1(1), CPA Order 1. Ba’ath party membership, even full membership, has been criticised as 
failing to recognise the pressure placed on judges even in the traditional court structure both to be 
members of the Baath party and to give judgments that accorded with the views of the ruling elite. In 
such circumstances, blanket dismissal removes the entire indigenous judicial corpus: Roberts, above 
n81, at 380-1, 398. Roberts preferred corruption as a determinant, but its extent has been disputed 
between judges and lawyers before and during the occupation. Canvassed in 2003-4, lawyers (those
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on Ba’ath party membership. Both occupants’ instruments dictated in considerable
I T 1
detail the requirements of the purge, and in Iraq, notwithstanding the delegation, 
the program was initially administered directly by local Coalition Forces. Later, 
control over vetting was transferred to a mixed national and international Judicial 
Review Committee, appointed by the CPA, with broad powers of removal and 
appointment. By contrast, in Germany, the Allies controlled deNazification 
directly through Control Council Directive 24, intending to remove those who were 
“more than nominal participants” in Nazi activities and all those “hostile to Allied 
purposes.”134
Dismissal of judges might be linked to the occupant’s authority to maintain
I T C
security. The CPA Administrator, for example, relied primarily on it, while the 
reference of the Allied occupants of Germany to removing those “hostile” to the 
occupying forces is a direct appeal to security. Although ultimately the efficacy of 
purges in assisting security is a question of fact,136 since occupation regulations
who had to contribute the funds) thought it a “serious problem,” judges disagreed: see Roberts, ibid, at 
385-6. For the CCCI-K, see Gettleman, above nl 15.
131 Article 2, Exclusion o f Undesirable Personnel, SCAPIN-550.
122 CPA Memorandum l -  Implementation o f de-Ba'athification Order 1, entered into force 3 June 
2003, setting up Administrative Review Committees initially comprised of Coalition Forces, but to 
include foreign civilian investigators and Iraqi professionals “whenever possible:” section 1(2); CPA 
Memorandum Number 7 -  Delegation o f Authority under De-Ba'athification Order No. 1, entered into 
force 4 November 2003. Lieutenant-Colonel Craig Trebilcock reports that “common tools” for 
judicial screening were polling the provincial bar association, local tribal leaders, local business 
leaders and municipal officials about the reputation of local judges and questioning the judges 
themselves. He commented that the business community’s views were not “reliable to measure 
judicial ethics and suitability,” and was especially subject to sectarian or other motivations. Removals 
also operated on different provincial procedures, but with varying levels of domestic involvement in 
2003 in a “quasi-democratic” system -  early success was set-back by the delayed formal vetting 
process conducted by the CPA in August-October 2003: Legal Assessment of Southern Iraq: 358th 
Civil Affairs Brigade After Action Review, as reported in CLAMO Rule o f Law Handbook, above 
n23, pp 174-7. By 5 November 2003, 66 judges had reportedly been dismissed: Global News Wire, 
‘Iraq: Judicial Review Committee Dismisses 66 Judges,’ 5 November 2003, as cited in Roberts, above 
n81, at 397.
122CPA Order 15 -  Establishment o f the Judicial Review Committee, entered into force 23 June 2003 
(“CPA Order 15").
134Control Council Directive 24, especially article 1, and see also Control Council Directive 38: The 
Arrest and Punishment o f War Criminals, Nazis and Militarists and the Internment, Control and 
Surveillance o f Potentially Dangerous Germans, 12 October 1946.
l35Prefatory recitation, CPA Order l, which drew on “my authority as Administrator of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA), relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, and the laws and usages of 
war,” pre-intervention human rights abuses, the “grave concern of Iraqi society regarding the threat 
posed by the continuation of Ba’ath Party networks and personnel in the administration of Iraq, and 
the intimidation of the people of Iraq by Ba’ath Party officials,” and “the continuing threat to the 
security of the Coalition Forces posed by the Iraqi Ba’ath Party.”
I36lnterestingly, allegations emerged in 2004 about on-going or resurgent Ba’athist influence on the 
CCCI-K and its conviction and sentencing record, as a substantial criticism of the court: Erik 
Eckholm, ‘Iraqi Indicted for Proposal to Open Talks with Israel,’ The New York Times, 6 Oct 2004,
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drawing on security are not justiciable if authorised prima facie, the reliance on it is 
reasonably conclusive of authority to implement a judicial purge.
Von Glahn, however, concludes that for all judicial and other officials, “the 
exercise of their authority depends entirely on the express or implied consent of the
i i n
occupant.” This is not in keeping with the strict judicial independence required by 
the rule of law, particularly when von Glahn argues that judges would “logically be 
subject to any oath of obedience exacted from officials retained in their posts,” 
which poses problems for the proponents of such intervention to achieve the rule of 
law. For example, the directive establishing the Iraqi Judicial Review Committee 
unusually asserts “the right of the CPA to take measures for its security, to ensure 
fundamental standards of due process and to promote the rule of law,” as well as the 
standard requirement to maintain order. 140 Within itself, this was a system where the 
Committee was to “operate at the discretion” of the CPA Administrator, whose 
discretion also controlled the appointment and dismissal of both Iraqi and 
international Committee members. 141 This level of executive control of the 
appointment and review process is not easily reconcilable with the rule of law 
properly so called or even with the notion of independence set out in the Order itself.
The permissiveness of von Glahn’s view also highlights a tension between 
state practice and a consistent interpretation of the capacity of the occupant to 
introduce ideological change. Re-ideologising the purged civil service after a fashion 
satisfactory to the occupant, in the case of Germany and Iraq to non-indigenous 
forms of democracy or the rule of law, is not consistent with the general compulsion 
on the occupant to preserve the status quo ante. However, where the previous regime 
engaged in international crimes, including crimes against humanity through 
judicially-administered discrimination, then there is both a broad responsibility under 
international criminal law, and a specific authority under Geneva IV, to end that 
behaviour to the extent within its authority so as not to be itself complied. 142 The
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/06/intemational/middleeast/06arrest.html, viewed 10 
November 2008; Roberts, above n81, at 369. 
l?7Von Glahn, above n9, p i36.
LJ8Ibid.
l39For example, Kelly, above n9, generally.
140Prefatory remarks, CPA Order 15.
14'Sections 1(2) and 3(1), respectively, CPA Order 15. 
l42Common Article 3, Geneva IV.
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purge of occupied Japan, for example, was directed to removing those officials 
complicit to varying extents in an alleged crime of aggression, and in Germany in 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. The tension emerges not so much in the 
removal but in the appointment process, particularly where the occupant’s domestic 
constitutional arrangements mandate certain policies.
3.4.2 Appointment and Re-appointment o f Judicial Officials
The purpose to be achieved by purging and then replenishing the civil service 
in Germany, Japan and Iraq included, variously, inculcating democratic values, 
removing militarist views and restoring the rule of law. Achieving this required 
permanent appointment of new judicial officials, without necessarily seeking local 
input, and could include a residual power of dismissal in the occupant.143 In 
establishing the CCCI, the CPA conferred powers of judicial appointment on the 
CPA Administrator, which were mandated to be exercised prior to the transfer of 
governmental authority planned for 1 July 2004, and established a range of criteria 
consistent with the de-Ba’athification program and what were seen to be general 
standards of professional competence and integrity.144 Critics identified cases where, 
for reasons not publicly available, the CPA appeared to have appointed unknowns or 
potentially unqualified people to high profile judicial appointments.'45 Order 13’s 
permanent appointments appear contrary to the previously agreed view that 
appointments were for the duration of the occupation only. In this case, it appears 
that the avowed rule of law purpose may have influenced the determination that this 
be a permanent, in the sense of open-ended appointment, consistent with a formalist 
view of certainty and predictability and the independence of the judiciary. The 
intention to create the rule of law under occupation encounters this tension: the rule
143For “clear evidence of unlawful or unethical conduct, breaches of the requirements of this Order, or 
incompetence on the part of the member: section 5(5) and 5(2) respectively, although after the 
transition to the interim Iraqi government, appointment and removal from office was directed to be “in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in Iraqi law:” section 5(6), CPA Order 13.
144Section 5(1), CPA Order 13, prescribed criteria as follows: judges were to be Iraqi nationals, of 
high moral character and reputation, have a background of either opposition to the Ba’ath party, non­
membership of the Ba’ath party or membership not falling within the leadership tiers described in 
CPA Order 1, have no criminal record unless the record was a political or false charge made by the 
Ba’ath party regime, have had no involvement in criminal activities, have demonstrated a high level of 
legal competence, and be prepared to sign an oath or solemn declaration of office. Section 5(3) 
permitted the appointment of reserve judges while 5(4) established the rating of the new CCCI judges 
in the official salary scales.
l45The CPA selected Zuhair al-Maliki as the CCCI-K’s original chief investigative judge, despite his 
never having worked previously as a judge, being a Shi’ite under Saddam Hussein: Moss, ibid.
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of law, whatever its nature, demands an element of certainty, but occupation law by 
its temporary nature is unable to provide it.
3.4.3 The Problem o f Legitimacy: Social Engineering by the Occupant
Given broad powers to appoint and remove judicial officials for the duration 
of the occupation, the scope for the occupant to attempt social engineering in the 
composition of the judiciary, and therefore permanent change in its character, exists 
and must be managed against the purposes of occupation law. The limit must be a 
restrictive interpretation of the Hague Regulations and the requirement to restore the 
status quo ante in terms of la vie publique. In the Iraqi city of Najaf in September 
2003, for example, the military governor from the US Marines ‘de-Ba’athified’ the 
local judiciary, and in the reappointment process sought to place a female judge on 
the bench. He was forced to back down on the day of the appointment by the 
“turbulent protest, supported by many local women, who felt that the Americans 
were imposing their social values upon the Iraqis.”146 The case is reminiscent of 
Ganzglass’ observations that Somalis in the 1990s markedly preferred to draw judges 
and police from their own clans. Thus, the “reappearance of tribalism had the 
unforeseen advantage of establishing a sense of trust between the population in one 
particular area and the people who would later serve as judges and police, because 
they were all of the same clan or subclan.”147
A survey of obstacles to reconstructing an effective Iraqi judiciary identified 
the “anger” of Sunnis with the loss of their historic dominance over the institutions 
of government as one of the most significant. However, Roberts rejects a simple 
approach of equal representation on the bench, in view of both the Shi’ite “ignorance 
of legal practice” and the rejection of the new system by Sunnis as “religiously 
biased, retaliatory, and possibly a tool of the imperialist United States.”149 
Additionally, the demand for self-determination and cultural input pressures reform
l46CLAMO, Rule o f Law Handbook, above n23, pi 65, citing CLAMO, Forged in the Fire: Legal 
Lessons Learned during Military Operations 1994-2006 (2006).
l47Martin P. Ganzglass, ‘Afterword: Rebuilding the Rule of Law in the Horn of Africa,’ in William 
Maley, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and 
Military Responsibilities in Failed States, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (p340), p342. 
Ganzglass noted a similar phenomenon in the early days of the Kosovo intervention. 
l4HRoberts, above n81, at 388.
149Ibid.
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under intervention. 150 Rather than equal representation as a value per se, Roberts 
recommends an effective and “legitimate” judiciary, which is representative in the 
form decided by the Iraqi people. 151
For a popular conception of the rule of law that values what it claims are 
universal human rights, expressed in domestic judicial institutions, there is a strong 
motivation to attempt to produce a bench which reflects the gender, ethnic and 
demographic spread of the population. However, efforts in Iraq tend to suggest that 
the legitimacy of judicial appointments, and it would follow respect for the courts, 
reflects the indigenous view of representation. The appropriate test against the Hague 
Regulations and Geneva IV must be, as identified by the Israeli High Court of Justice 
in another context, whether the proposed action “would have a far-reaching and 
prolonged impact ... far beyond the period when the military administration will be 
terminated.” 152 If so, the proper authority to implement such change is not the 
occupant. This aligns with the express limitation of the “necessity” of the 
administration of justice to intervene in the existing judicial structure. Although 
Geneva IV prohibits discrimination, this could be achieved by removing the 
possibility of discrimination from the appointments process, rather than 
implementing affirmative action where not matched by local demand.
3.5 Authority to Intervene in the Procedures of the “Administration of 
Justice”
The third means by which an occupant might intervene in the domestic 
judicial system is through procedural laws and practice, changes which could 
fundamentally alter the nature of plaints which might be brought to the court and the 
manner in which they are resolved.
l50Stromseth et al, above n8, p i9. 
l5lRoberts, above n81, at 367-8.
152 Jerusalem District Electricity Co v Minister for Energy and Commander of Judea and Samaria 
Region (1981) 11 Isr YBHR 354 at 357.
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3.5.1 Creation o f New Substantive Offences, and Amendment to Old
Subject to the creation of offences relating to the security of the occupant, the 
substantive penal laws in the occupied area “shall” continue in force, unless contrary 
to certain rights, such as non-discrimination, embodied in Geneva IV. The travaux 
for Geneva IV indicate that ‘security’ was discussed in terms of cancelling 
“provisions such as those concerning recruiting or urging the population to resist the 
enemy.”154 To what extent do the necessities of the “administration of justice” and 
orderly government allow further intervention in the content of penal laws?155 
Chapter Two established the broad purposive limitations imposed on legislative 
activity in this area, so that the occupant may not transplant its own law or legal 
system. This must be so even where the motive is altruistic, for example, the Israeli 
attempt to ensure “symmetry” with Israeli law and therefore avoiding “hardship for 
the local population” such as no fault compensation to accident victims.156 
Additionally, measures altering the status quo ante but authorised under Geneva IV 
as imperative to maintain order are expected in state practice to be temporary 
pending the resolution of sovereignty and the expression of the domestic will.157
Security offences implemented in occupation tend to be unsurprising in 
content: in Iraq, for example, prohibiting prosecutions for collaboration-type 
activities, increasing the penalty to life for offences concerning damage to public 
utilities and oil and theft of a means of transport,159 and authorising the carriage of 
arms for a variety of civilian diplomats, security contractors and officials not
153Article 64, Geneva IV. 
l54Pictet, above nl2, p335.
l55For example, the original Ottoman Criminal Code in the Iraqi area, based primarily on the French 
system, was updated by the British following their occupation of Basra in 1915, using colonial laws in 
India as a template: Medhat al-Mahmoud, above n43, p9.
l560ther changes included compulsory installation and wearing of seatbelts in motor vehicles and 
workers’ compensation rights: Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, 
above n9, pp8-9.
157When Palestinian advocates went on strike, the Ramallah Court of Appeal held that an Israeli 
military order allowing Israeli lawyers to appear was imperative for the administration of justice and 
therefore permitted. However, the court did not indicate that it was permitted as a permanent change: 
Muhammad Amin al-Ja’bari v Ahman Ya’qub ‘Abd al-Karim al-Awiwi (1968) 42 Inti L Rep 484 
(Court of Appeal, Ramallah, 17 June 1968); also Jabari v Karim (1968) unpublished File 44/67, 
District Court of Hebron, in Gerson above n67, at 13. And see the “suspensions” of various offences 
under Iraq law by the CPA, for example in CPA Memorandum 5 -  Implementation o f Weapons 
Control Order Number 3, entered into force 23 May 2003 (“CPA Memorandum 5”). 
l5SSection 3, CPA Order 7 -  Penal Code, entered into force 10 June 2003 (“CPA Order 7”).
159Sections 4-5, CPA Order 7.
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otherwise permitted to do so under Iraqi law. 160 There is no requirement for public 
approval or positive acceptance of such measures. 161 It should also be possible to 
introduce other administrative measures but only in so far as they addressed security 
matters. For example, an Israeli order permitting certain occupying officials the right 
to close criminal proceedings if convinced there is no public interest in pursuing 
them would be legitimate only for security offences, but not necessarily for all 
investigations under domestic law. The latter would have to be decided on a case- 
by-case basis and discontinued only where their security imperative was clear.
The position is equally clear for changes implementing prohibitions in Geneva 
IV itself, including the imposition of the death penalty by an occupant and the
i n
prohibition of torture, or suspending aspects of the penal law consequentially 
affected by occupation, including the deposition of a former regime. 164 That said, 
CPA practice of suspending capital punishment is more consonant with international 
law than the Israeli abolition of it in their occupied areas. 165 There is not yet a clear 
rule of international human rights law which proscribes the death penalty. 166 Against
u'qCPA Memorandum 5 referred in its recitals to the CPA’s obligation “to take all measures in its 
power to restore and ensure, insofar as possible, public order and safety in Iraq’’ but without any 
special obligation to protect diplomatic premises. Additional amendments to the Weapons Code 1992 
“suspended” extant exemption for government and social employees to carry weapons, and 
“amended” regulations on the amount of ammunition permitted to be carried by individuals licensed 
for weapons carriage: CPA Order 3 (Revised) (Amended) -  Weapons Control, entered into force 31 
December 2003, section 2(1) suspending Article 6.2 of the Weapons Code 1992 and 2(2) amending 
.Article 8.2 of the same statute.
l6!Compare the case of Kamal Mutib Salim, sentenced by the CCCI-K to 18 months imprisonment in 
2004, for having bomb-making materials in his home. His defence counsel argued that no Iraqi law 
prohibited the possession of the materials that the soldiers claimed to have found in Salim's house and 
there was therefore no case before an Iraqi court: Spinner, above nl6.
l62Compare the Israeli Order for Closing o f Files 841/1980, which purported to apply to security 
offences and offences under Jordanian law: Shehadeh and Kuttab, above n40, p40.
'“ Section 3, CPA Order 7.
1 “ including suspending political offences affecting the Ba’ath party and its regime and insulting the 
president, and inserting a requirement for the Administrator’s written permission to prosecute 
publication offences, offences against the external or internal security of the state or against public 
authorities and offences of insulting public officials: section 2, CPA Order 7, amending the Penal 
Code 1969, 3rd Edition.
'“ Compare section 3, CPA Order 7 and Order Concerning Local Courts (Death Penalty) 268/1968. 
The CPA suspension was upheld by the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) on the basis that it was temporary: 
Dujail Case, ppl-2.
l66The closest general instrument, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition o f the death penalty 1989, concluded 15 December 
1989, New York, 1642 UNTS 414, entered into force on 11 July 1991, but, as at 13 October 2009, it 
had only 72 states party, much less than half of the international community: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-12&chapter=4&lang=en, 
viewed 13 October 2009. This is notwithstanding the instrument’s adoption by the UN General 
Assembly in Resolution 44/128 (1989). The Second Optional Protocol elaborates Article 6 of the 
ICCPR, which was said to suggest abolition was “desirable” (prefatory remarks). On the status of the
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this background, permanent abolition is most likely a non-mandatory, long-term 
interference in the social fabric which goes beyond the limits of Article 43, Hague 
Regulations and may not necessarily reflect the view of the population. In Iraq, for 
example, on conclusion of the occupation, the death penalty was immediately re-
1 A 7implemented.
More problematic is the case where the occupant attempts to implement ‘rule 
of law’ changes to judicial procedures and substantive offences. Although such 
intervention was overt in Iraq, it is also discernible in earlier occupations. For 
example, both the Allies in Germany and the CPA directed judicial officials to 
administer municipal criminal laws “impartially” and without discrimination, 
elements of blueprint rule of law judicial institutions. The CPA also attempted to 
legislate for the inclusion of innovative human rights discourse into the criminal 
justice system, especially rights to defence counsel and gender equality, for example 
increasing penalties for kidnapping, rape and indecent assault and suspending 
mitigating circumstances in such cases.
3.5.2 Introduction o f Non-Security Related Rights Discourse
There is a body of academic discussion on the principle of whether human 
rights law can apply in situations of occupation.169 The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) has been held to apply in time of war170 and to 
acts done by a State in its extra-territorial jurisdiction.171 In any case, at the 
overarching level, international human rights law provides general principles, which 
are to be applied subject to the lex specialis of international humanitarian law,
death penalty in international law generally, see William A. Schabas, The Abolition o f the Death 
Penalty in International Law, 3rd Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.
167 Order for Reintroduction o f the Death Penalty 3/2004 (8 August 2004). 
l68Section 4, CPA Order 7; prefatory remarks, Control Council Law 4.
l69Kelly summarises a body of literature on the applicability of human rights law to situations of 
occupations, from those who reject its application absolutely, those who argue that at least some 
provisions were within the contemplation of the drafters of the Fourth Convention to the view of those 
who conclude that the law is not clear but sees no real utility in the debate: Kelly, above n9, paras 
602-618 and the references he cites. However, the European Commission of Human Rights held that 
human rights law was to be applied in the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus: Loizidou v Turkey 
(1996) ECtHR 15318/89.
170Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons (1996) 1 ICJ Rep 239 (Advisory Opinion of 8 
July), para 24.
171 Legal Consequences o f the Construction o f a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep (Advisory Opinion of 9 July), para 111.
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including occupation law,172 unless they reflect rules of ius cogens, in which case
173they apply to all situations and all countries as of law.
The difficulty is in determining which human rights law to apply to a legal 
system under occupation: is it the human rights law of the occupant extra-territorially 
(which is prohibited under the general law of occupation although the domestic 
obligations of occupants may require it), the law of the occupied territory (which 
may not incorporate it if that is the very purpose of the intervention), or the 
international rules applying by custom to all states, about which there is a divergence 
of interpretation.174 Further, the derogability of human rights, particularly of the right 
to a fair trial, albeit subject to the requirement in common article 3(1 )(d), Geneva 
IV that the occupant observe the “indispensable judicial guarantees” common to 
civilised nations, is indicative of a lesser human rights requirement on an occupant 
fully obliged under international law simply because the facts of occupation, which 
require the occupant to restore public order, are capable of construction as a state of 
emergency.
Israeli authority concerning the freedom of the press took the first view
above, arguing that occupation law was permissive and allowed the application of the
right as it existed in Israeli administrative law -  explicitly upheld as a substantive
1
rights-based approach to the rule of law, as opposed to strict formalism. 
Additionally, the US Supreme Court has held that where an occupation is “on behalf 
o f’ rather than “against” the occupied, the US authorities remain bound by the US
172In any case, Adam Roberts considers that occupation law is broader and more particular to the 
situation faced than the more general human rights instruments: Adam Roberts, ‘The Applicability of 
Human Rights Law During Military Occupations’ (1987) 13 Rev o f Inti Studies 39.
173Article 53, Vienna Convention, above n48.
l74Plunkett argues that the legal authority for enforcing rule of law has three sources: “international 
law, the domestic law of the peacekeeper’s country and the host country, and consent through 
negotiated agreement from the host country’s feuding factions and the peace operation members:” 
Mark Plunkett, ‘Rebuilding the Rule of Law,’ in William Maley, Charles Sampford and Ramesh 
Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities in Failed States, 
United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (p207), pp214-5. However, host State consent is not at 
issue in occupation because authority is conferred internationally through Geneva IV and the Hague 
Regulations. On differing interpretations, see section 1.2.2 above.
l75The right to a fair trial in Article 14, ICCPR, is not included as a non-derogable right (Article 4); 
see further section 1.3.1 above.
176al-Taliah Weekly Magazine v Minister for Defence (1979) HCJ 619/78, summarised in English in 
(1980) 10 Isr YBHR 333, and see Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, 
above n9, p38.
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Constitution to offer civilian defendants the same constitutional rights as US citizens 
if they are charged with non-military offences before a court under US authority.177
However, Article 64 provides that unless the penal laws of the occupied 
territory violate protections in Geneva IV, they are to continue in force. Human 
rights treaties that elaborate standards such as ‘discrimination’ in Geneva IV may
i  no
prove useful in meeting this obligation. Where standards differ, there are two 
possible outcomes. Where Geneva IV provides a broader compulsory regime than 
rights law, the broader regime is to be implemented by the occupant; Article 3 due 
process of law, for example, has not been recognised as a customary right. Where 
Geneva IV standards are met, and there is no problem of security, but domestic rights 
standards are nonetheless “contrary to fundamental humanitarian standards,” it has 
been suggested that the occupant’s obligation to allow their continuation is alleviated 
in favour of a “general principle of international law that these fundamental 
standards of civilisation must be adhered to.” The Allies relied on this in
1 Ä 1completely suspending the German judicial system in 1945.
Where derogable rights do pose security problems, it would appear that the 
occupant has the competence to derogate from them: in its early stages, for example, 
the CPA did not re-introduce directly a freedom of assembly for security reasons, but 
expressed its “intention” to remove the prohibition in the extant Penal Code 1969
1 R9“and advance towards normalisation ... as public security improves.”
3.5.3 Case Study: The Right to Defence Counsel
The right to adequate opportunity for defence before a properly constituted 
1
criminal court is an apposite example of the relationship between rights law and
177US v Tiede and Ruske (1979) Criminal Cases No 78-001 and 78-001A, US Department of Justice 
Reproduction.
178 Adam Roberts, ‘Applicability of Human Rights Law,’ above nl72, at 73.
l79Theodor Meron, ‘The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law’ (1987) 81 AJIL 348, at 357, citing 
the Restatement o f Foreign Relations Law o f the United Stated (Revised), paragraph 702 (Tent. Draft 
No 6, vol 1, 1985).
m)Haetzini v Minister o f Defence Israeli Supreme Court HC 61/80; Kelly, above n9, para 510. 
lslMere suspension of laws facilitating the Holocaust, for example, would have meant the revival of 
those laws after occupation without further action: Justice Trial, Opinion and Judgment, p962, citing 
an article by George A. Zinn, Minister of Justice of Hessen, entitled “Germany as the Problem of the 
Law of States.”
l82Section 1(1), CPA Order 19 -  Freedom of Assembly, entered into force 10 July 2003.
187Article 9(3), ICCPR, requires the conduct of criminal trials “promptly before a judge or other 
officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power;” Article 14(3b) requires, in the “determination of
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occupation. An occupant may be in a position where local defence counsel refuse to 
act under occupation, of particular significance to the occupant’s scope to create 
security offences and tribunals, or the occupant may determine that the right to 
counsel currently provided in the domestic penal law is inadequate by their own or 
international standards. The existence of an independent legal profession capable of 
filling this role of challenging the exercise of state power against the individual is 
seen as one of the institutional underpinnings of the blueprint analysis of the rule of 
law.184
In the first case, the Israeli response to a near universal strike by the 
Palestinian Bar Association has been to amend local law to grant Israeli lawyers a 
right of appearance and to invest the legal powers of the Bar Association in the
I O C
Officer in Charge of the Judiciary. ~ The strike was based on a Palestinian complaint 
that the abolition of the Jerusalem courts on purported annexation were unlawful and
i o s
so to “appear before the newly organised courts would give legitimacy” to them. 
Jordanian law already provided for a range of criminal cases where legal 
representation was mandatory. Provided this measure was expressed to be 
temporary, it would be within the competence to assure the ‘administration of 
justice’ in Article 64, because the administration of justice is ineffective without it.
In Iraq, however, the latter was the case. Thus the CPA legislated a right to 
counsel, including provision of legal aid for indigent defendants for “misdemeanours 
and felonies.” A right to counsel of choice before the CCCI-K was promulgated,
1 8Qincluding legal aid by a “suitably qualified attorney.” In practice, however, Iraqis
any criminal charge,” the defendant to “have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence and to communicate with counsel of his choosing” and (d) the ability at trial to “defend 
himself in person, or through legal assistance of his own choosing,” with limited requirements for 
legal aid for indigent defendants. 
l84Shehadeh and Kuttab, above n40, p45.
185Order Concerning Appearance in Court by Israeli Lawyers (Emergency) 145/1967, originally for a 
six month period only, extended on expiry until such time as the Regional Commander is satisfied it is 
no longer required. Its avowed purpose was to “guarantee the rule of law and to ensure the continued 
functioning of the courts existing in the area:” see further Israeli National Section of the International 
Commission of Jurists, above n9, p33.
186Shehadeh and Kuttab, above n40, p45.
I87lbid, pp46-7 and the references there cited.
l88But not “infractions,” the lowest level of criminal offending: sections 1 and 2 respectively, CPA 
Order 53 -  Public Defender Fees, entered into force 18 January 2004.
l89Section 22, CPA Order 13. This step was critical for an effective right, as required by the ICCPR, 
since the private cost for a defence lawyer was high under occupation, calculated in thousands of US 
dollars or in kind for modem or exclusive goods: Gettleman, above nl 15.
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reported the new right as ineffective in achieving its intended rule of law purpose. In 
the first case, on-going security concerns caused delays injudicial process and a lack 
of access to clients for the appointed counsel, notwithstanding Coalition efforts to 
create legal aid centres in their detention camps. 190 Secondly, the changes when 
unexplained caused difficulty -  anecdotal reports suggested that the failure to specify 
that the right could be waived by the defendant meant it was being enforced against 
defendants who wished to plead guilty, “because the Coalition required every 
accused to have a lawyer whether he wanted one or not.” In this situation, the judge’s 
reasoning was based on the inquisitorial system’s assumption of the completeness of 
the code. 191
The effort to meet an international standard, above that required for the 
purposes of the population, causes significant difficulties. This is particularly so for 
an occupant with a common law tradition, administering a society steeped in the civil 
law. Further, American criticism of the lack of volubility and strong defence by 
defence lawyers in CCCI-K proceedings “ was based on a lack of understanding of 
the operation of Iraqi procedure. In criminal matters, for example, while “lawyers 
can raise objections ... they traditionally play a smaller role than those in an 
American-style trial.”19’ This is attributable not just to a lack of familiarity but the 
long-held view that the common law constitutionalism is the better means to preserve 
individual rights, 194 although occupation law prevents that kind of importation of 
principle.
In this context, the prohibition on the introduction of the occupant’s law or 
legal system preserves the rule of law properly so called. The introduction of rights 
discourse which does not have an indigenous origin can significantly hinder rule of 
law outcomes as sought by the occupant, through lack of mutual comprehension 
from both parties as to their respective legal traditions and through the absence of a 
common, much less universal, understanding of the content of rights. Where there is 
no security purpose to be achieved, and no temporary intervention necessary to
l90Moss, above n21. One Iraqi defence lawyer considered that the delays and lack of access to clients 
under the CCCI-K set-up were no different to the Ba’athist legal system: Giordono, above n21.
191 Interview with Captain Dunn, as reported in CLAMO, Rule o f Law Handbook, above n23, pi 81. 
l92For example, Frank, above n27, Part III. 
l92Gettleman, above nl 15.
194 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study o f the Law o f the Constitution, 9th Edn, MacMillan, 
London, 1948 (originally published 1885).
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prevent activities contrary to Geneva IV protections, there should not be non- 
consensual rights-based intervention by occupants.
3.6 The Effect of Occupation Law on Efforts to Create the Rule of Law 
Through Judicial Reconstruction
The transition from occupation to sovereign government provides an 
opportune moment to test the permanent effect of judicial reconstruction attempted 
by the occupant. Since measures are intended to be temporary, and wholesale 
rejection by the sovereign is precluded (since no changes substantially affecting the 
character of la vie publique should have been implemented), the transition would 
logically be fairly smooth as concerns legal arrangements. It may be assisted, or 
occupation measures legitimated, by the involvement of an indigenous consultative 
organisation, such as the Iraqi Governing Council from the commencement of the 
occupation,195 but this is not mandated. However, even in Iraq an extensive 
rescission and passing of transitional provisions proved necessary before the transfer 
of power on 28 June 2004 to the Iraqi Interim Government.196
In the same way that international humanitarian law seeks to prevent the
1 Q 7waging of total war by limiting the harmful effects of combat on civilians, the law 
of occupation seeks to minimise the impact on the sovereignty and self-ordering of
195The CPA established it as an interim Iraqi administration on 13 July 2003 and undertook to “consult 
and coordinate on all matters involving the temporary governance of Iraq, including the authorities of 
the Governing Council,” although the CPA did not surrender the temporary powers of government it 
had asserted in its Regulation 1 three months earlier. See CPA Regulation 6 -  Governing Council o f 
Iraq, entered into force 13 July 2003.
,%For example CPA Regulation 9 -  Dissolution o f the Governing Council, entered into force 9 June 
2004. After the passage of the Law o f Administration for the State o f Iraq for the Transitional Period 
(“TAL”), the CPA found it necessary to rescind all orders, regulations, memorandums and other 
documents relating to the Governing Council of Iraq. Ahead of the transfer, all legislative acts of the 
CPA were asserted to remain in effect unless specifically rescinded or amended: prefatory remarks, 
CPA Order 100 -  Transition o f Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, entered into force 28 June 2004 (“CPA Order 100"). Section 1 specifically 
addressed transfer of powers granted to the CPA Administrator, including amending the appointment 
procedure and excusing of judges for the CCCI-K, abolishing the Judicial Review Committee, and 
appointing the High Judicial Council to replace the Council of Judges: sections 3(6) and 6(13). The 
last was pursuant to Article 45, TAL. Unsurprisingly, part of the transition was also ensuring the 
continuity of the powers given to the Coalition when it became the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF- 
I): sections 2(7-8), 3(3), 6(5) and 6(8).
l97See for example Denise Plattner, ‘Assistance to the Civilian Population: The Development and 
Present State of International Humanitarian Law’ (1998) 288 International Review o f the Red Cross 
249, available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/57JMAR, viewed 13 October 2009.
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an occupied territory by limiting the power of the occupant to effect permanent 
change to its social or political organisation. Further, aside from the fundamental 
problem of security, which imposes practical limitations on the rule of law power of 
the occupant, the very character of the occupant precludes their participation in the 
development of a rule of law system.
That is, military occupation itself is the most significant limitation on the rule 
of law, even where it occurs pursuant to an agreement, especially a treaty of peace, 
given relative bargaining power.194 Where the occupation lacks any cultural 
homogeneity or similarity with the occupied area, it will struggle to implement 
culturally appropriate reforms. Interestingly, the British activities in occupation of 
Basra, Mosul and Baghdad following World War One are identified as creating a 
legal and social climate in which Saddam Hussein was able to seize power.200 More 
recently, the CPA introduced the novel, federal CCCI-K to Iraq, which has lacked 
legitimacy for the populace because of its foreign origins and influences,_ but was 
intended to reform the domestic rule of law.
Amplified by some earlier authority from the protracted Israeli occupation of 
various areas, the Coalition occupation of Iraq in 2003-4 demonstrates a declared 
interest in using the occupation powers to create or recreate the ‘rule of law,’ 
sometimes as a measure of security but more often, it seems, as a good in itself. This 
marks a departure from earlier practice in Germany and Japan, where the purpose 
was rather the explicit inculcation of democratic values. The law and democratic
198CLAMO, Rule o f Law Handbook, above n23, p 162; Shehadeh and Kuttab, above n40, pi 1; Ernst 
Fraenkel, Military Occupation and the Rule o f Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1944, pp226-7, 
who says that failure to recognise the supremacy of citizens’ consent was the “greatest weakness of 
the Rhineland Agreement,” under which parts of Germany were occupied following World War One. 
'"For example, Articles 3(c-e) and 4 concerning the continuation of German law, penal provisions 
and arrest, of the Rhineland Agreement (Gazette, 1920, No 1) which provided for the occupation of 
areas of Germany for 15 years. However, Marshal Foch declared for the Allied and Associated 
Powers that the Hague Convention would be applied, presumably in the interstices. See further 
Fraenkel, ibid, who at p225 describes the Agreement as “an idealistic model plan for an occupation.” 
200Roberts, ‘Socio-Religious Obstacles,’ above n80, at 401.
2(1'Other alternatives were in fact available. Roberts favoured the adoption of the Kuwaiti judicial 
model, which permits religious-based personal status adjudication but does so within a division of the 
civil court structure and would have retained but reformed the “dysfunctional” Ba’athist system: 
Roberts, ibid, at 392-3.
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peace school would not distinguish the two in more than title, as they argue that
9 0 ?democratic rights-based rule of law and peace go hand in hand.“
Rule of law was essentially a self-appointed mission so far as it went beyond 
the establishment of security and stability in Iraq.“ Security Council Resolution 
1483 (22 May 2003) is ambivalent about any obligation of or authority in the CPA to 
create the rule of law, although along with all members states it is encouraged “to 
assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions.”204 Instead, the 
occupants are called on to administer Iraq effectively and work towards Iraqi self- 
determination, and the “people o f Iraq” are called on to “to form a representative 
government based on the rule of law that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi 
citizens.”205 A UN Special Representative was appointed to work with the CPA and 
the Iraqi people in developing democratic institutions and legal reform.“ Neither the 
‘rule of law’ nor the judiciary was specifically mentioned by the Security Council. 
Instead, a single paragraph highlights the need for effective domestic police and
907security forces to maintain law and order.“
The Coalition approach replaces earlier theories that non-interference in 
domestic law and policy were most conducive to the occupant’s security, and 
therefore also to peace generally. However, the fact of occupation and the 
privileges accorded to the occupant reveal a fundamental inconsistency in putative
202John Dugard, Special Rapporteur for the Commission on Human Rights, Question of the Violation 
of Human Right in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine, Commission on Human Rights 
E/CN.4/2004/6, 8 September 2003, para 3. Stahn, summarising, recognises that the authority of the 
occupant is not broad enough to permit “economic, social, and institutional change for the purpose of 
state-building: Carsten Stahn, ‘Justice under Transitional Administration: Contours and Critique of a 
Paradigm’ (2005) 27 Hous J  Inti Law 311, at 339.
203Para 13, UNSC Resolution 1511 (2003). Planning for this reform in pursuit of democracy and a free 
market economy is evident in United States Institute of Peace, above n81.
204Para 1, UNSC Resolution 1483 (2003).
2l)5Paras 4-5 and prefatory remarks, ibid. The Resolution was primarily concerned with the 
administration of donor funds, Iraqi national debt and the winding up of the oil-for-food program. 
UNSC Resolution 1511 (2003) clarified that the occupation would cease to be lawful when “an 
internationally recognised, representative government established by the people of Iraq” was sworn in: 
paragraph 1. In a letter to the Council prior to passing the Resolution, the Coalition declared itself to 
be “facilitating the efforts of the Iraqi people to take the first steps towards forming a representative 
government, based on the rule of law:” Letter from Jeremy Greenstock, Permanent Representative of 
the United Kingdom, and John Negroponte, Permanent Representative of the United States, to the 
President of the United Nations Security Council, 8 Mar 2003.
206Para 8(c and i), ibid.
207Para 16, UNSC Resolution 1511 (2003).
2l)XSee Fraenkel’s critique of laissez-faire negotiation of the Rhineland Agreement, following World 
War One: above nl98, p225.
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‘rule of law’ measures under occupation. Whether judicial intervention is capable of 
bettering security is also arguable.
3.6.1 The Occupant as a Non-Participant in the Legal System
In the first case, and crucially, the occupant cannot create a rule of law 
relationship because it is not a subject of domestic law.209 The authorities agree that 
international law not only does not allow, but in fact prevents, the use of the 
domestic court structure against the occupant without consent.210 Nor are occupation 
regulations subject to review, unless patently beyond the scope of Geneva IV and the 
Hague Regulations. An authority which is not part of the rule of law relationship 
properly understood is in no position to participate in its development, nor is 
executive fiat (the closest analogy to occupation rule) a non-instrumental rule 
governing the rule of law relationship. Thus, the Palestinian criticism of Israeli 
exemptions for their personnel and agencies from the jurisdiction of West Bank 
courts is correct when considering the rule of law in the area, but not because 
occupier assumes “the powers of a sovereign in all areas of government,” “ as 
claimed, simply because they are an occupant.
Nor is there a compulsion on the inhabitants of the occupied area to comply 
with acts of the occupant. Their resistance to foreign domination, even where 
intervention is limited to the occupant’s security, is inevitable and is expressed in 
activities “inconsistent” with that security.“ International law itself recognises this
20<)This is not to say that the occupant will never be subject to municipal law; it may negotiate a so- 
called Status of Forces Agreement which will govern the presence of its troops in the territory. Such 
an agreement was implemented in Iraq at the end of 31 December 2008, on expiry of UN Security 
Council authority for intervention. In this part, discussion refers to occupants present without consent 
of the territory where there is no international agreement governing their presence.
2l0Von Glahn, above n9, p3; and see also Israeli National Section of the International Commission of 
Jurists, above n9, p i3.
211 Muhammad Amin al-Ja’bari v Ahman Ya’qub ‘Abd al-Karim al-Awiwi (1968) 42 Inti L Rep 484 
(Court of Appeal, Ramallah, 17 June 1968); Halvorsen (1942-3) 11 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 604.
2l2Shehadeh and Kuttab, above n40, p36. The Order Concerning Local Courts (Status o f Israel 
Defence Force Authorities) 1967 exempts Israeli military personnel and executive agencies from the 
jurisdiction of West Bank courts except by permission of the Area Commander: see especially section 
2. Interestingly, it appears such permission was often granted, at least in the early years of the 
occupation: Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, above n9, pi 4.
212Major Richard B. Baxter, ‘The Duty of Obedience to the Belligerent Occupant’ (1950) 27 BYBIL 
235, at 235. Baxter criticises French and continental practice which seems to locate a duty to obey in 
the force exerted by the occupant as a concession to or approval of the conduct of hostilities implicit. 
His view is strongly supported by the prohibition on the use of force in international relations in
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in 1977 Geneva Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949 and 
Relating to the Protection o f Victims o f International Armed Conflicts, which applies to 
anti-colonial movements.214 Baxter concludes that there is no moral or legal 
obligation on the inhabitant of an occupied territory to obey the occupant in 
international law. However, Morgenstern disagrees, suggesting that “in justice and 
in legal logic” there must be an obligation to obey orders issued within the scope of 
occupation law. Customary practice is firm that the Hague Regulations and 
Geneva IV do confer certain competences on the occupant, albeit not sovereignty, 
and this grant would be nugatory without a minimal obligation to comply on the part 
of the occupied. Nor would there be utility in protecting the status quo ante without 
such.
Even where a blueprint program is implemented to form the ‘rule of law,’ 
measurability of outcomes is problematic. The approach, using sweeping principles 
such as ‘due process,’ was implemented and criticised in the Rhineland after World 
War One“ but is still employed. Measures such as the number of courts in operation 
does not shed light on the rule of law quality of those institutions, although the speed 
of their restoration might demonstrate achievement of Hague Regulations 
requirements to restore la vie publique. Similarly, tracking the number of cases 
resolved does not account for the observed phenomenon of a rise in crime during 
periods of reform of security institutions, while assessment of “interference” or
Article 2(4), Charter o f the United Nations, 24 October 1945, San Francisco, 1 UNTS 41, entered into 
force 1 November 1945.
2l4Article 1(4), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection o f Victims o f International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Geneva, 1125 UNTS 
3, entered into force 7 December 1978.
215Baxter, above n213, at 243, 260.
2l6Morgenstem, above n4, at 295, citing in support de RidderTartain v Procureur du Roi (1920) 47 
Clunet 727 (20 May 1916). He prefers to see the Hague Regulations as “a compromise” between the 
interests of the occupier and occupied.
2l7Fraenkel, above nl98, p230, considering the possible form of a (permanent) occupation of Germany 
on conclusion of the then-progressing Second World War. Stromseth et al favour “a constructive 
approach to building the rule of law must be ends-based and strategic, adaptive and dynamic, and 
systemic. We call this the synergistic approach:” above n8, p 13. However their program is still based 
on a judiciary and court structure with measurable features.
2lxFor example, Coalition forces monitored the rate of operation of regional courts. By the end of June 
2003, the courts in Babil, Karbala and Najaf provinces were operating: Major Craig Bennett, US 
Judge Advocate, al-Hillah Government Support Team (July 2003), as quoted in CLAMO, Rule o f Law 
Handbook, above n23, p 171. See also L. Paul Bremer, ‘Address to the Iraqi People on Justice,’ for 
broadcast 14 November 2003, http://www.coalitioniraq.org/transcripts/20031114_Nov-14-Bremer- 
Justice-post.htm, viewed 23 March 2008.
2|l,Seth Jones, Jeremy Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order 
After Conflict, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 2005, p.xiv.
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“external influence” especially “undue religious influence,” “  may confuse 
corruption with the crystallisation of an indigenous rule of law. At least some of 
these factors will necessarily form part of the domestic rule of law discussion (and 
self-determination), particularly tribal and religious influences, yet these are 
identified as indicators of the absence of the rule of law. The occupant attempting to 
implement rule of law measures faces the awkward situation of being unable to 
participate in the very process it wishes to foster, and being unable to measure the 
rule of law impact of programs it does attempt.
3.6.2 Competence o f  the Occupant to Act Contrarily to Rule o f  Law 
Principle in the Pursuit o f  Order
The primary concern of the occupant with security, both in international law 
and of necessity, allows and encourages actions directly contrary to the rule of law, 
even as understood internationally as a rights-based democracy. Article 78, Geneva 
IV, conceives of administrative detention for “imperative reasons of security;” that 
is, detention not on the basis of conviction and sentence by a criminal court 
following regular criminal proceedings, nor on the basis of a judicial order of 
arrest. This was the basis of the Coalition’s Combined Review and Release Board 
(CRRB) which decided, administratively and without representation of the 
individual, whether a person acquitted by the CCCI-K could be released or is to be 
further detained, this time without charge. Iraqis claim that this practice 
contributed to frustration with occupation and further violence.224 Israel too provides 
for extendable periods of administrative detention for “reasons of regional or public 
security;” it is subject to early judicial review but excludes certain elements expected 
of a fair trial, including allowing ‘confidential’ evidence not revealed to the
220
220Colonel Bruce Pagel, JA, USAR (First Infantry Division Rule o f Law Officer May 2004-February 
2005) in CLAMO, Rule o f Law Handbook, above n23, pi 93 (FN 7), reporting the criteria employed 
by an Assessment Team in North Central Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom 2.
22‘See for example the extensive debate about the role for Islamic Shariah law in the new Iraqi 
Constitution, and the CPA’s statements about the level o f dependence on the Shariah it would permit 
in enacting the draft document: Kristen Stilt, ‘Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi 
Legal System’ (2004) 36 Geo Wash Inti LR 695, at 707.
222Z. Hadar, ‘Administrative Detentions Employed by Israel’ (1980) 1 Isr YBHR 283. See the rights 
enumerated in Article 14, ICCPR, regarding trial and conviction, and in Principle 70, United Nations, 
Economic and Social Council, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation o f Provisions in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, UN Doc E/CN.4/1984/4 (1984).
223M oss, above n21.
224Ibid.
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99 Sdefence. This is an exception to the general principle that arrest or detention which
99 z.
is not followed by criminal proceedings is a breach of international law““ and the
227legal safeguards customary among “civilised nations.”
Administrative detention, in addition to the measures discussed above, is 
contrary to the traditional concepts of the rule of law. Granting the occupant the 
competence to disregard those theories, in addition to its absent competence to 
participate in the rule of law properly so called, is firm evidence of exclusion of a 
rule of law competence to occupants.
3.7 Conclusion: The Fundamental Problem of Security
In attempting to procure the rule of law through legislative intention in the 
domestic judicial structure, the CPA has encountered the same conundrum as has 
faced many occupants. Theorists argue that an essential element of the rule of law is 
strong and independent judicial institutions, and that the power of the occupant to 
maintain security and public order authorise such intervention, however judicial 
institutions are not able to function in this way in an insecure climate. In Somaliland 
in 1941, for example, the British considered that “the first necessity in Somalia was a 
strong and well organised police force, upon which the institution of courts and
990
judicial machinery could wait.”
International rule of law theory and practice, however, represent the judiciary 
as “a crucial co-requisite” to the constitution and democratic elections that dominated 
the CPA administration in 2003, while the maintenance of basic security was carried 
“simultaneously.”“ The problem for Iraq was the degree of public opposition, 
including violent opposition, to the occupation; the occupation was simply not
225Section 87A-D, Order Concerning Security Provisions 378/1970. See further Israeli National 
Section of the International Commission of Jurists, above n9, p72 et seq. A similar scheme applies to 
house arrest and restriction orders for reasons of security: p87.
22(Palios v Germany summarised in (1933) 111(2) Zeitschrift for ausländisches und öffentliches Recht 
und Völkerrecht 119, and see G. Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International 
Courts and Tribunals, Vol II: The Law of Armed Conflict, Stevens and Sons, London, 1968, p221. 
227“Lc detenu doit etre traite d ’une moniere appropriee ä sa situation, et qui corresponde au niveau 
habituellement admis entre nations civilises: ’’ Chevreau Arbitration (1931) 2 RIAA at 1123.
22xLord Rennell of Rodd, British Military Administration o f Occupied Territories in A frica During the 
Years 1941-1947, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1948, pp333-4.
22)Roberts, ‘Socio-Religious Obstacles,’ above n80, at 368-9.
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comparable with an occupation following surrender or peace treaty, such as in 
1945.“ Indeed, judicial security was so low as to require the CPA to make provision 
for pensions for the families of judges and prosecutors assassinated after the 
commencement of occupation. Judicial decision-making even at the flagship 
institution of the CCCI-K was reportedly subject to pressure from government and 
from militant groups, while the limitations on communication due to the military 
situation in southern Iraq in 2003 meant CPA changes to the Penal Code could not 
be evenly implemented.
In this climate, which is the cart and which the horse? Jones et al argue that, 
to achieve “success” in rebuilding internal security post-conflict, three things are 
necessary: the “golden hour,” the first window of opportunity following intervention 
of “several weeks of several months” must be taken advantage of, police and security 
reforms must be associated with a functioning judiciary and minimum resource 
levels and means identified in recent interventions must be applied.234 Occupation 
law, however, presents a different perspective. It mandates temporary administrative 
intervention in the justice system, only to keep it functioning, but it grants very 
extensive powers to the occupant to restore order and to maintain its security through 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and through Geneva IV. Some of these 
measures, in particular the establishment of extraordinary military occupation courts 
and creation of security offences outside the domestic system of criminal justice, are 
contrary to substantive and formal rule of law theories, and well outside the 
‘blueprint analysis.’
Where occupation law expresses no interest in the ‘rule of law’ popularly so 
called, in fact favouring the formation of a domestic rule of relationship, and 
provides broad security powers inconsistent with the first theory of the rule of law, it 
is clear that security must precede a preoccupation with the rule of law and that 
achieving security requires derogation, within the scope of human rights law, to 
create an environment in which post-occupation rule of law might flourish. It is
2?()Jones et al, above n219, p.vii.
21,1 CPA Order 52 - Payment o f Pensions for Judges and Prosecutors who Die while Holding Office, 
entered into force 8 January 2004, providing for pensions at 80% of salary forjudges and prosecutors 
who died or were killed in office after 1 June 2003.
2?2Moss, above n21.
223Interview with Captain Dunn, as reported in CLAMO, Rule o f Law Handbook, above n23, pi 77. 
2MJones et al, above n219, pp.xi-xii.
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neither proper nor effective for an occupant to attempt to intervene in the domestic 
judicial system in an attempt to create, recreate or enforce any understanding of the 
‘rule of law,’ nor have they that capacity. The appeal to such rhetoric may attract 
international legitimacy to a domestic undertaking which will feed the systemic 
coherence of international law, but it cannot and will not result in the domestic rule 
of law.
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C H A P T E R  FOUR
SECURITY COUNCIL INTERVENTIONS OUTSIDE AN 
EXPLICIT OCCUPATION FRAMEWORK
The United Nations Security Council, using its coercive powers to restore and 
maintain “international peace and security” under Chapter VII of the Charter o f the 
United Nations, has authorised a range of interventions in recent years which 
challenge notions of rule of law or judicial reconstruction by military forces, 1 
similarly to the challenges posed by occupation law. These include interventions by 
UN forces with the consent of a government in the host state, interventions where 
UN forces comprise a “transitional authority” exercising all or some of the powers of 
government, and interventions where the UN expresses support but allows 
interventions to occur under national command.“ It matches the American rhetorical 
and strategic focus on the rule of law as one of the “nonnegotiable demands of 
human dignity” along with a range of individual rights.”
The Security Council has not authorised an intervention where the Resolution 
itself acknowledges the application of occupation law -  therefore the questions arise: 
what law does apply to such interventions, and how does that body of law authorise 
or accept intervention in domestic judicial systems to achieve the rule of law, in a 
legal environment which demands self-determination and favours national
1 Charter o f the United Nations, 24 October 1945, San Francisco, 1 UNTS 41, entered into force 1 
November 1945; Michael A. Newton, ‘Harmony or Hegemony: The American Military Role in the 
Pursuit of Justice’ (2004) 19 Conn J  Inti Law 231, at 232.
Examples include intervention in Iraq based on host state consent (UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004), 
extended annually in Resolutions 1637 (2005), 1723 (2006) and 1790 (2007); United Nations 
Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET; UNSC Resolution 1272 (1999)), United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC; UNSC Resolution 745 (1992)) and United Nations 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK; UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999)) as transitional authorities; and national 
command-based intervention in the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), working with United Nations 
Operation in Somalia 1 (UNOSOM I), authorised in UNSC Resolution 794 (1992), or the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), which forces under national command agreed to 
‘co-operate’ with the UN Secretary General to achieve the designated mission (UNSC Resolutions 
872 (1992) and 929 (1994)).
^Including “free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic 
tolerance; and respect for private property: The National Security Strategy o f the United States of 
America, (September 2002), p9, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/ 
national/nss-020920.pdf, viewed 5 April 2009; see also Newton, ibid, at 233.
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jurisdiction in criminal prosecutions?4 Further, how does the use of military 
interveners aid or hinder such programs? In Iraq since the end of occupation in 2004, 
military interveners have taken an active role, contrary to the reality that the success 
of intervention is in establishing the secure environment required for the rule of law 
whose realisation will follow, rather than in direct judicial intervention.5 An analysis 
of the course of intervention in Iraq, and other states, follows a conceptual rather 
than chronological path in this chapter. This recognises that widespread public 
rejection of the intervention in Iraq by Coalition forces acting with UN authority, 
notwithstanding the consent of Iraqi authorities, provides a useful counterpoint to 
other interventions focussed on self-determination, particularly East Timor, in 
discussing legitimacy. It is legitimacy, in the sense of social acceptability, that will 
be seen as an essential element in rule of law formation, as opposed to the restoration 
of order and security.
Before considering the application of law to the intervention itself, recent 
developments in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, or the ‘responsibility to 
protect,’ mean that egregious human rights abuses may themselves justify an 
intervention in circumstances where the international rule of law is rights-based, 
affecting the scope of action permitted during intervention. The possibility of 
military intervention where a state’s legal system does not meet the popular rights- 
based, institutionalist model of the rule of law which dominates internationally has 
significant consequences for the formation of a domestic rule of law relationship -  
and, while not yet crystallised as a justification for direct intervention, this possibility 
is not precluded by current trends. It represents the culmination of the tension 
identified in Chapter One, in which the international rule of law demands reasonable 
consistency in the domestic rules of law for its own coherence,6 because it potentially 
subjects the domestic rule of law relationship to armed force in the quest for 
international rule of law coherence. It appears that there is an openness to the idea of
4For example, the principle of complementary jurisdiction in the Preamble and Article 1, Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, concluded 17 July 1998, Rome, 2187 UNTS 3, entered into force 1 July 
2002, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9* (“Rome Statute").
5Newton, above nl, at 238.
6See particularly section 1.7, Chapter One above.
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such a right of intervention, based in two decisions identifying judicial activity
7
contrary to rights-based rule of law practice as a crime against humanity.
This has become important since the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1040 
(1996), the first Council reference to the ‘rule of law’ in the context of supporting the 
Secretary-General’s intervening efforts to “facilitate a comprehensive political 
dialogue the objective of promoting national reconciliation, democracy, security and
o
the rule of law” in Burundi, which has been said to mark a move towards using the 
Security Council’s coercive powers to supplant the legal system of the state where it 
is assessed as not meeting rule of law standards as recognised in international law.* 89
Concerns have been raised in rule of law interventions which lack explicit 
authority from the Security Council that the intervener “should subject their 
intervention to the adjudication by the International Court of Justice,” including at 
the instance of the state subject to intervention.10 In such manner can the intervener 
demonstrate their own subjection to the international rule of law.11 The benefit of 
international judicial oversight, in Sampford’s view, is that the complaining state, to 
obtain redress, must also submit itself to examination as to its compliance with the 
international rule of law, including human rights, so that the “mechanism for 
subjecting interveners to the rule of law, desirable of itself, also deals with one of the 
strongest objections to it.”
1 US v Altstötter et al, (1948) 3 TWC 1 (“Justice Trial”) and Case Nr 1/9 First/2005 al-Dujail Case,
Iraqi High Tribunal, 2006 (“Dujail TriaF), judgment translated unofficially from Arabic to English by
Mizna Management LLC, available at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp, viewed 6
October 2009.
8Para 2. UN interest in the rule of law is a relatively recent phenomenon, noting both its ‘conspicuous 
absence’ from the Charter, and the authority conferred on the Security Council in Chapter VII to 
respond to threats to “international peace and security,” but not explicitly breaches of international 
law, suggesting that the two “do not necessarily overlap:” Jeremy Matam Farrall, United Nations 
Sanctions and the Rule o f Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp 15-16. Farrall traces 
its emergence in UN discourse, noting an enormous increase in references to the rule of law in UNSC 
Resolutions from 1998 (references in 69 Resolutions in 1998-2006, compared to a “handful” during 
the Cold War): p22. The rule of law was included in “peace operation mandates” in the Central 
African Republic, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Guinea- 
Bissau, Sudan and Burundi: p22 and the references there cited.
^Simon Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 Am J  Comp L 331, at 348.
l0Charles Sampford, ‘Reconceiving the Rule of Law for a Globalizing World’ in Spencer Zifcak (Ed), 
Globalisation and the Rule o f Law, Routledge, London, 2005 (p9), p25.
“ Ibid.
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4.1 When is a State’s Failure to Demonstrate a Rights-Based Rule of Law 
Itself Potentially Grounds for Intervention?
The concept of humanitarian protection, particularly to protect human rights 
whose content is not always universally agreed, has been rejected by a significant 
proportion of states who prefer to stand on a strict view of the Charter principles of 
non-interference in the domestic affairs of states. Their fear is neo-colonialism
1 T
under the ‘cloak’ of altruism. This emerges as a significant concern for the rule of 
law as a domestic relationship. Secondly, there is no necessary link between a 
‘humanitarian operation’ and judicial reconstruction or rule of law activities, as the 
latter is not a precondition to security, as demonstrated under occupation. Of the 
range of protective activities carried out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, none 
involved direct intervention in the judiciary -  the closest was voluntary reporting to 
the Commission of Experts and International War Crimes Tribunal -  probably 
because of the environment of an “all-out and merciless war.”14
A putative authority to intervene where a domestic legal system fails to 
demonstrate the individual human rights compliance required by the international 
rule of law must take its core justification from two decisions in which domestic 
judges were convicted of crimes against humanity for participating in such legal 
systems. The first was the so-called Justice Trial of 1948,15 the second the conviction 
of Awad Hamad Badr al-Bandar as-Saadoun, former president of the Revolutionary
l2ln April 2000, 114 member states of the Non-Aligned Movement condemned humanitarian 
intervention: Thalif Deen, ‘Politics: Non Aligned Movement Slams “Humanitarian Intervention,”’ 
Inter Press Service, 6 April 2000.
^Michael Kelly, Peace Operations: Tackling the Military, Legal and Policy Challenges, Australia 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1997, para 112 and the references there cited. 
l4Sergio Vieira de Mello, ‘Humanitarian and Military Interface in Peace-keeping: Cambodia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Comparative Analysis’ in Umesh Palwankar (Ed), Symposium on 
Humanitarian Action and Peace-Keeping Operations: Report, ICRC, Geneva, 1994 (pi8), p21, 
referring to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its expanded 
humanitarian mandate under UNSC Resolution 758 (1992).
15Justice Trial. The sixteen indicted German defendants included five judges, four prosecutors and 
eight officials from the Reich Ministry of Justice (Engert was both judge and official), charged with 
war crimes and crimes against humanity (1939-45), conspiracy to commit the foregoing (1933-45) and 
membership of certain organisations declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal. Control 
Council Law 10 set out these matters as crimes. The Tribunal convicted ten of the sixteen of one or 
more charges, sentencing them to terms of imprisonment including life imprisonment. Four were 
acquitted and the trials of Westphal and Engert were discontinued -  Westphal had died and Engert 
was seriously ill. For a case in which the same approach was applied to special wartime military 
courts, see Isayama, US Military Commission (Shanghai), 25 July 1946, reported in Jean-Marie 
Henckaert and Louise Doswald-Beck (Eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol 2 
(Practice Part 2), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p2385.
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Court, by the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) in 2005. The former in particular was a trial 
less of the defendants than one in which “the judicial system of the Third Reich as a 
whole” was indicted;16 accordingly, evidence was presented as to the administration 
of justice generally, only then as to each defendant’s actions in its perpetration. In the 
latter, Awad Hamad was charged with crimes against humanity, and with murder 
contrary to section 406 of the Iraqi Penal Code 1969. The cases are significant 
because they identify international limitations on the character of the legal system 
able to be implemented internally by independent States, breach of which may justify 
direct intervention. In addition to establishing acts which constitute war crimes by 
individual judges, they determine a measure by which entire judicial systems are 
judged criminal based on egregious human rights abuses, noting that it is this key 
phrase which governs the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention.’ As with all other 
cases of ‘humanitarian intervention,’ the trend sits very tensely with the UN Charter 
and specifically its prohibition on the use of force.
4.1.1 Rejection o f Judicial Activity as an Act o f State in International 
Criminal Law
Acts committed by or assumed by a state are immune from individual 
criminal liability under foreign municipal law, because sovereignty is equal; that is,
l6“Das Verfahren war das einzige der Nachkriegszeit, mit dem die Justiz des Dritten Reiches als 
Ganzes ‘bewältigt’ werden sollte:” Professor Dr Klaus Kästner, “Der Dolch des Mörders war unter 
der Robe des Juristen verborgen:” Der Nürnberger Juristen-Prozess 1947,
http://www.justiz.bayem.de/imperia/md/content/stmj_intemet/gerichte/oberlandesgerichte/nuemberg/ 
kastner_jp.pdf, viewed 17 October 2009 (translated by the author), p4. In part this was due to the 
absence of those with the greatest responsibility: Roland Freisler, the ‘hanging judge’ of the 
extraordinary People’s Court (similar in structure and purpose to the Iraqi Revolutionary Court 
presided over by Awad Hamad) was killed in an air raid in 1945; and the president of the 
Reichsgericht and both Ministers of Justice were also dead (Minister Otto Thierack by suicide while 
in Allied custody): see further Ingo Müller, Hitler's Justice: The Courts o f the Third Reich, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1991, (translated by Deborah Schneider), p270.
I7A s defined in Article 12, Law of the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court 10/2005 (replacing the Statute o f 
the Iraqi Special Tribunal 1/2003, issued by the Iraqi Governing Council pursuant to delegation in 
Coalition Provisional Authority Order 48: Delegation o f Authority Regarding an Iraqi Special 
Tribunal, entered into force 10 December 2003). The definition follows those of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the 
International Criminal Court: Michael Scharf and Michael Newton, ‘The Iraqi High Tribunal’s Dujail 
Trial Opinion’ (2006) 10(34) ASIL Insights, available at http://www.asil.org/insights061218.cfm, 
viewed 14 October 2009. The indictment itself specifically concerned murder, arrest of civilians, 
destruction of private property, devastation of the Dujail village area, torture and judicial murder in 
the village of Dujail following an alleged assassination attempt there on Saddam Hussein on 14 
October 1984.
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|8 . . .they are barred from prosecution, not necessarily not criminal. If judicial activity is 
considered an act of state, then jurisdiction to prosecute judges remains with the 
home state if the acts are criminal, notwithstanding the reality that states will not 
prosecute acts they have accepted as acts of state, and if the act is disclaimed, then 
immunity is waived. The Justice Case, dealing with international crimes, also 
recognised the primacy of domestic jurisdiction, permitting trial in another State only 
if it procured the defendant before the court, or a competent international tribunal. 19 
The IHT found that immunity from trial for crimes against humanity was 
“impossible,” dismissing the objection of counsel for Saddam, although because
90domestic crimes had also been charged, the question was largely academic.
The problem for the assertion of a right to intervene based on the criminality 
of the domestic judicial system is therefore the limitation of jurisdiction. In 
Germany, since occupying Allies brought the prosecution, the Tribunal asserted the 
Control Council’s legal right, in the absence of a functioning sovereign government, 
to give consent on Germany’s behalf. However, this was a far broader claim of 
right than under the general law of occupation, essentially asserting sovereignty. 
Through the implication of consent, it acknowledged the application of act of state 
doctrine to judicial activity, contrary to its later assertion that it “can scarcely be said 
that governmental participation, the proof of which is necessary for conviction, can
99also be a defense to the charge.”
The Nuremberg Tribunal took a slightly different view than the IHT: they 
considered that the laws and “perverted Nazi judicial system themselves constituted 
the substance of war crimes and crimes against humanity.” If the laws and judicial 
system were the essence of Nazi criminality, then the German state must have borne
l8See Robert Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law, Revised Edition, Stevens, London, 
1962, p67. For a broader explanation of the act of state doctrine, see Yitiha Simbeye, Immunity and 
International Criminal Law, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2004, pl24 et seq.
19Justice Trial, Opinion and Judgment, p967.
20Dujail Trial, Opinion, Part 1, p32, 41, adopting the judgment of the International Military Tribunal 
(IMT) in Trial o f the Major War Criminals, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946.
2'The Tribunal in the Justice Case concluded that as Germany was no longer a belligerent and was 
incapable of government, the Allied powers were seized of full legislative and constitutional power, 
rather than the interim power accorded to occupying belligerents under international law: Opinion and 
Judgment, pp960-4, 971.
“ Ibid, p984.
23Ibid.
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primary liability, law-making being the quintessential act of state.24 Further, in the 
case of criminal laws, the offence is generally understood to have been committed
25against the state and the state administers punishment in the person of the judge." 
Since law-making is not beyond the competence of the state per se, the Tribunal 
fixed upon the exercise of state power in accordance with National Socialist ideology 
as the criminalising element." That is, the exercise of state power to particular ends 
may be beyond its competence and internationally criminal -  not, after all, an act of 
state.27
However, international criminal liability can attach only to individuals, who 
procure these purported acts. Judge Schlegelberger bore “primary liability” for the 
Nazis’ Night and Fog Decree, which he had signed, and hence was liable as a 
principal for the abuses which flowed from it. Subsequent German courts have tried 
to deal with this conundrum by ascribing primary blame to the “leaders of the 
National Socialist regime”" and convicting judges and Ministry officials as 
accessories to the crimes of these “indirect perpetrators.” In this way, the guilt of 
the state is maintained, but at least some individual liability is accepted.
24The British prosecutor argued before the IMT that Germany was herself a criminal state, and the 
defendants accessories to her crimes: Trial o f Major War Criminals before the International Military 
Tribunal, Nuremberg (1947) Volume 1, p223, and see Quincy Wright, ‘International law and Guilt by 
Association’ (1949) 43 AJIL 746, at 411. Evidence was led at the Justice Trial that Hitler’s 
progression to sole legislator was arguably in accordance with the Weimar Constitution, and therefore 
laws passed were, formally, lawful: Testimony of Defence Witness Professor Jahrreiss, pp253-68. 
25For example, the Australian Constitution speaks of the “judicial power of the Commonwealth” in 
section 71, which must necessarily be administered through individuals, while the Criminal Code 
1995 (Cth) codifies all “offences against laws of the Commonwealth” (section 1.1).
26For example, laws dealing harshly with habitual criminals, looting, hoarding and limitations on free 
speech were not criticised but those referring to ‘the sound sentiment of the Volk' were judged 
criminal: Justice Trial, Opinion and Judgement, p i026.
27See Wright, above n24, at 410.
28The IMT in the Trial o f the Major War Criminals found that crimes “against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities,” and the Justice Case Tribunal adopted the ruling 
verbatim at Opinion and Judgment, p i062. Accordingly, Article 2(2) of Control Council Law No 10 
(20 December 1045) provided for a range of liabilities, from ‘connection’ with the crime to ordering 
its commission.
Justice Trial, Opinion and Judgment, 1083. The precise status of each conviction is not always clear 
in the court’s judgment.
20Augsburg Landgericht, 15 October 1955 (trial of judges Huppenkothen and Thorbeck for the 
execution of the July 20 resistance leaders), discussed in Müller, above nl6, p250.
2 ’Wiesbaden Landgericht (trial of “high-ranking” Ministry officials), discussed in Müller, above nl6, 
p251 -  no date supplied.
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4.1.2 The Universality o f 'Justice ’ in the Mens Rea o f Judicial Crimes
As the cognitive element of crimes against humanity committed by judges, 
the Nuremberg Tribunal sought evidence that:
the accused knew or should have known that in matters of international concern he 
was guilty of participation in a nationally organised system of injustice and 
persecution shocking to the moral sense of mankind and that he knew or should have 
known that he would be subject to punishment if caught.32
Constructive knowledge based on appointment could satisfy the first element of 
knowledge of morally shocking and systemic injustice. Further, knowledge need 
only have been of the fact, rather than knowledge of the acts’ inhumanity.34 The 
imposition of criminal liability on an objective standard of knowledge is open to 
substantial criticism, since the Justice Case Tribunal inferred it simply from the 
defendants’ status as jurists; it found the argument as to the binding nature of 
German law on the defendants irrelevant, because the domestic laws themselves 
were contrary to international law. The IHT took a similar view against Awad 
Hamad.36
Rather than an impermissible defence of superior orders (which would be 
contrary to an independent rule of law judiciary anyway), the defence argument at 
Nuremberg more closely resembled mistake of law, characterised as a defence
'llnegating mens rea. This construction is neutral as to the criminality of national
32Justice Trial, Opinion and Judgment, pp977-8.
33Klemm, for example, denied knowledge of Night and Fog procedure, but the Tribunal did not accept 
that a State Secretary whose “sources of knowledge were of a wide scope” lacked it: ibid, pp 1090-93. 
34Klemm ought to have known of Night and Fog procedure, thus when the Tribunal judged it criminal, 
the criminality could be imputed to his factual knowledge. Further, the level of knowledge was set 
low; it sufficed that Klemm knew and “approved in substance, if not in detail” of the mass execution 
of prisoners at Sonnenburg: ibid, p 1106. This approach is now one of the International Criminal 
Court’s Elements o f Crimes 2002, ICC-ASP/l/3(part II-B) (agreed by the Assembly of States Party), 
Article 30.
35Lautz, as “a lawyer of ability ... must have known that the proposed procedure was in violation of 
international law,” but “if German law were a defense, which it is not, many of [Lautz’s] acts would 
be excusable:” ibid, ppl076, 1128. See also the dismissal of defence submissions for Rothenberger, 
pi 109, and Kastner’s discussion, above nl6. The real difficulty faced by tribunals of the Justice model 
is to adapt legal principles to morally repugnant situations, resolved in the Justice Case by overtly 
addressing the prosecution in terms of morality and the conscience of mankind: for example, pp977-8. 
See further Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality o f Evil, Faber and 
Faber, London, 1963, pp251-2, where she discusses the emphasis on criminal trial above the quest for 
moral explanation.
36Further, as a judge and law graduate, al-Bandar “enjoys certain skills that might not be available to 
simpler people:” Dujail Trial, Part 2, p30.
37See Yoram Dinstein, ‘Defences,’ in Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and Olivia Swaak-Goldman (Eds), 
Substantive and Procedural Aspects o f International Criminal Law, Vol 1, Kluwer, The Hague, 2000
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laws, and has been subsequently applied to the investigation of judicial officials. It 
answers the problem of defendants steeped in the impugned judicial and social 
system, who may not in fact recognise the criminality of the laws applied. For 
example, Awad Hamad argued in defence that “he only did what any judge would 
have done in a court established under the law” and that he followed all legal 
procedures during the trial of the Dujail villagers.40 He also argued that the 
circumstances of the Iran-Iraq War were relevant and should be taken into account as 
diminishing the judicial standard required.41 Finally, Awad Hamad argued that he 
was under duress as a “government employee and not a judge.” All arguments were 
rejected.42
38
The result is a demand in international criminal law for a universal, intuitive 
recognition of justice by judges, because they are judges. Failure to administer such 
is an international crime. In cases of torture or other ius cogens rights breaches, this 
is clear enough but doubts emerge when the criminality is in the ideology of the 
domestic legal system. It has already been demonstrated above that the claim of 
universality for a rights-based rule of law is unsustainable.
4.1.3 Criminality o f Legal Features Contra Rights-Based Rule o f Law
The key features of the Nazi system impugned were the erosion of 
predictability through use of a rule of analogy which discounted pre-1935 judicial 
interpretations, institutionalisation of double jeopardy through the filing of so-called
(p367), pp377-8. Woetzel also argues that lex loci is relevant “in order to determine the awareness of 
guilt:” above nl6, p74. Article 32(2), Rome Statute now makes this a defence.
38The Karlsruhe Appeal Court concluded that Public Prosecutor Fränkel could not be prosecuted since 
there was no evidence he had ever “doubted the validity o f the regulations.” Investigation ceased 
without prosecution on 3 September 1964, discussed in Müller, above nl6, p222.
39Luc Huyse, ‘Justice After Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the 
Past’ (1995) 20 Law and Social Inquiry 51, at 60, and the references there cited. In the Rehse Case, 
the Bundesgerichtshof, for example, held that the Nazi judge was “independent under the then-valid 
law ... subject only to law and responsible to his conscience. His duty demanded that he follow only 
his own conviction of the law,” individualizing the consciousness of injustice in a way the Justice 
Case Tribunal refused: Verantwortlichkeit des berufsrichterlichen Beisitzers des Volksgerichts 
(Bundesgerichtshof Urt v. 30.4.1968 -  5 StR 670-67), reported in (1968) 21 Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1339-40. It also addresses the defence argument raised at Nuremberg by the judge 
Schlegelberger, who submitted that he had attempted to ameliorate the worst impacts of Nazi laws: 
Justice Trial, Opening Statement for the Defendant Schlegelberger (by his counsel Dr Kubuschok), 
p i26 et seq, citing the Transcript, pp4084-89.
w Dujail Opinion, Part 2, p i2, referring to Case 944/C/1984, Revolutionary Court.
41 Ibid.
42Ibid, p39.
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“nullity pleas,”43 the receipt of torture-tainted evidence and abuses of process.44 
These procedural features were in addition to unlawful substantive statutes, which 
authorised torture, disappearances or discriminatory measures, and the establishment 
of a range of special or extraordinary courts, which the Tribunal also considered in 
breach of the international prohibition on war crimes and crimes against humanity.45 
The IHT trial, although it necessarily criticised practice in extraordinary courts, 
especially the Revolutionary Court in the Saddam regime, did not find Iraqi laws 
criminal, but instead criminalised the failure to apply them in the trial of 148 Dujail 
villagers in 1984 as a crime against humanity, holding that no real ‘trial’ had taken 
place and therefore the sentences of death amounted to judicially ordered murder.46 
They concluded that the evidence was condemnatory on all these factors, that there 
was no trial in the required sense of the word and therefore the Revolutionary Court 
action was “an order for murder” and not a judicial decision.47 The illusory character 
of the trial was taken as evidence of Awad Hamad’s constructive knowledge of
4 0
injustice, while signing the sentencing document caused the commission of murder.
The principle of law relied on by the Nazi judicial system was Gesetz ist 
Gesetz or Taw is law,’ leaving it “defenceless” in face of wicked or criminal laws49 
although it has been suggested that characteristically awkward and ambiguous 
language in Nazi statutes left them open for results-oriented jurisprudence.50 
International rule of law theory, however, values predictability and certainty in law. 
Further, the criminality of Nazi ideology is interesting when, ius cogens breaches 
aside, the effect of that ideology on international law is considered, challenging its
43See Matthew Lippman, ‘The Prosecution of Josef Altstoetter et al’ (1998) 16 Dick J  Inti Law 343, at 
382 et seq.
44Defendant Klemm was accused of receiving evidence which he “must have” known was procured by 
torture: Justice Trial, Opinion and Judgment, ppl093, 1097.
45For example, Schlegelberger bore primary responsibility for criminal decrees which he had signed, 
including the so-called Nacht und Nebel (Night and Fog) decree, authorising disappearances: ibid, 
p i083; he was also found to have committed war crimes by establishing discriminatory legislation 
against Poles and Jews in the Occupied East (pp 1083-5). The involvement of the judiciary in acts of 
this kind was especially colourable (pp 1086-7).
46The evidence relied on for this finding included the brevity of the trial, the defendant’s failure to 
confirm the number or identity of the defendants or their ages since a large number were in fact 
minors, the passage of sentence on persons already dead in interrogation {Dujail Trial, Opinion, p21), 
the making of findings patently in disregard of the evidence before it (p i5, 19) and submission to 
executive direction in the result (pp 13-15).
47Dujail Trial, Part 2, p21, also p28.
4Tbid, p28.
49Kastner, above nl6, FN33. See generally also Lippman, above n43.
50Lippman, ibid, at 382.
145
foundational principles by defining the nature of the state in terms of the “organic, 
natural entity” of the Volk, rather than its physical characteristics.51 It also “radically 
revised” the judicial role, allowing ideology to permeate it to the extent of turning it 
effectively into a quasi-judicial administrative structure responding to regime 
directives. So, to be valid at international law, it seems, a “legal code must be 
firmly rooted in the liberal tradition.”54
4.1.4 Humanitarian Intervention to Restore Rule o f Law Judicial 
Institutions
The two major trials imposing criminal responsibility on judges for actions in 
the domestic legal sphere are inconclusive in establishing a right to intervene on 
humanitarian grounds. The IHT conviction of Awad Hamad, in particular, focused 
not on the legality of the domestic legal system but on the failure in an identified 
case to apply standards required by the domestic as well as the international system. 
Further, it explicitly considered that the role of custom in the international sphere 
meant that “the concept of law is not identical in the international and national 
scopes. In the national scope, the law in action is issued by a legislative authority.”55 
However, there are indications which, in the prevailing climate favouring rule of law 
interventions, are troubling.
To the extent that the IHT supports humanitarian intervention it is on the 
basis of egregious violations of the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life.56 
Arbitrariness could, by extrapolation, have been avoided by compliance with 
domestic law. The Justice Trial has a number of highly problematic aspects, in 
particular the universal ‘consciousness of injustice’ as a result of judicial office, as an 
element of the crime against humanity. Requiring individual consciousness as a test 
of criminality makes the condemnation of an entire legal system outside the Nazi
5'Detlev Vagts, ‘International Law in the Third Reich’ (1990) 84 AJIL 661, at 687-90. Compare 
Article 1, Convention on the Rights and Duties o f States, adopted by the Seventh International 
Conference o f American States, 26 December 1933, Montevideo, 165 UNTS 19, entered into force 26 
December 1934, for the standard definition of statehood.
52Lippman, above n43, at 356.
53Justice Trial, Opinion and Judgment, pp 1024-5.
54H.F. von Haast, ‘A Second Nuremberg Trial’ (1948) 24 NZU  67, at 68.
55Dujail Opinion, Part 1, p39.
56Article 6(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, adopted by General 
Assembly Resolution 2200 (1966), A/RES/2200A XXI, 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 
1976 (“ICCPR”).
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context difficult to establish sufficiently to justify armed intervention to restore it to 
the judiciary. Such intervention was not called for in Somalia, where, twenty years 
prior to UN intervention, the Supreme Revolutionary Council under Muhammad 
Siad Barre established a system of special security courts for political crimes in 
which sat judges appointed by the Council. Nor was it called for in 2001 when 
Indonesia’s former Attorney General admitted corruption was so entrenched in the
r  o
judiciary it amounted to a “mafia.” Calls to expand humanitarianism to include the 
rule of law and human rights generally59 have not yet been matched with state 
practice.
However, broader authority to intervene from the UN Security Council to 
restore international peace and security might include scope to intervene in the 
domestic judicial structure, as part of the security mission to restore ‘international 
peace and security’ if not its sole objective. The link between security as conflict 
resolution and judicial intervention, particularly seeking accountability for past 
international crimes through ‘transitional justice,’ has been asserted in Rwanda and 
East Timor.60 However, this depends largely on restrictions applying to the mission 
by general principles of international law, including international humanitarian law, 
and therefore the rule of law character of the interveners.
4.2 The Application of International Humanitarian Law and / or Occupation 
Law to Military Interventions Authorised by the Security Council
The relatively stable conception of international humanitarian law since 1949 
that conflict will involve two parties, whether international in character or otherwise, 
has to some extent been overtaken by the prevalence since the 1990s of operations
37See comments on the pre-UNOSOM judicial system in Kelly, above nl3, para 710.
SiThe Jakarta Post, 6 July 2001, cited in Mohamed C. Othman, Accountability for International 
Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case o f Rwanda and East Timor, Springer, Berlin, 2005, pl40. 
59Kelly includes the prevention of genocide, prevention of famine and restoration of ‘law and order’ as 
justifications: Kelly, above nl3, p5; de Mello, above nl4, p 18. De Mello was at that time Head of 
Civil Affairs, UNPROFOR, and considered UNSC Resolution 688 (1991) as the first move towards 
realising this, while Rwanda marked an ‘abdication.’ He defined the rule of law as “democratisation, 
‘good governance’ through institution-building, constitutional and legal reforms, information and 
education, elections:” ibid.
6°Statement of President of Rwanda, Pasteur Bizimungu, to UN General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 51st 
Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.78 (1996), p5; Othman, above n58, pl49.
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undertaken under UN auspices and further expansion is predicted.61 UN operations 
are typically divided into peacekeeping operations, governed by the consent of the 
parties, UN neutrality and minimum force in self-defence as set out in the authorising 
Security Council Resolution, and peace enforcement operations. The latter emerged 
around the time of the Rwandan genocide, as operations broader than neutral peace­
keeping supervision including the restoration or establishment of public security, for
S '*
example to allow the distribution of humanitarian assistance and to prepare the 
territory for transition to democracy.64
The model for such intervention varies broadly from a ‘light footprint’ where 
core administrative functions remain in the hands of the host state, such as in Iraq65 
and Afghanistan, to the vesting of “all of the classical powers of the state, including 
the administration of justice” in the UN force, as in Kosovo and East Timor, and a 
mix of the two as in Cambodia. The UN interveners might be placed under national 
command with UN authority, or overtly as a UN force.66 In all the variations, most 
recent interventions feature “the direct involvement of international actors in the 
restoration of justice and the rule of law in post-conflict territories” to fill domestic 
lacunae in the domestic judicial structure generally and the specific concern of 
transitional justice, whether conducted purely by the interveners or in conjunction 
with a (consenting) domestic authority.67 However, there are some variables in the 
applicable body of authorising law, which are addressed in turn below.
6lComelio Sommaruga, Preface to Umesh Palwankar (Ed), Symposium on Humanitarian Action and 
Peace-Keeping Operations: Report, ICRC, Geneva, 1994 (pi), pp5-6.
^Introduction to Palwankar (Ed), ibid, p7. For example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary 
General, spoke of operations “hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned” in An Agenda for 
Peace, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, Report of the Secretary-General 
pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, 
A/47/277 -  S/24111, 17 June 1992, para 20. Neutrality was fostered by the involvement of many 
nations from all geographic areas: Lieutenant-General Lars Erik Wahlgren, ‘Operational Tasks of 
Peace-keeping Troops’ in Palwankar (Ed), ibid, (p 12), ppl4-5.
^Introduction, Symposium on Humanitarian Action, above n62, p8.
^Wahlgren, above n62, p i2.
650n the end of occupation on 28 June 2004, Coalition forces did not hand over to a UN-mandated 
transitional authority but to an interim Iraqi government. The Security Council continued to authorise 
Coalition intervention but it was in the first class of ‘light footprints’ discussed above. Resolution 
1546 (8 June 2004) established a mandate for two organisations in Iraq after the transfer of 
government authority, not just to assist in the Iraqi transition but to ensure “regional stability:” the 
advisory United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), and the security-driven Multi-National 
Force-Iraq (MNF-I): Prefatory remarks.
66See note 2 above.
67Instead of distinguishing traditionally between judicial intervention and transitional justice to deal 
with the (international) crimes of a deposed regime, Stahn considers the administration of justice by a
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Before turning to instances of actual Security Council authority to intervene, 
it is necessary to address arguments that the support offered to the original United- 
States led occupation of Iraq in 2003-4 in Resolution 1483 (2003) may not in fact 
have confirmed the application of the law of occupation but instead “created a partial 
exception from the regime of occupation, authorising the [Coalition Provisional
s o
Authority] to engage in far-reaching law reform.” This, says Stahn, is a 
characteristic ambiguity of Security Council direction affecting the process of 
judicial reconstruction.69 However, the problem in that case seemed rather to be a 
disjunct between the hortatory outcomes the Security Council sought from the 
occupant, phrased in terms like ‘promote’ and ‘assist,’ and the mandatory limitations 
of applicable occupation law. For this reason, Scheffer preferred an explicit 
“tailored nation-building effort” by the Security Council, in which relevant principles 
of occupation law “particularly humanitarian and due process norms” could be 
combined with broader international legal concepts, such as “human rights, self- 
determination, the environment and economic development so as to create a legal
n i
regime uniquely suitable for the territory in question.” This depends on an 
emerging concept of intervention with Security Council authority capable of activity, 
possibly coercive, to achieve such goals.
transitional authority, such as the UN, as a “separate paradigm,” broader than the creation of special 
tribunals to address international crimes: Carsten Stahn, ‘Justice under Transitional Administration: 
Contours and Critique of a Paradigm’ (2005) 27 Hous J Inti Law 311, at 312-4. Newton goes further 
and argues that rebuilding the domestic judicial structure should be the “first priority”: above nl, at 
244.
68Stahn, ibid, at 321. In particular, paragraph 4 called on the Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”), 
“consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the 
welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular 
working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in 
which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future.” Scheffer points out that this 
goal, “though laudable ... cannot be achieved through occupation law alone,” noting that as well as 
identifying occupation law as applicable generally, the prefatory remarks ‘noted’ the involvement of 
“states that are not occupying powers” with the CPA, indicating that the law of occupation applied to 
them regardless of their actual status as occupants: David J. Scheffer, ‘Agora (Continued): Future 
Implications of the Iraq Conflict’ (2003) 97 AJIL 842, at 844.
69Stahn, ibid, at 321.
70Assistance to local authorities or communities is not precluded by occupation law, although 
permanent structural changes without consent are: see sections 2.3.3-4, Chapter Two above.
7'Scheffer, above n68, at 843.
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4.3 Security Council Authorisations under National Command with Host 
State Consent
There is a school of argument that the 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative 
to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War (“Geneva IV”) “ was intended 
to apply to all situations where another state is in control of territory, regardless of
'7 'Xthe existence of armed conflict, including the various kinds of UN operations. 
Since Article 4 of Geneva IV refers to persons “in the hands o f’ an occupying power, 
the test of occupation is said to be simply one of “effective control” of the territory.74 
Roberts, however, argues that the test for the application of occupation law also 
includes non-consensual presence (for if there is consent, it will govern the terms of 
the foreign presence), and a pragmatic need for the continuation of daily 
administration despite the unlawfulness of the foreign presence. Aside from the 
unlawfulness of the intervention, this could include effective control by a UN force 
under national command since these rules represent custom binding on ail states. 
However, problems of coherence and effectiveness in traditional rule of law terms 
arise when the UN force does not exercise effective control, or does not exercise 
effective control over the entire territory, especially should they attempt to exercise 
the limited scope occupation law allows to intervention in the domestic judicial 
administration.
7212 August 1949, Geneva, 75 UNTS 287, entered into force 21 October 1950.
77Kelly points out that Geneva IV “was designed to regulate the relationship between foreign military 
forces and a civilian population where the force exercises the sole authority or is the only agency with 
the capacity to exercise authority in a distinct territory.” Article 2, and the explicit clarification in the 
1947 Report of the Work of the Conference of Government Experts for the Study of the Conventions 
for the Protection of War Victims (14-26 April), Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 
1947, which would have the Convention applying “also in the event of territorial occupation in the 
absence of any state of war,” support the view: Michael Kelly, ‘Military Force and Justice’ in William 
Maley, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and 
Military Responsibilities in Failed States, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (p229), 
pp232-4. For example, the rules of occupation applied to the United Kingdom in Persia during the 
First World War, even though Persia remained neutral:” Chevreau Arbitration [1931] 2 RIAA at 
1123.
74Kelly, ‘Military Justice,’ ibid, p235.
7:1 Adam Roberts, ‘What is a Military Occupation’ (1984) 55 BYBIL 249, at 305.
76For example, the area of Somalia under the control of UN forces during UNITAF/UNOSOM II, 
compared to the transitional authority operating across the state in Cambodia under UNTAC: Kelly, 
‘Military Justice,’ above n73, p238.
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Where UN forces operate under national command,77 for example when the 
UN Security Council invites a state to conduct an intervention on its behalf, they are 
bound by their own obligations under international law. Thus, where the mandate is 
defined by Security Council authority for intervention in a domestic conflict, eg 
Korea, Somalia (UNITAF) and Rwanda (UNAMIR), then international humanitarian 
law as it applies in international armed conflicts operates between the interveners and 
the local forces, potentially including occupation law. Part of this will be the 
obligation to participate in transitional justice by pursuing justice for grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions in its own territory or territory under its control through
on
occupation. This is demonstrative of the primacy of domestic jurisdiction, which
0 1
was insisted upon in the negotiation of Geneva IV.
The case of Iraq is illustrative. The Coalition in the new form of the Multi- 
National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) was authorised to take “all necessary measures to 
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq,” as requested by 
Iraq. As an indigenous government remained in legislative control of Iraq, and the 
MNF-I presence was regulated by consent (even if in the form of agreement to the 
Security Council’s “all necessary means” authorisation), the MNF-I was not in 
effective administrative control and therefore did not attract, or indeed assert, the de 
facto administrative authority of the occupant.
77UNAMIR, for example, was a consensual intervention, in which forces under national command 
agreed to “co-operate” with the UN Secretary General to achieve the designated mission (UNSC Res. 
872 of 1992 and 929 of 1994): Daphna Shraga and Ralph Zacklin, ‘The Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace-keeping Operations: Conceptual, Legal and Practical 
Issues’ in Umesh Palwankar (Ed), Symposium on Humanitarian Action and Peace-Keeping 
Operations: Report, ICRC, Geneva, 1994 (p39), p41.
78Toni Pfanner, ‘Application of International Humanitarian Law and military operations undertaken 
under the United Nations Charter’ in Umesh Palwankar (Ed), Symposium on Humanitarian Action 
and Peace-Keeping Operations: Report, ICRC, Geneva, 1994 (p49), p55.
79Ibid. Domestic authority to act or to appropriate funds for the intervening state may also be required. 
For example, the US Foreign Assistance Act proved critical to rule of law programs in Haiti: Newton, 
above nl, at 254.
80Article 146, Geneva IV; Newton, above nl, at 241, citing as examples NATO’s intervention in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Coalition’s obligation to prosecute Saddam Hussein for various offences 
committed against Iran and Kuwait. This was achieved through delegation to the Iraqi Governing 
Council: CPA Order 48, above nl7.
81Newton, above nl, at 244; Jean Pictet, The Geneva Conventions o f 1949: Commentary: Geneva 
Convention IV Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War, International Committee 
of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1958, at 586, unless another state has physical custody of the suspect. 
82Article 10, UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004). The letters attached as Annex A set out the Iraqi request, 
which is specifically for “security” assistance and seek “an effective and cooperative security 
partnership” between the multi-national force and the sovereign Iraqi government: Text of letters from 
the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq Dr Iyad Allawi and United States Secretary of 
State Colin L. Powell to the President of the Council, 5 June 2004. The intervention was to be 
reviewed after twelve months or withdrawn on request: Article 12.
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Further, the MNF-I asserted and was not denied a need to continue to operate 
under the existing framework as to their status and jurisdiction and declared that it
O ')
would abide by international humanitarian law, although the occupation was 
declared ended. The undertaking was noted by the Council in the preface to 
Resolution 1546 as “obligations under international humanitarian law.” It is not quite 
the situation proposed by Adam Roberts, where international humanitarian law
o c
applies under Resolution 1546, because of the lack in 2004 of a traditional form of 
armed conflict, but one where the rules are voluntarily observed; had the MNF-I
oz:
been in effective control of Iraq, however, occupation law could have applied. The 
terms of the consent therefore governed the intervention, subject to the broad 
restrictions of humanitarian law regarding combat interactions.
The MNF-I mandate commenced in a situation of “huge insecurity” 
accompanying the transfer of authority, leaving broad potential scope for action. 
However, the ‘rule of law’ does not appear in the MNF-I mandate or in the 
requesting letters, notwithstanding the ‘affirmation of its “importance,” along with
00
reconciliation, human rights and democracy. Given the terms of the mandate, court 
and judicial intervention measures implemented or supported by the MNF-I were 
predicated on the necessary link between, on the one hand, judicial, rights-based 
institutionalism and the rule of law, and on the other, the rule of law and security -
83Letter of Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, to the President of the UN Security Council, 5 June 
2004, annexed to UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004), Annex A. This was acknowledged in the prefatory 
remarks to Resolution 1546 and Article 9 which reaffirmed the provisions of Resolution 1511 (2003). 
It should be noted that, after the transfer of governmental authority, the CCCI’s lack of jurisdiction to 
compel the production of foreign military forces to the court continued: section 17(2), CPA Order 13: 
Central Criminal Court o f Iraq (Revised) (Amended), entered into force 22 April 2004; section 2(8), 
CPA Order 100: Transition o f Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, entered into force 28 June 2004.
84Prefatory remarks, UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004).
S5Adam Roberts, The End of Occupation in Iraq,’ 28 June 2004, International Humanitarian Law 
Research Initiative, http://www.ihlresearch.org/iraq/feature.php?a=51, viewed 4 April 2009.
86Ibid.
87Ibid. Indeed, the first executive order issued by the new Iraqi government permitted the Prime 
Minister, “with the unanimous approval of the Presidency Council,” to declare a state of emergency, 
suspending a variety of rights, in response to grave danger from “an ongoing campaign of violence by 
any number of people” to prevent democratic development or any other purpose: Article 1, Order 
1/2004: Safeguarding National Security (translated by the Law and Order Task Force (“LAOTF”), 
reproduced by permission, copy on file with the author). A 60-day state of emergency across Iraq, 
except the Kurdish provinces, was declared on 7 November 2004: Human Rights Watch, World 
Report 2005: Country Summary: Iraq, 13 January 2005, available at http://www.Human Rights 
Watch.org/legacy/ english/docs/2005/01/13/iraq9805.htm, viewed 18 October 2009, p3.
88In his letter, Colin Powell declared MNF-I “ready as needed to participate” in humanitarian 
assistance and civil reconstruction: Annex A to UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004).
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linkages which must be subjected to close scrutiny because they are made in all 
forms of intervention discussed in this Chapter.
4.3.1 Security through Direct Participation in Judicial Process: CCCI-K
The CCCI’s institutional jurisdiction was enlarged by the interim 
government, which directed it to review major crimes committed during a state of 
emergency. The measure was said to be, inter alia, “in support of the rule of law 
and the independence of the judiciary, its effectiveness and monitoring” and “the 
firm necessity to counter terrorists and law breakers.” These comments were phrased 
around declarations regarding the government’s commitment to the “guarantee” of 
various human rights.90 This will be of significance in assessing the security/rights- 
based rule of law link.
MNF-I continued the reconstruction efforts through the CCCI-K commenced 
under occupation through Task Force 134, which ‘assisted’ the Iraqi authorities with 
criminal prosecutions.91 Task Force 134 comprised a “headquarters element, a 
magistrate's cell, the combined review and release board (CRRB) review section, and 
the CCCI liaison office.” Most sections conducted substantive legal review tasks for 
detainees in MNF-I administrative detention. The CCCI Liaison Office, staffed with 
US military lawyers, was responsible for ‘facilitating’ prosecutions before the CCCI- 
K. This included the same capacity to request the investigative judge to ask 
questions that is accorded to Iraqi lawyers, although Task Force 134 personnel were 
critical of the rule of law effect of having to make a request, but not representation at 
trials, although hearings and decisions were tracked. ' The role was evidently a 
continuation of Coalition involvement at the CCCI-K during the occupation period,
S9Major crimes included murder, robbery, rape, kidnapping, destruction, bombing/buming/damage of 
property, possession of military weapons and ammunition, or manufacturing, transportation, 
smuggling or trafficking of such weapons: see Article 7(1-2), Order 1/2004: Safeguarding National 
Security (Iraq). The Order referred to Central Criminal Court of Iraq (“CCCI”) not the Central 
Criminal Court of Iraq-Karkh, leaving the way open for the establishment of additional ‘CCCIs,’ as in 
fact occurred: see further note 14, Chapter Three above.
90Order 1/2004: Safeguarding National Security.
91 Major W. James Annexstad, ‘The Detention and Prosecution of Insurgents and Other Non- 
Traditional Combatants -  A Look at the Task Force 134 Process and the Future of Detainee 
Prosecutions’ (2007) Army Lawyer 72, at 73.
92Ibid, at 74. In the case of prosecutions, Annexstad claimed that the MNF-I role was “vital” and the 
strength of the case rested with the evidence collected by military units in the field, in a clear 
reflection of the on-going participation in prosecutions, as opposed to ‘assistance:’ at 75 
93Human Rights Watch, above n87, p i2; and see Annexstad, ibid, at 78. The results were passed to the 
detaining MNF-I units.
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although primarily concerned with the intersection of the CCCI-K’s jurisdiction, 
particularly over those accused of crimes against Coalition forces, and MNF-I 
administrative detention.
4.3.2 Security through ‘Building Judicial Capacity: ’ CCCI-Rusafa
In line with the abrogation of Coalition legislative capacity, and in a 
significant departure from the origin of the CCCI-K in CPA Order 13, the Central 
Criminal Court of Iraq -  Rusafa (CCCI-R) was established by decree of the Iraqi 
High Judicial Council on 2 May 2007.94 It shared the same legal jurisdiction over 
major crimes as the CCCI-K, although its geographical jurisdiction was originally 
limited to its own administrative district (Rusafa). This was quickly amended to a 
federal criminal jurisdiction to enable the CCCI-R to be the court of review for the 
entire detainee population in the Rusafa Temporary Detention Facility, housed in the 
same complex.95 This is necessarily a simultaneous criminal jurisdiction with the 
CCCI-K.
The CCCI-R was therefore, on its face, an instrument of permanent domestic 
judicial reform. However, it replicated the model of the CCCI-K and appears to have 
originated, with its associated MNF-I advisory body the Law and Order Task Force 
(LAOTF), in an MNF-I proposal.96 LAOTF’s purpose was to “help build Iraqi 
judicial capacity” and to provide the CCCI-R judiciary with “a secure environment”
94High Judicial Council, Department of Judicial Affairs (»CiSli jj_*4 ^  Judicial
Order 56/Q/A (56/j/l), dated 2 May 07 (translated by LAOTF, reproduced by permission, copy on file 
with the author).
95High Judicial Council, Department of Judicial Affairs, Judicial Order 65/Q/A (65/ij/i), dated 27 May 
2007 (translated by LAOTF, reproduced by permission, copy on file with the author). Its original 
jurisdiction did not encompass the majority of the detainees in the Rusafa Temporary Detention 
Facility (RTDF), because their place of arrest was outside the Rusafa area, and the Criminal 
Procedure Code 23/1971 allocates jurisdiction on the basis of geographic location: paragraph 53. As a 
high capacity temporary facility, RTDF was intended as a centralised pre-trial detention centre for 
those charged with major crimes, particularly in the aftermath of the 2007 surge in MNF-I troops: 
Michael R. Gordon Tn Baghdad: Justice Behind the Barricades,’ New York Times, 29 July 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/30/world/africa/30iht-30military-web.6889642.html, 
viewed 18 October 2009.
%LAOTF was reportedly floated as an idea to the MNF-I commander, General Petraeus, by his Staff 
Judge Advocate, Colonel Mark Martins, in February 2007 and LAOTF personnel were in place by 
mid-May, noting that the CCCI-R was decreed only on 2 May: Michelle Tan, ‘Task Force Puts Iraqi 
Courts Back to Work,’ Army Times, 12 November 2007, available at http://www.armytimes.com 
/news/2007/1 l/army_ safehouse_071112/, viewed 18 October 2009.
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Q7to perform their duties transparently. It included a direct investigative role in major 
crimes through four assigned Iraqi investigators, exercising their authority under 
Iraqi law and assisted by US federal agents and military investigators.98
In part, the LAOTF intervention was necessitated by a predicted spike in 
detainee numbers as a result of the so-called MNF-I ‘troop surge’ and 
implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan in response to pervasive unrest and 
sectarian violence in early 2007." The provision of security, reconstruction of 
facilities and funding for contractors to do the same are within the volunteered 
competence recognised in UNSC Resolution 1546.100 Thus, for example, MNF-I 
assisted with the secure compound, which included the CCCI-R, secure 
accommodation for judges and their families, the Rusafa Temporary Detention 
Facility (RTDF) which was intended to become Baghdad’s primary pre-trial 
detention centre, and the Baghdad Police College. A substantial new building was 
opened in September 2008.101
,7LAOTF Director Mr Mike Walther, 29 October 2007, quoted in Tan, ibid. Tan also reports that in 
2007 LAOTF comprised 50 military and 75 civilian lawyers, paralegals and investigators, including 
personnel from the United Kingdom and Australia.
,8LAOTF Director Mr Walther, quoted in Tan, ibid. The FBI was also involved in the Joint 
Investigative Force, established in 2006, utilising “hand-picked” and screened (by US forces) Ministry 
of Interior investigators and an embedded Investigative Judge. The FBI assisted with forensic 
evidence collection, in place of the traditional emphasis on investigation by confession: Dina Temple- 
Raston, ‘Elite Iraqi Task Force Probes Sensitive Crimes,’ NPR, 26 March 2008, available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=89123960, viewed 18 October 2009. The 
emphasis on forensic evidence responded to Coalition concerns, expressed by Mr Phillip Lynch, Role 
of Law Coordinator, US Embassy, that the judges’ preference for intuitive assessment of witnesses’ 
veracity, rather than examining in depth photographs and physical evidence, amounted to 
“soothsaying truth and falsehood:” quoted in Dina Temple-Raston, ‘Iraqis on Slow Road to Building 
Judicial System,’ NPR, 27 March 2008, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? 
storyld=89162530&ps=rs, viewed 18 October 2009. Annexstad sees this as a failing of the 
inquisitorial system itself: above n91, at 73. As discussed further below, this does not reflect the 
impact of an overwhelming lack of security in obtaining such evidence.
"in  Rusafa, the detainee population rose rapidly in 2007 from 2500 to 7000: Tan, ibid. UNAMI 
reported an increase in the country-wide total of detainees in Iraqi government custody from 17 565 in 
March 2007 to 25 007 by November: UNAMI Human Rights Report l January -31  March 2007, para 
58, available at http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/HR%20Report%20Jan%20Mar%202007%20EN. 
pdf, viewed 26 April 2008, and UNAMI Human Rights Report 1 July -3 1  December 2007, available 
at http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/HR%20Report%20Jul%20Dec%202007%20EN.pdf, viewed 
26 April 2008, para 57.
l00Para 10 provides “authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of 
security and stability in Iraq.”
l0lThe Justice Palace includes a court house, witness security facility (apartments for 150 witnesses), 
offices and conference rooms, including for the High Judicial Council: Kendal Smith and Polli Keller, 
‘New Court House Opens in Baghdad,’ US Army Corps of Engineers Press Release, 10 September 
2008. A second, US$21 million dollar facility was opened in Ramadi (Anbar province) in 2009, but 
reports in August suggested that it was beset by the same problems as the Rusafa complex, including 
corruption according to United States military personnel, lack of evidence and forced confessions
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MNF-I measured the success of the CCCI-R in overt rule of law indicators, 
arguing that LAOTF assistance to the court was assistance to the Iraqi government in 
implementation of the rule of law. ~ The dominating principle of sovereignty in 
international law means that where such assistance is by true consent of the Iraqi 
government, then there is no issue of unlawfulness under the terms of the MNF-I 
mandate. The acceptance of the CCCI structure, replicated from the CCCI-K to the 
CCCI-R, and of the secure facilities, indicates consent, and there is no apparent 
objection to the advice provided by LAOTF and even the participation of Task Force 
134 injudicial process. However, the overt linkage between the rule of law measures 
and security in Iraq is not self-evident, and, lacking consent, would be of concern in 
future operations.
4.3.3 The Link Between Efficient, Rights-Based Judicial Review and 
Security: CCCI Practice
A series of practical problems and results have dogged both CCCI outposts, 
and their detention facilities,103 remarkably consistently from 2004 to 2008.104 On 
analysis, it is the lack of security which is primarily behind the criticisms of the 
CCCI judiciary and procedure, with the effect that rather than the existence of the 
rule law leading to peace and stability, it must be concluded pragmatically that order 
and security must precede the formation of the rule of law, however conceived.
according to the Iraqi judges, and police complaints that detainees were simply being ‘let go.’ In 
response, US Marines introduced a “monthly security conference” between Iraqi stakeholders in July: 
Jane Arraf, ‘Ramadi struggles to instill a rule of law,’ The Christian Science Monitor, 21 August 
2009, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0821/p06s23-wome.html, viewed 8 September 
2009.
l02See telephone interview with Colonel Mark Martins, Staff Judge Advocate MNF-I, Baghdad, 
reported in Austin Bay, ‘Quiet Step for the Rule of Law,’ The Washington Times, 12 April 2007, 
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/apr/12/20070412-085639-2020r/print/, 
viewed 19 January 2009.
I03ln the period of UNSC authority for MNF-I to 31 December 2008, the CCCI-K focussed on MNF-I 
detainees from Coalition detention centres, including Camp Cropper, near Baghdad Airport, and 
Camp Bucca, located in the south near Basrah, although it also heard matters referred by the 
Ministries of the Interior and Justice: Human Rights Watch, The Quality o f Justice: Failings o f Iraq’s 
Central Criminal Court, 14 December 2008, available at http://www.Human Rights 
Watch.org/en/reports/2008/12/14/ quality-justice-O, viewed 18 October 2009, pl l .  The CCCI-R drew 
primarily on the co-located RTDF.
l04See for example Human Rights Watch, 2005, above n87; Michael Moss, ‘Iraq’s Legal System 
Staggers Beneath the Weight of War,’ The New York Times, 17 December 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.eom/2006/l 2/ 17/world/middleeast/17justice.html?ei=5090&en=:7fa73a48953997 
00&ex=1324011600&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all, viewed 13 October 2009; 
Temple-Raston, above n98 (article dated March 2008); Human Rights Watch, 2008, above nl03 
(article dated December 2008).
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A summary of the criticisms against the Iraqi courts in the period of Security 
Council intervention focus on three areas: inadequate administrative and judicial 
procedures, inadequate realisation of human rights (in particular the right to defence 
counsel) and protracted delays. The situation ably illustrates the difficulties security 
causes for supporters of a non-derogable right to a fair trial matched with minimum 
procedural standards, such as in the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right 
1984.105 Principle 70 considered that certain procedural standards should never be 
derogable, including the public recording of persons in detention; the prohibition on 
“indefinite” detention or incommunicado detention “for longer than a few days;” 
availability of review of detention without charge; “fair trial by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law;” trial of civilians by ordinary 
courts or, if strictly necessary, independent military courts; standards relating to 
defence including the presumption of innocence, right to information on charges, 
“adequate time and facilities to prepare the defence,” defence of choice or by legal 
aid, presence at trial, rights about witnesses and public trial unless “on grounds of 
security,” which “ensure a fair trial;” the creation of records of proceedings; and the 
exclusion of double jeopardy.106
The current state of the law does not reflect the desire of Principle 70 for 
minimum non-derogable standards, nor, as it will become apparent, are they 
reconcilable with a total absence of civil security. Indeed, analysing the right to a fair 
trial, the European Court of Human Rights considered that a test of the legitimacy of 
measures in derogation was whether the “the ordinary law,” including provision for 
normal courts, military courts or special courts, would “suffice” to restore order. It 
was clearly within the contemplation of the court that lack of security could not 
always be resolved through minimum trial standards.
l05Principle 70(e), United Nations, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation o f Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1984/4 (1984). The Principles elaborate the right to a fair trial established in Article 14, 
ICCPR.
l06Principle 70(a-i), ibid.
ll)7See section 1.3, Chapter One above.
m Lawless v Ireland (Application Nr 332/57) Pub EUR Court of HR, Series B (1960-1), a case 
concerning administrative detention in Northern Ireland; see also Subrata Roy Chowdhury, Rule o f  
Law in a State o f  Emergency, Pinter Publishers, London, 1989, pi 06.
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4.3.3.A Inadequate Administrative and Judicial Procedures
The security situation had direct impacts on the nature of evidence 
underpinning charges, particularly fostering a significant dependence on secret 
informants -  where informants were both unwilling to identify themselves and to be 
examined by the court.109 Where the witness responded to summons, scope for 
protection was available under the Criminal Procedure Code 23/1971 ,uo but a 
regular failure of witnesses to do so meant that cases were protractedly adjourned at 
the investigative stage. These failures were eventually dealt with domestically, by 
instruction of the High Judicial Council in November 2008 that such cases were to be 
dismissed if there was insufficient other evidence.111 In that year, some cases were 
observed to be dismissed for this reason. ~
If a rule of law outcome is ensuring a fair trial of criminal charges, then there 
appears to be failure of the community interest when the security situation is so 
lacking that witnesses feel unable to appear. At CCCI-K, MNF-I reported that local 
Iraqi witnesses “rarely -  if ever” testified because of security concerns regarding 
their movement to the court and appearance, noting that evidence must be presented 
in person to be accepted. Human Rights Watch adds criminal detention without 
judicial warrant and on-going problems of coercive interrogation,"4 which, with lack 
of counsel, by 2008 sometimes resulted in the dismissal of charges.115 Although 
critiques are directed to the manner in which the CCCIs addressed missing secret
l()9Prime Minister’s Office, Republic of Iraq, Reform Paper on the Detention System in Iraq, July 
2007, Part C: The Security Axis (translated by LAOTF, reproduced by permission, copy on tile with 
author).
" ‘'Article 47(2), Criminal Procedure Code 23/1971, permits witnesses to request security where 
national security is involved or in other serious criminal matters; see also paras 152 (power to close 
hearings), 172 (power to accept a witness statement in lieu of appearance) and 215 (“absolute 
authority” in the judge to evaluate evidence).
11 'Human Rights Watch, 2008, above nl03, p32. Human Rights Watch attributed this to case overload 
and argued that witness safety in the prevailing security climate ought not to be determinative at the 
expense of the detainee’s right to question the evidence against them. 
ll2Ibid, p21.
11'Annexstad, above n91, at 77. A Human Rights Watch interview with a Legal Advisor to Task Force 
134, Captain Brian Bill, on 12 May 2008 suggested that the security classification of evidence meant 
“only approximately 10 percent” of all MNF-I detainees faced CCCI prosecution: Human Rights 
Watch, 2008, above nl03, pl2, and see p i8.
1 l4Human Rights Watch, 2005, above n87, p4; Human Rights Watch, 2008, ibid, p i9. 
ll5See further Human Rights Watch, 2008, ibid, p28, who observed such a matter at the CCCI-K. 
Human Rights Watch considered these matters under the heading “administration of justice” and 
recommended in December 2008 that the criminal law be complied with, but also amended to address 
“international standards, notably by prohibiting torture and other mistreatment and the use of coerced 
confession as evidence: pp4-5.
158
informants, the real shortcoming is clearly the lack of physical security as a condition 
precedent to an effective judicial process.
The simple failure of administrative systems was identified by both Iraqi and 
public sources. A July 2007 Iraqi Reform Paper described the situation as “chaos,” 
including lost files, delays and lack of a central database, secret informant evidence, 
corruption and a failure to follow Iraqi detention and investigation procedure for 
MNF-I detainees.116 It also addressed a failure to follow required Iraqi procedures, 
including widespread arrest without, or without record of, judicial warrant or 
extensions. They proposed domestic resolution through a coordinating inter- 
Ministerial Committee and requesting MNF-I co-operate with Iraqi authorities to 
resolve MNF-I detentions, which they said did not comply with Iraqi detention and 
investigative requirements.118 Some MNF-I assistance was provided with record­
keeping systems,119 and there was an MNF-I effort to supply computers, although
190reportedly unsuccessfully.
4.3.3.B______ Inadequate Realisation of the Right to Defence Counsel
The Iraqi Constitution, adopted by referendum in October 2005, provides a 
range of individual rights, including to be deprived of liberty only by decision of a 
competent judicial authority, to a fair trial, to freedom from torture and to defence 
counsel. There is a world consensus that this last right requires “adequate
1 99opportunity” and consultation should not be delayed.
ll6Prime Minister’s Office, Reform Paper, above nl09, Part B: Judicial and Legal Axis. Significantly, 
the report identified the stakeholders in these popularly identified ‘rule of law’ issues as the High 
Judicial Council, the prosecution, and the Ministries of Defence, the Interior, Justice and Labour and 
Social Affairs (the last having responsibility for minors in detention).
I17lbid.
1 l8Ibid. See also Human Rights Watch, 2008, above nl03, p5, for their charge-or-release 
recommendations, which would not address the core issue.
ll9It appears largely by introducing checklist references, in English and Arabic. This indicates the 
problems encountered by MNF-I personnel simply because of the language barrier as the rest of the 
file was maintained, unsurprisingly, in Arabic only: for example RTDF file #6874 (dated 2005) 
(scanned copy held by LAOTF, reproduced by permission, copy on file with the author). The forms 
included a checklist for the investigative judge to make his decision to refer for trial, release, or 
require further investigation, and one for the Iraqi Corrections services headed ‘ICS Detainee Transfer 
Checklist.’
l20William McQuade, ‘Operation Hammurabi Information Technology: Metrics Analysis Report for 
Baghdad Courts (Iraq),’ Army Lawyer, 1 October 2006, p i .
l2lArticles 19 and 37(3), Dustour Jumhurriyat-aI-‘Iraq (Constitution of the Republic of Iraq). It 
differed from the Law of Administration for the State o f Iraq for the Transitional Period 2004, which
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Defence counsel at both CCCIs reported corruption, significant delays and 
a lack of access to their clients rendering the right nugatory, especially for MNF-I 
detainees held at great distance from Baghdad, and in Camp Cropper, where counsel 
reported limited access due to MNF-I security concerns.124 Hearings at both courts 
tended to be the first opportunity for consultation and therefore the defence tended to 
be silent or perfunctory. ~ However, counsel also pointed out that the government
19legal aid rate was token and in practice took up to twelve months to be paid. 
Critically, counsel who acted for accused insurgents were accused of being 
insurgents themselves, threatened so severely that many fled Iraq. In other cases, 
acquitted defendants (and lawyers) were kidnapped and/or murdered, almost at the
1 97gate of the prison.
Human Rights Watch suggested in 2008 that the right to defence was being 
compromised by “the lack of a vibrant and established culture of legal defense; and 
insufficient judicial oversight,” and called on international donors to fund legal 
aid.l2s A legal aid program supported by LAOTF with US funding from May 2008 
suggested otherwise. The program provided salary, advice and logistic assistance to 
25 defence lawyers working at the RTDF and reported early success in some
spoke of a right to engage “independent and competent counsel” as opposed to a “right of defense,” 
and a right to a “speedy and public trial:” Article 15(E-F).
'“ Principle 8, Basic Principles oh the Role o f Lawyers, adopted by the Eighth UN Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August -  7 September 1990, UN 
Doc.A/CONF.l 44/28/Rev. 1 at 118.
l23For example at CCCI-K in 2006: Moss, above nl04; see also Joseph Giordono, ‘Trying Insurgents 
in Iraqi Courts Seen as Big Step in Rebuilding Legal System,’ Stars and Stripes (Mideast Edn), 26 
December 2004, http://www.military.eom/NewContent/0,13190,SS_122704_Court,00.html, viewed 
13 October 2009.
124Annexstad, above n91, at 80; Moss, ibid, reports judges of the CCCI-K in late 2006 told counsel 
that they were implementing Coalition policy in refusing to make orders for access to MNF-I 
detainees, although that was denied by MNF-I officials. Defence lawyers reported to Human Rights 
Watch that their main concerns accessing MNF-I detainees were their safety and the simple logistics 
of getting there. However, Human Rights Watch received comments from MNF-I detainee 
management personnel that defence counsel didn’t “want” to meet clients at the MNF-I centres: 
Human Rights Watch, 2008 above nl03, p37, discussing comments to Human Rights Watch from 
Major-General Douglas Stone, head of detainee operations until June 2008, and CAPT Brian Bill, 
Task Force 134 judge advocate, 12 May 2008. See also Moss, ibid; Giordono, ibid. 
l25Human Rights Watch, 2008, ibid, pp20, 33; Moss, above nl04. CCCI-R practice was to assign 
counsel to an unrepresented defendant immediately upon confirming his identity at trial, and then to 
continue the trial forthwith: Human Rights Watch, 2008, ibid, Section VIII, adding that lawyers were 
often not present at all during investigative hearings.
l26Lori Hinnant, ‘Iraq’s Legal System Burdened by War’s Wake,’ Associated Press, Baghdad, 6 
December 2007.
i27M oss, above nl04; see also Giordono, above nl23. 
l2sHuman Rights Watch, 2008, above nl03, p7.
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matters. However, their on-going concerns were all security-related: including 
long delays for files which were lost, were tampered with when requested by counsel
1 T A
or were simply inaccessible in violent areas such as Diyala province.
4.3.3.C______Delays
Lengthy delays in pre-trial detention, appeals and the mandatory superior 
review of capital punishment were attributed directly to lack of security, along with 
long delays in release on completion of sentence or dismissal of charges. Such delays 
persisted for months and often years, contrary to the ICCPR requirement for trial 
“without undue delay.” Consequently, essential MNF-I witnesses had often left the 
country by the date of trial, creating further delay. Physical movement of 
witnesses and judges within Baghdad and to MNF-I facilities was inhibited, also 
causing adjournments.
The delays caused congestion and difficulties in the detention system which 
compounded problems in case flow,134 not helped by the large volume of detainees 
being taken into custody as a result of civil insecurity, leading to further 
overcrowding, administrative failures, court overloading and even longer delays.
129
1 ^ Sufficiently to justify LAOTF planning, reported in January 2009, for five more such clinics in Iraq 
and a renewal of the CCCI-R funding, due to expire in February 2009. The politics of a Shi’ite 
majority government and a predominantly Sunni detainee population at RTDF raised doubts for 
counsel about on-going funding from the Iraqi government. Interestingly, US funding was only 
obtained after long effort, said to be due to a preference for prosecution among military lawyers: Tina 
Susman, ‘Iraqis Languish in Crowded Jails,’ Los Angeles Times, 22 September 2008, available at 
http://www.articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/22/world/fg_detainees22, viewed 19 January 2009. 
l30Lost file cases included misdemeanour charges for offences such as littering which resulted in 
“months or years” in pre-trial detention: Susman, ibid.
131 Article 14(3)(c). For example, one detainee, convicted by al-Bayaa Misdemeanour Court in 2005 
remained in detention twelve months after the expiry of his sentence in May 2006 -  a letter from 
RTDF to the al-Bayaa court and the Ministry of Justice to ascertain the status of his case sent in May 
2007 was returned in July, unable to be delivered because of the security situation, and an attempt to 
transfer the detainee himself to al-Bayaa for release was frustrated for the same reason shortly 
thereafter: RTDF File #6682 (translated by LAOTF, reproduced by permission, copies on file with the 
author). Iraqi law requires the return of a detainee to the arresting police unit for release, as well as 
manual confirmation that no further charges or investigations are pending. See also the BBC report on 
RTDF: BBC News, ‘Iraq’s Jails “Terribly Overcrowded,”’ 25 November 2008, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/go/pr/fr/-/l/hi/world/middle_east/7748795.stm, viewed 19 January 2009, 
reporting a Ministry of Interior argument that overcrowding was due to the security crack-down.
132 Annexstad, above n91, at 77.
133Prime Minister’s Office, Reform Paper, above nl09, Part C: The Security Axis; Annexstad, ibid, at 
80.
134Annexstad, ibid. For Iraqi authorities, it led to undocumented and overcrowded temporary prisons 
in 2004-06, such as in Baquba: Moss, above nl04.
I35ln the first two and a half years, MNF-I alone detained 61 000 people, of whom 43 000 were 
released and 3000 referred for trial (resulting in approximately 1500 convictions): Annexstad, ibid, at
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Iraqi authorities also saw the threat situation as limiting their capacity to detain
i o / :
suspects and coordinate between the judiciary and intelligence services. The threat 
of assassination for an unpopular decision impacted judges’ capacity to decide 
matters independently, thus the Rule of Law Complex was designed to alleviate this 
key handicap to independent decision-making by providing a secure compound of
1 ^7courts and accommodation.
A general amnesty for minor crimes, those which were not international
crimes, were not terror-related or did not result in death or permanent injury, where
1 ^ 8the accused had suffered delays in the criminal process, was passed in early 2008. 
However, its effect was disappointing compared to expectation in reducing the case 
backlog, especially at the CCCI. The High Judicial Council attributed it to 
administrative failures,140 but it was also due to the small proportion of amnesty 
grantees actually in custody.141 Amnesty is criticised as a measure in judicial
81. This is to be compared to reported case disposition - the High Judicial Council reported that 96% 
of 2006 criminal detentions were resolved: Gerry Gilmore, ‘Iraqi Courts, Police Institute Rule of Law, 
Officials Say,’ American Force Press Service News Articles, 13 August 2007, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsatricle.aspx?id=47034, viewed 19 January 2009. In 2007 the 
CCCI-K informed Human Rights Watch that it had dealt with 32 084 investigative cases (7447 
referred for trial, 17 820 dismissed) and concluded 2875 cases -  utilising 10 trial judges, 25 
investigative judges and 15 judicial investigators: See further Human Rights Watch, 2008, above 
nl03, p28, statistics provided on 15 May 2008. The figures are indicative of the size of the problem -  
to process this number of cases judicially necessarily requires a lowering of trial standard, which is in 
turn criticised as a failure of the rule of law.
l36Prime Minister’s Office, Reform Paper, above nl09, Part C: The Security Axis.
13nReform Paper, ibid; Annexstad, above n91, at 80. William Gallo, Director Law and Order Task 
Force, as quoted in Dina Temple-Raston, ‘Iraqis on Slow Road to Building Judicial System,’ above 
98.
I38lt was to apply to persons held for more than six months without an investigative hearing or more 
than 12 without referral to trial: Qanun al-‘Afw al-'Aam (General Amnesty Law) 2008, available at 
http://www.niqash.org/intem/getBin.php?id=460, viewed 4 April 2009. MNF-I argued that detainees 
in its custody were not subject to the amnesty: ‘Coalition Forces Set to Release Former Detainee 
(Baghdad),’ MNF Press Release, 14 April 2008, at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option= 
com_content&task=view&id=18464&Itemid=128, viewed 4 April 2009.
l39Mr William Gallo, LAOTF Director, in an interview reported in Susman, above nl29; see also 
Human Rights Watch, 2008, above nl03, p2.
l40The High Judicial Council announced in July 2008 that 96 000 cases had been approved for 
amnesty by the Judicial Committee, but by September only 5-8000 had been released: Human Rights 
Watch correspondence with Western diplomat (name withheld) monitoring amnesty implementation, 
9 September 2008, reported in Human Rights Watch, 2008, ibid, pl4. The same diplomat reported 
anecdotal evidence of prison officials demanding payment prior to release under amnesty.
I4llt is thought only 25% of detainees eligible for amnesty were in custody. Further, a detainee might 
be amnestied on one charge but continue to be held on another: ibid, p i5.
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reconstruction because it sidesteps the court process which epitomises justice rather 
than expediency.142
4.3.4 The Link between Security and the ‘Rule o f  Law  ’
Annexstad, working at Task Force 134, correctly saw the only solution to the 
Iraqi situation as “stability,”143 but not to the extent of his suggestion that “Once 
there is justice, peace will follow.”144 Instead, security must precede deliberate 
efforts to create the (international) rule of law, or as a minimum go hand in hand, 
because rights-based, institutionalist models of justice cannot perform adequately 
without a minimum level of security. Without it, as Iraq demonstrates amply, 
administrative failures, procedural shortcomings, adequate access to counsel and 
timely case disposition are simply not possible. Indeed, both occupation law and 
Security Council authority recognise this by permitting means such as administrative 
detention for security purposes, which are contrary to the ‘rule of law’ international 
law demands be established in domestic legal systems.
MNF-I’s approach to the rule of law in Iraq centred on an independent, fair 
and efficient judicial system.145 The view was shared with Human Rights Watch, 
who was critical of the CCCTs failure to meet the standard, despite greater resources 
and than other elements of the domestic court structure.146 However, reconsidering 
the initial Resolution 1546, the “importance of developing effective police” in 
maintaining “law, order and security” is explicitly identified and authorised, where
l42Helen Durham, ‘Mercy and Justice in the Transition Period,’ in William Maley, Charles Sampford 
and Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities in 
Failed States, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (pl45), pl45. But compare the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC) decision that military apprehension of suspects indicted by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) would destabilise the region and undermine 
overall operational goals (security) by enhancing the status of the radical nationalist parties: Newton, 
above nl, at 237. 
l43Annexstad, above n91, at 80.
144Ibid, at 81. Compare Stanley Roberts, who considered the obstacles to judicial reconstruction in 
Iraq to conclude that “fundamental law and order” needed to precede assistance with judicial 
reconstruction: ‘Socio-Religious Obstacles to Judicial Reconstruction in Post-Saddam Iraq’ (2004) 33 
Hofstra LR 367, at 391.
l45Gilmore, above nl35, discussing an interview with Mr Jim Santelle, Justice Attache at the US 
Embassy in Baghdad.
I46lndeed, Human Rights Watch asserted that the result was a “disturbing continuity” with the Saddam 
period: Human Rights Watch, 2008, above nl03, p3. Human Rights Watch observers examined 
investigative files and attended investigative hearings at both the CCCI-R and the CCCI-K, spoke 
with counsel and defendants at the CCCI-R and CCCI-K (but not MNF-I detainees), and observed 
five trials at both courts: ibid, ppl-8.
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the importance of the ‘rule of law’ is simply affirmed.147 Instead, Resolution 1546 
emphasises order and security, recognising the scope in international humanitarian 
law through Geneva IV and through the authority to “take all necessary measures” to 
restore security that interveners are permitted to take actions which are not consonant 
with the complete international rule of law institutional model, although minimum 
non-derogable human rights are observed. The primary authorised method is 
administrative detention for security purposes, an authority also available to 
occupants.
4.3.5 Administrative Detention for ‘Imperative Reasons o f Security’ and its 
Rule o f Law Effect
Although unpalatable to current rule of law thinking, intervention in present 
Security Council practice permits administrative detention outside the paradigm of 
criminal justice by trial. It is also consistent with the law and practice of occupation. 
It is these extra-‘rule of law’ methods which prevent a worsening of order through 
prison overcrowding and delays, and not the failure to establish “an adequate” 
judiciary alongside police reconstruction. In the case of Iraq after the 2004 transfer 
of authority, the sheer volume of detainees in both MNF-I and Iraqi custody would 
not have required an ‘adequate judiciary’ but an extraordinary, ad hoc court 
structure, because the volume of criminality could not persist in a peaceful society -  
that is, the existing judiciary might be perfectly ‘adequate’ for a peacetime load but 
fails in time of emergency, apparently causing rule of law collapse. In these 
circumstances, reconstructive measures are likely to result in a court system which is 
not appropriate to the developing rule of law relationship. An emergency measure, 
recognisable as such, addresses the problem while ensuring that the scope remains 
for the subject community to develop a suitable expression of their ordered rule of 
law relationship.
In Iraq, MNF-I was authorised to take persons into administrative detention 
“for reasons of imperative security,” as contemplated in their acceptance of the Iraqi
l47Article 16 and prefatory remarks, respectively.
l48Kelly, above nl3, para 767, where this view was expressed by Somali police as well as intervening 
forces. The National Security Council took a similar view, but was also concerned about the lack of 
resistance to political pressure demonstrated by the Iraqi judiciary, despite “technical” independence: 
see Moss, above nl04.
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request for assistance.149 Its terms were promulgated in CPA Memorandum 3 (27 
June 2004) Revised - Criminal Procedures before the transfer, and established a 
minimum standard of administrative review of detention.150 Security detainees were 
to have the same access to the Ombudsman and the ICRC as criminal detainees.151 
Demonstrating the different character and authority for the detention, a security 
detainee subsequently awarded a criminal penalty could not discount the period of 
administrative detention against his sentence nor could any security detainee seek an 
Iraqi judicial remedy against a failure to comply with the rights granted him in CPA 
Memorandum 3.152
CPA Memorandum 3 must be understood on its terms as a security measure 
directed to “law and order” and the “administration of justice” rather than the rule of 
law. In implementing CPA Order 7 it made some final changes to rectify some 
human rights issues in the Criminal Procedure Code 1971, including mandatory 
directions to an accused about his right to silence and to representation, but in 
recognition of the need to transition to local control.154 Additionally, national MNF-I 
contingents were given powers of criminal arrest (as opposed to administrative 
detention) to be “handed over” to Iraqi authorities, unless retained in MNF-I 
detention at Iraqi request.155 It is directed to the practicalities of security in a 
deteriorating security environment, rather than systemic reforms towards an ideal 
judicial structure.
l49Letter of Colin Powell to the UN Security Council, Annex A to UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004). 
l50The justification for detention was subject to review after 72 hours, with further review at six 
monthly intervals thereafter. Internment commenced after 30 June 2004 could persist for so long as 
imperative security needs required it, but detainees were to be transferred to Iraqi custody or released 
at the expiry of 18 months unless an application for extension was made to the Joint Detention 
Committee: section 6, CPA Memorandum 3 (Revised): Criminal Procedures, entered into force 27 
June 2004 (“CPA Memorandum 3”). Note that minors were to be released after 12 months. 
Memorandum 3 drew explicitly on the authority of UNSC Resolutions 1511 (2003) and 1546 (2004) 
as “part of the CPA’s obligation to restore law and order.”
151 Section 6(7-8), CPA Memorandum 3. 
l52Section 6(9-10), CPA Memorandum 3. 
l53Prefatory recitations.
l54Sections 1, 3(b-c) and 4, CPA Memorandum 3, respectively.
I55ln such a case, section 5 goes on to provide certain minimum rights standards, and a maximum of 
90 days in the detention facility without judicial review: CPA Memorandum 3. It also grants access to 
the Iraqi Prisons and Detainee Ombudsman and the ICRC unless temporarily denied for reasons of 
imperative military necessity” (section 5( 1 )(e-f))- However, again an MNF-I failure to observe the 
enunciated rights requirements was directed not to be a ground for legal remedy: section 5(2). The 
period of pre-trial detention, however, could be discounted from any final sentence.
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In practice, the MNF-I reportedly in-processed all detainees alike in 
bureaucratic terms, deciding the character of their detention on initial review of their 
file.156 The Task Force 134 Magistrate’s cell took responsibility for administrative 
review of files with a view to referral to the CCCI-K for criminal prosecution, 
although the review was reported to be “largely subjective” in the lack of firm 
criteria. Dismissal of prosecution files at this stage was said to be ‘routine’ where 
evidence against an individual was classified and therefore could not be submitted to 
the CCCI. If referred for prosecution, such cases would have been sent before the 
CCCI-K, and possibly resulted in acquittal.
The CRRB process was said by participants to be intended to meet review
1 CO
requirements under Article 78, Geneva IV. However, Human Rights Watch 
objected to the application of Geneva IV, arguing that since there was no 
international armed conflict, the proper law was human rights law, specifically the 
ICCPR which requires that persons ‘arrested’ must receive judicial review and a fair 
trial.159 Human Rights Watch also demanded Iraqi criminal jurisdiction in place of 
MNF-I administrative internment.160
The major criticism of administrative detention arises from those who argue 
that judicial disposition of a matter should be final, such determinations should be 
made by Iraqi courts and that all detainees should be transferred to local custody,161 
consistently with a Security-Council interest in the domestic rule of law. However, a 
dismissed criminal file or CCCI-K acquittal did not necessarily result in release but 
was usually reviewed by the Combined Review and Release Board (CRRB) for 
possible continuation of detention for security reasons. The independent, nine- 
member CRRB was a partnership between MNF-I and Iraqi authorities, including six
163Iraqi ministerial representatives and three senior multinational forces officers.
156 Annexstad, above n91, at 76, citing CPA Memorandum 3. 
l57Annexstad, ibid, at 80.
I58lbid, at 79.
159Article 14, ICCPR; Human Rights Watch appears to argue that this applies to all persons detained 
in Iraq, 2008, above nl03, pl4.
I60lbid, p2.
161 For example, ibid, p2. Of course, Human Rights Watch made an exception for transfer of detainees 
where there would be a risk of torture or coercion: p6. 
l62Annexstad, above n91, at 77.
u,7Two representatives each were from the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Human Rights, those 
involved in criminal justice: Annexstad, ibid, at 79. One press report, dated 17 December 2006, cited 
“military officials” saying that “approximately 60 times, or in about 4% of dismissed cases,” the
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Cases were presented by MNF-I military lawyers and classified evidence could be 
adduced; deliberations were short as the caseload reportedly reached 1000 per week 
and matters were decided by majority vote. If release from administrative detention 
was ordered, MNF-I was given the “opportunity to object.”164 This practice was 
apparently conducted with Iraqi consent.
What administrative detention for security purposes demonstrates is a 
divergence between rule of law rhetoric and academic debate on the one hand and 
practice on the other. In Iraq, a Security Council intervention under national 
command but with host state consent, the most permissive of circumstances where 
one would expect reliance on the indigenous system, administrative detention was 
authorised and practised to foster security alongside measures aimed at improving 
the rule of law, which were ultimately unsuccessful because of the lack of security. 
This has important ramifications for the reliance on security arguments for non- 
consensual intervention in domestic judicial systems under Security Council 
authority.
4.3.6 Multinational Involvement in Consent-Based ‘Rule o f  L aw ’ 
Interventions
The involvement of a variety of nations in LAOTF decries the concern that 
differences between intervening partners can affect a consensus approach to the 
intervention,165 notwithstanding differing approaches to, for example, capital 
punishment, however the point stands for the difference between the legal system of 
the interveners and the intervened. The criticisms leveled by common lawyers during 
the occupation period against the inquisitorial character of Iraqi criminal justice were 
repeated during the period of Security Council authorisation to MNF-I.166 However, 
the ubiquity of rule of law rhetoric, often in circumstances where order or security is 
meant, has the disadvantage of creating a public demand for a “rule of law in
detainee was retained in administrative detention: Moss, above nl04. The same officials said that the 
process had a dual purpose: “striving to protect American troops, while promoting due process.” 
l64Annexstad, ibid.
l65Newton, above nl, p235. He argues that the shared “pursuit of justice” can create a multi-national 
force, as well as unravel one, perhaps as a result of his view that the pursuit of justice is one that 
“seeks to build ... fair, independent and relatively expeditious” courts (at 231). This is the “heart” of 
the concept of a rule of law society (at 241).
l66Annexstad, above n91, at 73-4, who considers that the nature of the inquisitorial systems means a 
judge is “more likely to act upon his biases” than a common law counterpart (at 73).
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practice” which the society is not in a position to create, either as an international 
rule of law or the proper formation of a domestic relationship.
Indications from the Iraqi government of intentions to adopt the CCCI model 
outside Baghdad, although it is not clear whether on a federal or regional 
jurisdictional basis, suggest the early formation of a new Iraqi rule of law structure
1 z o
notwithstanding the on-going criticisms. It is significant that the spread of the 
CCCI model has followed a gradual improvement in the security situation in Iraq, 
albeit not its complete resolution. It supports the view that institutional rights-based 
rule of law does not lead to security and peace; 169 indeed the lack of security 
fundamentally handicaps efforts to engage in rule of law reform. Recognising this, 
the Security Council provision to MNF-I of complete authority to engage in security 
measures, including administrative detention contrary to the international model of 
the rule of law as adjudicative criminal justice, is the most practical and pragmatic 
program for reform. It is also significant, as it was for the Coalition as an 
occupant, that the MNF-I was exempt from the application of Iraqi law. Although 
“an unsatisfactory legal gap” in the ideal administration of justice, 171 it is acceptable 
if intervention is understood in security and not international rule of law terms.
1
l67Newton, above nl, at 247.
u,xOn 7 October 2008, the High Judicial Council informed Human Rights Watch that CCCI panels had 
been formed in these districts. A CCCI-R judge (name withheld) reported to Human Rights Watch in 
May that they would be formed in Mosul, Tikrit and Kirkuk, but would be called “Major Crimes 
Courts:” Human Rights Watch, 2008, above nl03, pi 1.
l69Compare Jane Stromseth, David Wippman and Rosa Brooks, Can Might Make Rights?: Building 
the Rule o f Law After Military Interventions, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006, p3, who 
argue that “durable solutions to humanitarian and security problems ... require rebuilding (or building 
from scratch) the rule of law” through rights-based institutionalism and substantive legal reform, 
although they are correct in their reference to the need for a “widely shared commitment” as an 
element of the rule of law.
i70How to measure performance in security intervention is debatable. Jones et al recommend the 
measurement of outcomes rather than outputs in assessing the success of security reforms which 
“should encourage experimentation by local managers” to improve performance further: Seth Jones, 
Jeremy Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order After Conflict, 
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 2005, p.xxi.
17lStahn, above n67, at 317; see also Newton, above nl, at 256, who acknowledges the impact of 
financial constraints in causing such gaps.
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4.4 Security Council Authorisations under National Command without Host 
State Consent
Where there is no host state consent, the state/s in command of the 
intervention remain bound by their own obligations under international humanitarian 
law in armed conflict situations as above. However, where there is no traditional 
armed conflict between organised forces that would otherwise require application of 
international humanitarian law, Geneva IV “may offer appropriate and practical 
answers.” The benefit of this view is the certainty (a claimed rule of law 
advantage) about the purposive limits of judicial intervention, where an intervener 
has effective control of some portion of territory.
4.5 Security Council Authorisations under UN Command for Interventions 
Less Than Assumption of Transitional Administration
There is a divergence of view as to whether the Geneva Conventions, or 
indeed international humanitarian law generally, apply to interventions which are 
under direct UN control. Where force for mission accomplishment is contemplated -  
war-like peace enforcement with or without host state consent under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, comparable to armed conflict -  the UN Legal Office considered that 
international humanitarian law applies. Further, the Secretary-General has 
declared that an inexhaustive list of the core protections of international humanitarian 
law apply to UN operations, without displacing the national obligations of 
participating troops. 174
l72Pfanner, above n78, p56.
l73Chapter VII peace enforcement was by consent in Korea in 1951, but without it in the First Gulf 
War. However, problems arise as in Somalia where the character of the operation passes through 
different stages as in Somalia (compare UNOSOM I under UNSC Resolution 751 (1992); UNITAF 
under UNSC Resolution 794 (1992) and UNOSOM II under UNSC Resolution 814 (1993)). It is 
complicated again when the Security Council mandate is for a ‘hybrid operations,’ such as 
UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina (compare UNSC Resolutions 770 (1992), 816 (1993), 824 
(1993) and 836 (1993)): Shraga and Zacklin, above n77, p41, and Pfanner, above n78, p57, but 
compare the Report of Working Group 4 in Umesh Palwankar (Ed), Symposium on Humanitarian 
Action and Peace-Keeping Operations: Report, ICRC, Geneva, 1994, p89, who did not want to set 
threshold tests as to classes of operations.
174Secretary-General ’s Bulletin: Obser\>ance by United Nations Forces o f International Humanitarian 
Law, ST/SGB/1999/13, dated 6 August 1999 and entered into force 12 August 1999.
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The Office was more doubtful about its application to peace-keeping 
operations, where force is authorised only in self-defence, because of the lack of 
apposite analogy to armed conflict. 175 Further, since they were acting “on behalf of 
the international community at large,” the UN could not sensibly be construed as 
being a party or a Geneva Convention ‘Power;’ as an international organisation the 
UN had not the capacity to fulfill obligations under the Geneva Conventions, 
notwithstanding the willingness of the ICRC to accept compliance to the extent 
consistent with its nature. Finally, the UN observed that the Geneva Conventions 
do not provide for the accession of international organisations, although this does 
not resolve the question of the applicability of customary law. In any case, UN forces 
were directed “to observe the principles and spirit” of international humanitarian 
law. ' 78
The ICRC view is that international humanitarian law binds all states and all 
armed forces in a conflict, therefore also “the universal organisation established by 
States and recognised by them as an independent subject of international law.” 
However, application would have to be “mutatis-mutandis” given the character of the 
United Nations, for example regarding certain obligations in the treatment of 
prisoners of war and penal sanctions. Further, the UN is bound by customary law
1 ROas it reflects the Geneva Conventions.
For rule of law operations, the debate about the formal applicability of
humanitarian law is misfocussed. To date, it primarily considered whether its
protections are available to UN and associated personnel and whether UN operations
181are obliged to operate within the tactical limitations imposed by humanitarian law.
l75Shraga and Zacklin, above n77.
l76For example, in Korea. Shraga and Zacklin, ibid, p39, 43; Kelly, above nl3, para 454. 
l77Shraga and Zacklin, ibid, p43.
l78This was explicit for the first time in Article 7 of the Status of Forces Agreement between the UN 
and Rwanda, and also reflects paragraph 28 of the Model Agreement between the United Nations and 
Member States contributing personnel and equipment to United Nations peace-keeping operations, 
UN Doc.A/46/185, Annex, see Shraga and Zacklin, ibid, p45.
l7 ,Shraga and Zacklin, ibid, p42; and see the Statement of the ICRC at the 47th Session of the General 
Assembly on 13 November 1992.
IS()Pfanner, above n78, p58. Further, Article 1(3) of the UN Charter, protecting of human rights, 
“implies respect” for international humanitarian law.
m For example, the Convention on the Safety o f United Nations and Associated Personnel, 9 
December 1994, New York, 2051 UNTS 363, entered into force 15 January 1999, focused on 
concerns about the protection of personnel conducting UN operations. Article 2(2) excluded Chapter 
VII “peace enforcement” operations where UN personnel “are engaged as combatants against 
organised armed forces and to which the law of international armed conflict applies.” Article 20(a)
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However efforts to reconstruct judiciaries under international humanitarian law rely 
on the permissive regimes, subject to purposive limitation, of occupation -  that is, a 
capacity to act, not a protection from others’ actions or a direct limitation on conduct 
where it is not specifically authorised in the Resolution.
Kelly is the lead proponent of the application of permissive occupation law to 
UN interventions in control of territory, based on Somali experience, and does not 
see the presence or absence of armed resistance to the occupation as determinative; 
more important is the idea of occupation law as the minimum customary standard 
required in war, therefore no less can be expected in intervention in circumstances 
less than war. “ What is missing from his analysis is the character of Security 
Council authority as a ‘lex societatis’ binding on members through the Charter, in 
which interference in the domestic affairs of a state is explicitly rejected. Since 
facilitating self-determination in the formation of a state is a principle erga omnes, 
the argument that where a state has collapsed the limitation does not apply because 
there is no sovereignty to offend must be rejected. Even were occupation law to 
apply, it would not grant a capacity to interfere permanently in such affairs, because 
the occupant is not the locus of sovereignty.
Further, both when the Security Council exercises its coercive Chapter VII 
powers or acts with the host state’s consent, it is creating de jure administrative 
authority, therefore the limits that apply must be the actual limits of the grant. If a 
UN force is exercising effective control without Security Council authority, then it 
has unlawfully exceeded its mandate. Where the Security Council does not grant the 
level of administrative power granted to an occupant as the de facto administrator of 
the territory, then notwithstanding that the UN force has been tasked to create order it 
lacks the ‘effective control’ over territory required for an occupant. Therefore, where
also directed UN personnel to “respect” international humanitarian law and human rights standards as 
they applied to the operation. In fact, the Convention defines the status of UN personnel under ius ad 
bellum but not ius in hello (where international humanitarian law dominates): see Antoine Bouvier, 
‘Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel: Presentation and Analysis’ 
(1995) 309 Inti Rev o f the Red Cross 638.
l82Major M.J. Kelly, ‘Legal Regimes and Law Enforcement in Peace Operations’ in Hugh Smith (Ed), 
The Force o f Law: International Law and the Land Commander, Australian Defence Studies Centre 
(ADFA), Canberra, 1994 (pi89), pp 190-1. Ottolenghi’s view that occupation law cannot apply to 
interventions in non-international armed conflicts is not consistent with the view of the UN that its 
intervention in a non-international armed conflict in a peace enforcement capacity renders it an 
international armed conflict: Michael Ottolenghi, ‘The Stars and Stripes in al-Fardos Square: The 
Implications for the Law of Belligerent Occupation’ (2004) 72 Fordham LR 2177, at 2182. 
l82Compare Kelly, ‘Legal Regimes,’ ibid, pl96.
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there is consent from the host state to intervention, and the intervention is authorised 
by the Security Council, the terms of the consent and the Security Council 
Resolution will govern the extent to which the intervening UN force may engage in 
judicial reconstruction. This must be so notwithstanding the difficulty of obtaining or 
maintaining consent, and particularly genuine consent in circumstances where 
pressure is applied to states to accept intervention. It has been plausibly suggested 
that the presence of consent poses a problem for the application of international 
humanitarian law because it could well be indicative of the absence of an “armed 
conflict,” in which case it would not apply, compared to non-consensual peace 
enforcement operations.185
4.5.1 Authority to Use “All Necessary Means ” to Restore Security
As a result of the criticality of the mandate, and how the operation proceeds, 
the applicability of international humanitarian law may vary on a case by case 
basis.186 A common form of authority is “all necessary means” to restore security 
generally or to a purpose. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF), for example, in 
Somalia had a broad mandate, and employed the Security Council’s Chapter VII 
authority, to permit “all necessary means” to establish a secure environment for 
humanitarian aid operations.18 The authorisation to create security and order 
dominated the approach of UNITAF’s (US) command. Kelly argues that this was an 
‘effective assumption’ of the Geneva IV occupant’s responsibilities, despite explicit 
disagreement by command. Relying on the UN mandate, the Australian UNITAF 
contingent in Baidoa undertook a deliberate task of judicial systemic reconstruction, 
based on the linkage between a strong judicial system and security, commencing 
with a significant effort to restore security and facilitate community consultation and
IX4Pfanner, above n78, p53. He notes that the applicability of consent does not limit the Security 
Council to Chapter VI action only, although it is important to recognise that Chapter VII action is not 
consent-dependent.
IX5Report of Working Group 1 in Umesh Palwankar (Ed), Symposium on Humanitarian Action and 
Peace-Keeping Operations: Report, ICRC, Geneva, 1994, p75. A focal point of disagreement was 
whether UN forces could be a party to armed conflict and whether force members were combatants 
attracting prisoner of war status. The Group also pointed out that peace enforcement operations “had 
so far always [been] entrusted to States:” p76.
IS6Preliminary discussion (Yves Sandoz) in Umesh Palwankar (Ed), Symposium on Humanitarian 
Action and Peace-Keeping Operations: Report, ICRC, Geneva, 1994, p68.
IX7UNSC Resolution 794 (1992), paragraph 10. 
lxxKelly, ‘Legal Regimes,’ above nl82, p 191.
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1 RQprogressing to mentoring participation in the system itself. Kelly reports success 
with this process of restoring the court as a locus of community life and dispute 
resolution in Baidoa.190
The UNITAF mandate is to be compared with the United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), established on 14 August 2003,191 which was limited to 
advice and promotion of human rights and democratic, constitutional development, 
at the request of the Interim Government. In judicial reconstruction and court 
intervention its mandate was only to “promote” human rights, reconciliation and 
judicial and legal reform “to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq.” This was 
expanded on 7 August 2007 in UNSC Resolution 1770, again at Iraqi request but 
only “as circumstances permit,” to “advise, support and assist” the same 
formulation. It was primarily exercised through consultation, advice and the 
facilitation of national fora to discuss rule of law issues, but did not involve direct 
intervention.194
4.5.2 Specific Authority to Assist or Participate in Judicial Measures
The much more specific mandate for UNOSOM II, the third sequential UN 
operation in Somalia, authorised “all necessary measures against” perpetrators of
IM,See Kelly, Peace Operations, above nl3, para 807 et seq. The Australian effort included purging 
the judiciary and making appointments on local advice, convening a domestic Steering Committee to 
assess constitutional reform and review the Somali Penal Code (para 768 et seq), providing security 
and administrative assistance and providing direct legal advice on cases (paras 834-5). 
l<)0Kelly, Peace Operations, ibid, para 835.
I9IUNSC Resolution 1500 (2003), and its mandate post occupation was set out in UNSC Resolution 
1546 (2004).
192Article 7(b)(iii), UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004). The Resolution affirmed in its preface “the 
importance of the rule of law, national reconciliation, respect for human rights” and democracy. 
MNF-I was to provide security for UNAMI. The mandate as expanded in UNSC Resolution 1770 
(2007), renewed in UNSC Resolution 1830 (2008), but remained one of advice and ‘promohon’ 0f 
rule of law and other humanitarian goals. UNAMI continues at the date of writing under authority of 
UNSC Resolution 1883 (2009). In all Resolutions, the UN undertook to withdraw at Iraqi request: for 
example, Article 4, Resolution 1770. UNAMI was not the first UN representative organisation in Iraq. 
The late Special Representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello, appointed under UNSC Resolution 1483 
(2003) to advise on “legal and judicial reform,” was killed in August 2003 in the bombing of UN 
Headquarters in Baghdad, after which the UN withdrew temporarily from Iraq.
193Article 1, UNSC Resolution 1770 (2007), as extended.
l94For example, assistance to the Government of Iraq, especially the Ministry of Human Rights, in 
meeting reporting obligations under various international treaties, and organisation of training 
workshops in human rights (UNAMI Human Rights Report l April -  30 June 2007, 
http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/HR%20Report%20Apr%20Jun%202007%20EN.pdf, viewed 26 
April 2008, paras 105-6); advocacy on human rights and detention issues (para 13), and training of 
governmental and corrections officials (paras 88-91): UNAMI Human Rights Report 1 July - 3 1  
December 2007, http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/HR%20Report%20Jul%20Dec%202007%20 
EN.pdf, viewed 26 April 2008.
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armed attacks, including investigation, detention and trial,195 police assistance to 
restore “law and order” and ‘assistance’ to Somalis to re-establish “national and 
regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country.”196 The explicit 
authority to detain, without clear authority on detention and judicial processing, has 
been described as a “breach of all acceptable human rights standards,” which should 
have been addressed by occupation military tribunals or by efforts at reinvigorating
1 07an indigenous justice system. The demand for trial and punishment places it 
outside analogy with administrative detention for security purposes under Article 78, 
Geneva IV, but there is no recognition of a need or authority to intervene in the 
domestic judicial structure to ensure effective achievement of the mandate. Thus, in 
terms of judicial intervention, UNOSOM II actually engaged only in training, and 
in releasing detainees who had been in extended pre-trial detention to ease prison 
overcrowding.199 It ‘avoided’ establishing temporary military courts, relying instead 
on neighbourhood structures pending the development of a unitary system.200 At
UNOSOM IPs 1995 departure, however, not all regional areas yet had a justice
201system in place.“
4.5.3 The Link Between Security, the Judicial System and the ‘Rule o f  Law ’
However, UN SC Resolution 865 stated that “the reestablishment of the 
Somali police, and judicial and penal systems, is critical for the restoration of 
security and stability in the country.” The emphasis, as in occupation, is squarely 
security. This does not necessarily require administrative controls and non- 
consensual intervention in domestic judicial structures, and might, for example, have 
been met by the provision of adequate security for extant institutions to reform 
themselves with advisory assistance. With the exception of the extent of involvement 
of UNITAF legal officers in individual proceedings, this kind of activity in Baidoa
l95Paragraph 4, UNSC Resolution 814 (1993). The first UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was 
authorised in response to a request from Somalia, and was limited to certain security operations to 
allow the delivery of humanitarian aid: UNSC Resolution 751 (1992), drawing on Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter.
l%Kelly, Peace Operations, above nl3, para 926.
'"Especially Articles 9-11, Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, adopted by General Assembly 
Resolution 217 of 10 December 1948, A/RES/217 A III and Article 9, ICCPR; Kelly, ibid, para 765. 
'"Kelly, ibid, para 926.
'"Kelly, ibid, para 936, references omitted.
200Kelly, ‘Legal Regimes,’ above nl82, p 195.
:olKelly, Peace Operations, above nl3, para 926.
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was effective in restoring order.202 The Report o f the Commission o f Inquiry into 
UNOSOMII Pursuant to UNCR 885 found that where the UN “operates in a country 
that it has thus characterised [as being without a government], it necessarily has to 
bear responsibility for at least some of the basic state concerns traditionally 
appertaining to a government and that could invariably raise the spectre of a United 
Nations trusteeship or neo-colonialism.” However, they need not require an 
interventionist model as regards the domestic judiciary, maintaining the importance 
of self-ordering and non-interference in domestic affairs. Further one must not 
conflate law and order with the rule of law. UNITAF was clearly guided that, while 
the Security Council was “determined further to restore peace, stability and law and 
order,” it recognised that only Somalis bore “ultimate responsibility for national 
reconciliation and the reconstruction of their own country.”204
Intervention not concerned directly with the creation of civil order may yet 
impact on the rule of law. There have been two recent instances of Security Council 
intervention to create international tribunals to try those accused of international 
crimes, drawing on Chapter VII authority. These were the International Criminal 
Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (ICTY; ICTR).205 Rwanda, 
however, was dissatisfied with the domestic rule of law effect of the ICTR for 
several reasons, chiefly the foreign location of the tribunal and post-trial detention 
facilities, and the exclusion of the death penalty (especially considering that it could 
be and was applied in domestic trials). While the authorising Resolution does not 
itself refer to the rule of law, it was explicitly referred to as a reason for intervention 
in debate." In a non-conflict environment, the rule of law was seconded to political
202Ganzglass, however, prefers to describe it as “successful ... in restoring the rule of law.” He does so 
in reliance on the institutionalist, ends-based thinking criticised in Chapter One, above: Martin P. 
Ganzglass, ‘Afterword: Rebuilding the Rule of Law in the Horn of Africa,’ in William Maley, Charles 
Sampford and Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military 
Responsibilities in Failed States, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (p340), pp342-3. 
203Para 251, quoted in Kelly, Peace Operations, above nl3, para 938.
204Paragraph 10 and prefatory recitations, UNSC Resolution 794 (1992). See also UNSC Resolution 
143 (1960), authorising consent-based intervention in Congo (ONUC) under UN command, to “take 
necessary steps in consultation” with the Congolese government to maintain order. UN Secretary- 
General U Thant observed that the “maintenance of law and order, which was one of the main 
attributes of sovereignty, was principally the responsibility of the Congolese government:” Secretary- 
General’s Report of 29 June 1964 on ONUC (S/5784), see further United Nations, The Blue Helmets: 
A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, Department of Public Information, New York, 1985,
pp218-20.
2I)5UNSC Resolution 827 (1993) and UNSC Resolution 955 (1994), respectively.
206Othman, above n58, p60.
2ll7See further Othman, ibid, p54.
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acceptability ahead of the holding of free and fair elections when UNTAG (UN 
Transition Assistance Group in Namibia) only ‘discussed’ with South Africa the 
repeal of discriminatory laws which would affect the elections.
As a result of its Charter interest in security and order, especially in Chapter 
VII actions, UN commanded intervening forces with less than complete 
administrative authority in a territory do not tend to focus on the rule of law, but still 
engage in a range of judicial reconstruction activities with the purpose of achieving 
order. In Somalia alone, this spanned simple security, amendment to laws, judicial 
personnel policy, detention and participation in criminal proceedings. However, 
importantly, these activities were carried out in fact on a consultation or partnership 
basis, so that they cannot be described as non-consensual activities where they 
directly impacted the local administration of justice. Further, they are determined by 
the limits of the authorising Security Council Resolution. Therefore it appears that 
the Security Council can mandate assistance to domestic judicial institutions with an 
eye on the (international) rule of law. However, practice does not yet support 
mandatory, non-consensual intervention as a security purpose.
4.6 UN Transitional Authorities
The third class of UN interventions involves a similar structure but broader 
authority than the second. It is the establishment of transitional governing authorities 
pending the development or re-emergence of a representative local government. 
Recently, this kind of authority has been exercised by the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Transitional Authority in 
East Timor (UNTAET), chief among a handful of instances.209
20XUnited Nations, The Blue Helmets, above n204, pp376-7.
2(WPeacekeeeping missions began to expand with UNTAG in 1989-90 (Namibia), and might include 
“assisting or exercising civil administrative functions during the transition to independence or 
democracy.” Until 1990 the only peace enforcement operations were, in the absence of the Soviet 
Union, in Korea (1950) and ONUC in Congo (1961): see further Major J.G. Waddell, ‘Legal Aspects 
of UN Peacekeeping’ in Hugh Smith (Ed), The Force o f Law: International Law and the Land 
Commander, Australian Defence Studies Centre (ADFA), Canberra, 1994 (p47), p49.
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The assumption of governing authority, particularly transitional authority, 
suggests an immediate analogy with occupation law, and is therefore suggestive of 
its application. However, an examination of the scope of activity authorised by the 
Security Council on such missions indicates a much broader assumption of authority 
to institute permanent ‘rule of law’ measures notwithstanding that the terms of the 
mandates suffer from a lack of specificity in sweeping grants of competence. This, it 
has been said, means the authority is deliberately left to “give meaning” to their own 
mandate to exercise legislative, judicial and executive powers. In Kosovo, for 
example, UN forces exercised “all legislative and executive authority ... including the 
administration of the judiciary,” although they themselves were explicitly excluded
9 1 1
from the legal system they sought to create.
A similar grant to the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) in 
1999 also overlooked the phrase ‘rule of law,’ “ but conferred broad and more 
specific administrative authority to build the foundations for a democratic and stable 
state, to prepare East Timorese for governance, to facilitate the drafting of a 
constitution, and to build a legal system, a judiciary, a police force and a civil 
service; East Timorese involvement was integral, unlike in Kosovo. Resolution 
1272 was passed in response to a Secretary-General’s report that civil administration 
in East Timor had collapsed and the courts “had ceased to exist,”214 explaining its 
specificity.
2I0A s in Kosovo and East Timor: Stahn, above n67, at 321.
2llChesterman, above n9, at 349, referring to UNMIK Regulation 1999/1: On the Authority o f the 
Interim Administration in Kosovo, entered into force 78 September 1999.
212Para 1, UNSC Resolution 1272 (1999).
2l3Para 2, ibid; Othman, above n58, p48. INTERFET, which preceded UNTAET, was also a Chapter 
VII authorisation to use “all necessary means to restore peace and security” in East Timor without 
specific reference to the ‘rule of law:’ UNSC Resolution 1264 (1999). INTERFET, under Australian 
command, deployed on 20 September 1999 and was authorised to apprehend and detain local citizens 
as “security” detainees, on suspicion of criminal activity as well as security purposes: 
COMINTERFET Detention Ordinance, 21 October 1999; see also Othman, above n58, p i09 and 
Bruce Oswald, ‘The Interfet Detainee Management Unit in East Timor’ (2000) 3 YB oflHL 347-361. 
The policy spoke specifically of “apprehension” not “arrest.” Plunkett argues that the combination of 
“banditry,” the maintenance of “order by lawless means,” and human rights violations prior to UN 
intervention amounted to a “rule of law vacuum:” Mark Plunkett, ‘Rebuilding the Rule of Law,’ in 
William Maley, Charles Samp ford and Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil 
and Military Responsibilities in Failed States, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (p207), 
p207.
2l4Progress Report of the UN Secretary-General, Question o f East Timor, A/50/436, 19 September 
1995, para.37. See further Othman, above n58, pp48-9, and Suzannah Linton ‘Prosecuting Atrocities 
at the District Court of Dili’ (2001) 2 MJIL 301, but note that a similar near-total lack of a trained 
judiciary did not justify intervention by a UN transitional authority to restore the ‘rule of law’ in
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In practice, both mandates were held by the respective UN transitional 
authorities to have authorised wide-reaching programs of judicial and legal reform. 
By comparison with the legal authority of occupants, UN transitional authorities 
appear to consider themselves authorised to implement permanent and 
comprehensive institutional change in pursuit of the rule of law, notwithstanding the 
absence of that term in the authorising resolutions. Further, the rule of law as 
conceived by UN practitioners falls firmly into the rights-based institutionalist model
9 1 Sdiscussed in Chapter OneC
In Kosovo, for example, the Security Council received a report in which the 
ambit of competence claimed, responding to an “urgent need to build genuine rule of 
law,” included amendment of domestic laws and institutions where they conflicted 
with the UNMIK mandate, the issue of regulations as the superior law, appointment 
and training of judicial officers, the assurance of judicial administration of courts, 
police and prisons, development of legal policy, and the establishment and re- 
establishment of permanent courts. UNTAET considered itself competent to 
‘abolish’ the death penalty, and exercise a similar range of authorities, including 
the insertion of a new Special Panel for Serious Crimes in the Dili District Court, 
with a mixed national and international bench, creation of a “completely new” 
indigenous judiciary with “no succession” either to the court arrangements under 
Indonesian occupation or earlier Portuguese colonial administration, administering
Rwanda in 1994. The state of the judiciary there was reported to the UN by Special Representative 
Mr. Michel Moussalli in Report on the Situation o f Human Rights in Rwanda submitted by the Special 
Representative, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/33, 8 February 1999, para 39.
2l5For example, the rule of law was urgently to be created “through the immediate re-establishment of 
an independent, impartial and multi-ethnic judiciary” and would thus contribute to reconciliation and 
security in the area:” Report o f the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo, 12 
July 1999, S/1999/779, para 66. For UNTAC, see De Mello, above nl4, p25, and generally see Stahn, 
above n67, at 333-4.
~16 Report o f the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo, ibid, paras 36-40 and 
66-71 in the specific context of judicial affairs. The Supreme Court of Kosovo, abolished during 
Serbian rule in 1991, and the General Prosecutor’s Office were restored and the remainder of the court 
hierarchy ‘rationalised’ (paras 70-1). UNMIK also established a specific Judicial Affairs Office, 
which augmented the work of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
which took key responsibility for “institution building and human rights:” see further Newton, above 
nl, at 258-9. The Judicial Affairs Office was given specific authority over “the administration of 
courts, prosecution services and prisons; the development of legal policies; the review and drafting of 
legislation, as necessary, for the goals and purposes of UNMIK; and the assessment of the quality of 
justice in Kosovo, including training requirements:” Report o f the Secretary-General on the UN 
Interim Administration in Kosovo, ibid, para 67.
2l7Section 3.3, UNTAET Regulation 1/1999: On the Authority o f the Transitional Administration in 
East Timor, entered into force 27 November 1999. Compare the ‘suspension’ of capital punishment 
during the Coalition occupation of Iraq in section 3.5.1, Chapter Three above.
2lxSee Othman, above n58, p96, who describes it as a “distinctive” feature of UNTAET.
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the Public Prosecution Service through the Department of Ordinary Crimes, 
introducing a new role of Investigative Judge which had not existed under the 
Indonesian-administered court system where investigation was the responsibility of 
the Prosecutor, planning employment of international judges and prosecutors 
directly in extraordinary courts, establishing a salaried ‘Public Defender 
System’““ and establishing the Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
Both authorities were explicitly interested in the rule of law.
UNTAC poses a contrast. It had a notionally more limited grant of legislative 
competence, although its human rights mandate has been described as “the most 
comprehensive human rights mandate ever entrusted to a United Nations peace­
keeping force” to achieve systemic change and to facilitate free elections through 
training and investigation of abuses.““ UNTAC had “direct control” over five areas: 
defence, public security, finance, foreign affairs and information,224 but law and 
order, and the administration of justice, was left to domestic factions.22^  This meant 
UNTAC’s non-rights related intervention was limited to advice on legal and judicial 
reform, the kind contemplated by interveners with less than complete 
administrative authority.
Its rights mandate with respect to preventing the reoccurrence of past abuses, 
on the other hand, supported a significant interest in transitional justice. In the
2l<)The new structure comprised District Courts and the Court of Appeal, although at the time of 
Othman’s publication four District Courts had been established across thirteen administrative districts: 
ibid, p95. See sections 4 and 7, UNTAET Regulation 125/2001: On the Amendment o f UNTAET 
Regulation 11/2000 on the Organization o f Courts in East Timor and UNTAET Regulation 30/2000 
on the Transitional Rules o f Criminal Procedure, entered into force 25 September 2000, and also 
UNTAET Regulation 18/2001: On the Amendment o f  UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/11 on the 
Organization o f the Courts in East Timor, entered into force 6 March 2000, and 16/2000: 
Organisation o f the Public Prosecution Service in East Timor, entered into force 6 June 2000. 
Compare the role of the Investigative Judge in the Iraqi criminal court structure, as described in 
Adnan Abdelazak al-Hashemi, ‘Criminal Trial Procedures as a Tool to Serve Litigants, Protect 
Human Rights, and Activate the Judicial Activity,’ Iraqi Judicial Forum: Iraqi Judicial System: 
Reality and Prospects, Baghdad, 2004, and Annexstad, above n91, at 73-5.
22(lHowever, the planned Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court (KWECC) never sat due to concerns 
about the diversion of resources from the domestic judiciary and the fear of inflaming ethnic tensions: 
Stahn, above n67, at 331-2 and Newton, above nl, at 259.
22lOthman, above n58, p97.
222UNTAET Regulation 10/2001: On the Establishment o f a Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation in East Timor, entered into force 13 July 2001; Stahn, above n67, at 335-6.
22?De Mello, above nl4, p26.
224Ibid, p27.
225Janet Heininger, Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia, Twentieth Century 
Fund Press, New York, 1994, p98.
226Ibid, p99.
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absence of a “credible judicial system” after the personnel shortages left by Khmer 
Rouge purges and the political inability to prosecute the Khmer Rouge itself for 
crimes against humanity, UNTAC established a Special Prosecutor’s Office on 6 Jan 
1993, “to prosecute cases in the Cambodian court system itself rather than rely on the 
authorities to do so.”227
Rule of law rhetoric has placed judicial reconstruction high in UN transitional 
authority prioritising. Special offices dedicated to judicial reconstruction programs 
have been established in Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor. However, there is 
typically a strong dual focus in the course of interventions: in reconstructing or 
recreating the domestic judicial system for the ordinary administration of justice, and 
in developing ‘transitional justice’ programs, to prosecute allegations of international 
and other crimes committed in the course of the regime replaced by the UN 
transitional authority. In East Timor, transitional justice was linked directly to the 
rule of law; accountability was notable because it was to be complete, as against ail 
perpetrators, and because it was “premised on a workable cooperative arrangement” 
with Indonesia. However, where transitional justice is primarily left to the subject
99Qcommunity, complete legal accountability is not necessarily sought.““
Finally, as in occupation law, transitional authorities assert competence to 
declare the nature of the applicable law. In both Kosovo and East Timor, the 
declaration was met with dispute by significant groupings in the community. In 
Kosovo the applicable law was proclaimed to be that extant in 1989, prior to the 
Serbian seizure of control, but, oddly, UNMIK allowed application of post-1989 
laws “as an exception” provided they did not compromise human rights and
227Some UN prosecutors, however, reported the discontinuing of proceedings and political pressure 
not to affect the electoral process: ibid, p97.
22sOthman, above n58, p33, see also the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding 
Cooperation in Legal, Judicial and Human Rights Related Fields as signed between UNTAET and 
Indonesia on 6 April 2000, published in the Official Gazette of East Timor, vol 1/3, pp93-96. Othman, 
who served as a UN prosecutor, explained full accountability as a result of public pressure, the 
“domestic nature” of the accountability model and the “need to establish the rule of law and to create a 
viable system of administration of justice,” inter alia. He also notes cooperative accountability as the 
Security Council’s preference in Resolutions 1272 (1999), 1319 (2000) and 1410 (2002), and a 
necessary result of the primacy of complementary jurisdiction before the International Criminal Court: 
see p i29.
22,For example in Rwanda, the Organic Law on Genocide 1996 provided that accountability should 
target those with leadership and therefore the greatest responsibility. See further Othman, above n58, 
pp l64 ,172.
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addressed what would otherwise be a lacuna. In East Timor, the applicable law 
was declared to be that extant prior to the commencement of UNTAET, but subject 
to similar caveats about human rights standards and mandate conflicts. However, 
this was subject to divergent, and trenchant, interpretation by the Court of Appeal as 
reconstituted by UNTAET, “ to the extent that Othman saw the only solution to the 
retardation of “the administration of justice” as legislative intervention, 
notwithstanding its breach of the separation of powers. Further, caveating the 
continued application of laws with international human rights standards has been 
argued to be “too simplistic” in its demand that laws be interpreted to the most 
current rights standards, without the necessary background in the domestic legal 
system.
Specific legal concerns arise in the direct application of international 
standards to fill gaps in the UN regulatory regime, which would normally be subject
9 9 4to the domestic constitutional position on the incorporation of international law. 
Both issues pose substantial problems, and inhibitions, for the development of a 
genuine domestic rule of law relationship post-intervention. What they clearly 
achieve is preparation of sufficient institutional forms for the putative State to 
participate in the international rule of law.
Practical criticisms of judicial intervention are remarkably consistent across 
transitional authorities. Key among them is lack of sufficient funding to introduce 
and maintain the institutional and personnel changes attempted in the course of the 
administration, and also the lack of intervention in some areas due to funds 
limitations, leading to ineffective defence and shortcomings in judicial decision-
230Article 1, UNMIK Regulation 24/1999: On the Law Applicable in Kosovo, entered into force 10 
June 1999.
231Section 3, UNTAET Regulation 1/1999.
232The majority of Portuguese judges interpreted Section 3.1 of UNTAET Regulation 1/1999 as 
providing that the law applicable before 25 October 1999 was Portuguese law and not Indonesian law, 
since Indonesia had never been a lawful occupant: P v Armando do Santos, p4, Court of Appeal, Case 
No: 16/PID.C.G./2001/PD.DL, 15 July 2003. The Special Panel for Serious Crimes, in P v J. 
Sermento D. Mendonca decided not to follow that decision on the ground that the Court of Appeal had 
violated the Constitution, the laws of East Timor, and international human rights standards: SPSC, 
Dili District Court, Case no: 18a/2001, 24 July 2003. Othman recounts the effect of subsequent 
contradictory decisions and the resulting application of different bodies of law by different courts 
within the same hierarchy, above n58, p91.
2330thman, ibid.
234Stahn, above n67, at 322, references omitted. Compare section 3, UNTAET Regulation 1/1999 
which, in addition to a general caveat, identified certain laws which breached rights standards and 
declared that they “shall no longer be applied.”
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making.235 This was particularly so for UNTAC, although it overlooks the effect of 
significant limitations in its mandate.236 These criticisms seem to focus on the lack of 
success in rule of law creation through too-minimal intervention, rather than 
criticising the character of judicial intervention itself.
However, reflective of the rule of law properly so called, interveners’ lack of 
familiarity with the domestic legal system, including basic shortfalls in the 
availability of the applicable law in translation or generally, and in the rejection of 
reconstruction measures by parts of the subject community238 have impacted on UN- 
administered judicial reconstruction. By contrast, where reconstruction measures 
such as the East Timorese Special Panel for Serious Crimes drew on the extant legal 
framework rather than directly from international documents, and indigenous 
personnel, this was seen as an advantage to the smooth administration of justice.
Like occupation, the strongest critiques are based on the character of 
intervention and the compatibility of the authority granted to transitional authorities 
with the rule of law properly so called. A fundamental problem with intervention in 
the judiciary to produce judicial independence, through de-politicising lustration, 
training or the provision of advice generally and in specific matters, is that such 
intervention requires necessarily close supervision of the judiciary, contrary to the 
human rights-based obligation to respect the independence of the judiciary.240 The 
same argument applies to the capacity granted to transitional authorities, as to
235For the uneven allocation of resources to defence counsel services, compared to prosecutions, in 
East Timor, and the lack of funding for transcription and court recording, see Othman, above n58, 
p i03-4. Section 26, UNTAET Regulation 11/2000: On the Organization o f Courts in East Timor, 
entered into force 6 March 2000, mandates the transcription of proceedings.
236UNTAC was criticised for not funding judicial salaries as a means to assure judicial independence: 
Comments on the Asia Watch Report of May 1993, from a letter written by Special Representative 
Yasushi Akashi, quoted in Heininger, above n225, p97. It also decided it was not feasible to retrain 
judges legally before its mandate expired: ibid.
237Stahn, above n67, at 329 (UNMIK).
23sThe UNMIK-planned Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court (KWECC) never sat because of fears 
of inflaming ethnic tensions, inter alia, while Serbian judges refused to participate in the emergency 
judicial review program implemented to review security detainees apprehended by KFOR: Newton, 
above nl, at 258-9.
239Othman, above n58, p97.
24l)Stahn, above n67, at 323-4, and also Hansjorg Strohmeyer, ‘Collapse and Reconstruction of a 
Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor’ (2001) 95 AJIL 46, at 51, 
58. For example, UNMIK Regulation 24/1999 encouraged Kosovar courts to “request clarification 
from the Special representative of the Secretary-General in connection with the implementation of the 
present regulation,” which identified the body of applicable law in the area: section 2. Further, persons 
detained by KFOR, a NATO force deployed under UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999), on security 
grounds were held in protracted detention without trial while the applicable law and suitable judicial 
fora were established: Newton, above nl, at 247.
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occupants, to detain persons administratively for security reasons, without necessary 
reference to human rights standards, and to their exemption from the application of 
domestic law which they assert competence to create.241
The concern is more than the initial problem of the limited temporal authority 
of UN Transitional Authorities while attempting to achieve permanent or long-term 
development, or the too-rapid development of a transitional society leading to 
“resentment and disbelief in the virtues of liberalism.” 242 It is the asserted capacity of 
UN interveners to introduce purportedly permanent judicial change, substantially 
more than the competence of the occupant. It is especially so when the effect of the 
change is irreversible, for example the imposition of criminal convictions or the 
liberalisation of the economy.243
In a telling reflection on the (lack of) permanent rule of law effect through 
UN Transitional Authority intervention, the UNTAET-established judiciary was 
adopted in the new East Timorese Constitution but only “until such times as the new 
judicial system is established,” while transitional accountability through the mixed 
SPSC was maintained pending the resolution of contemporary investigations.244 If 
the intervention is directed to achieving the rule of law, it cannot succeed without the 
domestic origination of change.245
4.7 Conclusion: The Concern of Security Council Interventions with 
Restoring the Rule of Law
Human Rights Watch’s emphasis on the institutionalist model of rule of law 
as the key to national reconciliation in Iraq246 is challenged by realities not just in 
that consent-based intervention, but in the range of interventions conducted under the 
banner of the United Nations. The view of international law that the rule of law is an
241Stahn, ibid, at 329.
242Ibid, at 324-5, 335-6.
243Ibid, at 326.
244Sections 160 and 163, Constitution o f the Democratic Republic o f East Timor 2002.
245Stahn identifies an “ultra-liberal critique” of intervention “in core areas of state-building, such as 
democratisation and judicial reconstruction, because domestic actors have the right to make their own 
mistakes and to learn from them” (above n67, at 326), or the “threat of tutelage,” but the problem is 
greater. It is not so much that the domestic population is deprived of a self-development opportunity, 
the very lack of their involvement precludes the rule of law.
246Human Rights Watch, 2008, above nl03, p3.
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absolute is incompatible with the legal and political demand for intervention under 
Security Council auspices to create it, both in law and in practice. Even the firmest of 
rights-based theorists acknowledge that the conduct and legitimacy of the 
interveners’ will affect their effort to persuade locals that “law matters” and that 
there will be “internal contradictions” in intervention.“ The consequence should be 
programs tailored to the security situation facing interveners, but international 
pressure, based on its concept of the rule of law, increasingly demands a standard
748
package or blueprint.“
Recognising the actuality of intervention and its contradictions to the 
international rule, the continuing push in international law for a single, rights-based 
global structure has serious implications for the principles of self-ordering and 
sovereignty in the development of indigenous legal systems and rule of law 
relationships.
247Stromseth et al, above nl69, p21 and 12 respectively. This is particularly so when seeking an 
independent judiciary which is a product of both law and society: Robert S. Summers, ‘A Formal 
Theory of the Rule of Law’ (1993) 6(2) Ratio Juris 127, at 134.
248Especially Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report o f the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations, A/55/305 S/2000/809, United Nations, 2000 (“Brahimi Report”) which supports the 
development of a standard criminal code for transplantation into transitional societies, especially to 
ease problems during the intervention itself caused by the interveners’ lack of familiarity with 
domestic law: paras 80-1; Mark Plunkett, ‘The Establishment of the Rule of Law in Post-conflict 
Peacekeeping’ in Hugh Smith (Ed), International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian 
Experience, Australian Defence Studies Centre (ADFA), Canberra, 1994.
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C O N C L U S I O N
MOVING TOWARDS RULE OF LAW LEGITIMACY BY 
REFOCUSSING ON ORDER IN INTERVENTION
Practitioners identify, unsurprisingly, practical aspects such as “funding and 
physical capability” as essential to the efficacy of rule of law operations, 1 but this 
presupposes coherence in the idea and purpose of interventions in domestic legal 
systems with a rule of law purpose at all. Stromseth and her colleagues attribute 
“disappointing progress” in military ‘rule of law’ interventions to create rights to 
three factors: the complexity of the mission, the typical “resource and bureaucratic 
constraints,” but above all “the failure o f many policymakers to examine or fully 
understand the very concept o f ‘the rule o f law.
Identifying the building of the ‘rule of law’ as a mission in international 
military interventions is beset with contradictions between rule of law theory, legal 
theory, the content of international law and the reality of security and order. The 
concerted effort in Iraq both under the law of occupation and later consent-based 
Security Council authorisation to create ‘the rule of law’ through functioning courts 
crystallise a growing body of practice which brings into serious question the 
traditional and widespread view that the restoration of order, as a security function, 
and of the rule of law proceed hand in hand, demonstrating that the best efforts to
'Michael Kelly, Peace Operations: Tackling the Military, Legal and Policy Challenges, Australia 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1997, para 1039. The Brahimi Report described its “key 
conditions” as “political support,” which has legitimacy overtones to be explored further below, 
rapidity of deployment and “a sound peace-building strategy” (para 4), which are still directed to the 
practicalities of intervention: Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report o f the Panel on 
United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305 S/2000/809, United Nations, 2000 (“Brahimi Report”).
2Jane Stromseth, David Wippman and Rosa Brooks, Can Might Make Rights?: Building the Rule o f 
Law After Military Interventions, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006, p69, emphasis 
original.
Tor example, Michael Kelly, ‘The Role of the Military in Globalising the Rule of Law,’ in Spencer 
Zifcak (Ed), Globalisation and the Rule o f Law, Routledge, London, 2005 (pi 84), pi 90, citing the 
experience of UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) and UN Mission of Support in 
East Timor (UNMISET) interveners in Timor Leste and Coalition forces in Iraq in 2003; Stromseth et 
al, above n2; Mark Plunkett, ‘Rebuilding the Rule of Law,’ in William Maley, Charles Sampford and 
Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities in Failed 
States, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (p207).
185
create rights-based criminal justice institutions as the core feature of the latter 
generally fail without an existing basic level of order in society. Prematurely 
attempting to create domestic institutions matching the international rule of law 
model in these circumstances, or doing so via imposed measures lacking domestic 
legitimacy, achieves little but to bring the rule of law itself into disrepute. Indeed, the 
“1990s notion of the Washington Consensus, namely that democracy, markets and 
the rule of law all would develop in unison, looks hopelessly naive a decade later.“4
5.1 Dismantling the Security / Rule of Law Interrelationship
Popular substantive or blue print theories of the rule of law continue to assert 
that the rule of law is expressed only in a rights-based criminal justice system based 
on familiar judicial structures.5 In Kosovo and Iraq, for example, programs were 
introduced contemporaneously to “establish security and build governance structures 
that advance fundamental goals of self-determination and protection of human 
rights.“ 6 7Similarly, the Brahimi Report’s “key recommendations” for United Nations 
operations were for interveners to participate in short-term, high visibility local 
engagements, for example in rebuilding core infrastructure, to address the problem of 
former combatants, and to develop a “doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, 
other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to 
reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving
n
respect for human rights in post-conflict environments.” Peacebuilding through the 
rule of law and democratisation, Brahimi said, is “integral to the success of
ftpeacekeeping operations” in resolving conflict.
However, the law of interventions recognises the primary importance of 
security by allowing activities contrary to the rule of law to restore “public order”
4Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa (Eds), Rule by Law: The Politics o f Courts in Authoritarian 
Regimes, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008, p2.
sFor example Stromseth et al, above n2; Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of 
Law,’ in Thomas Carothers (Ed), Promoting the Rule o f Law Abroad: In Search o f Knowledge, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2006 (p31); and see section 1.2.3, 
Chapter One above.
6Stromseth et al, above n2, pp51-2.
7Brahimi Report, para 47(b), and see also 37 and 41-2.
sBrahimi Report, para 35, finding support from the Security Council and the General Assembly’s 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.
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and the necessary “administration of justice.” 9 In fact, laws governing the conduct of 
intervention whether under occupation or authority of the UN Security Council do 
not themselves regulate rule of law institutionalism at all. At best, occupation laws 
are a “minimum legal framework for the restoration of law and order ... [but] are 
quite conservative in their conception of authority and reform.” 10 That is, where the 
first line of inquiry in this thesis deconstructs the concept of the rule of law as 
expressed in international discourse, the second line of inquiry demonstrates that the 
law of interventions in effect supports the concept of the rule of law as an indigenous 
relationship. They do not explicitly allow permanent intervention in domestic judicial 
and legal structures for any ‘rule of law’ purpose but only to restore order and 
security.
Even the broadest form of intervention, Security Council transitional
administrations which purport to act on behalf of the subject people to implement
such permanent changes, remains unable to foster the rule of law as a legitimate
domestic system. It is interesting to note, as Stahn does, that transitional
administrations which do pursue the rule of law as a mission approach the problem
and solutions as society-based, rather than the focus on individual rights through
victim-centred interests in transitional justice which might be expected from the
overwhelming role of human rights in rule of law theory. 11 It suggests a fundamental
recognition of the greatest efficacy of individual rights in an orderly society. The
principle of derogability in human rights law, including of the right to a fair trial in
• • • 1 2times of national emergency including armed conflict as well as internal disorder, 
demonstrates the same result.
Putting aside the international legitimacy and support thought to flow from 
appeals to the rule of law as mission goals, the applicable law takes a more pragmatic 
view, delinking security, sometimes formulated as order, from rule of law
Article 43, Annexe to Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs o f War on Land: Regulations 
Respecting the Laws and Customs o f War on Land, 18 October 1907, The Hague, (1908) 2 AJIL 
Supplement 90-117, entered into force 26 January 1910; Article 64, Convention IV Relative to the 
Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War, 12 August 1949, Geneva, 75 UNTS 287, entered into 
force 21 October 1950, respectively.
l0Carsten Stahn, ‘Justice under Transitional Administration: Contours and Critique of a Paradigm’ 
(2005) 27 Hous J  Inti Law 311, at 319.
"ibid, at 315.
l2For example, Articles 4 and 14, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by 
General Assembly Resolution 2200 (1966), A/RES/2200A XXI, 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 
March 1976 (“ICCPR”); section 1.3, Chapter One above.
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development internal to the subject population. Intervention practice, amongst which 
the experiment of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq stands out, shows that without a 
pre-existing level of order achieved through extraordinary means permitted by 
intervention law, adjustments to ‘rule of law institutions’ produce no more than 
negligible results.
1 ^“Like democracy, the rule of law requires the right conditions to flourish,” 
and the necessary conditions are order and security. Forces deployed in Bosnia 
concluded, as their “pre-eminent lesson,” that their role was to create “an 
environment that is conducive to the rule of law,” including by combating power 
structures obstructing the development of rule of law institutions. 14 The Brahimi 
Report agreed that force “can only create the space in which peace may be built, ” 15 
although it advocated rule of law intervention. The Report, and other writers, 
intuitively recognise this, but, by equating Taw and order’ with the ‘rule of law, ’ 16 
conceptual clarity is lost. Recognising the delineation between security and the rule 
of law is essential in defining the future of intervention. Adopting suitable 
terminology and labels is a part of this process, whether ‘security operations’ or 
other. 17
Once the rule of law is reconceptualised not as a universal system of rights- 
based institutionalism, but as a negotiated internal relationship between the subjects 
of the law, the failure of domestic legitimacy in rule of law operations is explicable. 
Legitimacy comes through self-ordering; it requires more than locals ‘internalising’
^Michael J. Glennon, Limits o f Law, Prerogatives o f Power: Interventionism After Kosovo, Palgrave, 
New York, 2001, p i76.
14SFOR Lessons Learned: in creating a secure environment with respect for the rule o f law based on a 
study o f Bosnia, unpublished report provided to Kelly by US Armed Forces (May 2000), cited in 
Kelly, ‘Role of the Military,’ above n3, at pi 92. 
lsBrahimi Report, p.viii.
l6For example, US Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD71), Strengthening Criminal Justice 
Systems in Support o f Peace Operations and Other Complex Emergencies “concluded that the issue of 
re-establishing the rule of law is of the highest priority in a peace operation and will result in the 
earliest opportunity for the ramping down of military involvement,” but that “unless basic safety is 
provided, the civilian organisations will be unable to conduct their tasks:” Kelly, ‘Role of the 
Military,’ above n3, p i93, noting that PDD71 was “shelved” by the GW Bush administration (p i94); 
Plunkett, above n3.
l7This must be matched by definition, however. Australian doctrine labels brings rule of law tasks, 
including “supplementary law enforcement” by military police, under the aegis of “security 
operations,” but makes no distinction between the two missions: Combined Arms Training and 
Doctrine Centre, Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals o f Land Warfare, Cth of Australia 
1998, which designates ‘rule of law’ operations as ‘security operations:’ see Kelly, ‘Role of the 
Military,’ above n3, p i97.
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or ‘buying into’ external reforms.18 Military intervention to restore order and security 
creates the preconditions for the formation of a rule of law relationship -  but not the 
result.
5.2 International Legitimacy and ‘Rule of Law Operations:’ Explaining 
Persistence despite Failure
Sovereignty, and in particular, the sovereign equality of states, has 
traditionally been considered the underpinning “architectonic” concept of 
international law, supporting the principles of their relationships, including self- 
determination, jurisdiction over population and territory, the capacity to engage in 
diplomacy and treaty relations, non-intervention, and, indeed, the ban against force 
itself.19 The equality of states is the foundation of a Nardinian international rule of 
law relationship, although the practice o f equality through the Security Council has 
been criticised.20
Since 1945, however, democratic sanction and rights protection are 
increasingly seen as a sign of “legitimacy” on the part of states, drawing primarily on 
rights documents such as the Universal Declaration.21 The Brahimi Report’s focus on 
democracy building, and “free and fair elections” in strengthening governance, relies 
on it being viewed as an “appropriate and credible” alternative to violence as a 
means of expression. However this requires “the support of a broader process of 
democratisation and civil society building that includes effective civilian governance 
and a culture of respect for basic human rights, lest elections merely ratify a tyranny 
of the majority or be overturned by force” later.““
lxPlunkett is concerned with local ‘ownership’ through participation in reform: above n3, p223. Stahn 
recommends “moderation” in intervention to maximise the chance of internalisation: above nlO, at 
343. Measures to achieve this focus on matters such the promulgation of new codes in local 
languages: for example, SJA After Action Report, Tab A(l), quoted in Kelly, Peace Operations, 
above nl, para 764. 
l9Glennon, above n 13, ppl47-8.
20Terry Nardin, ‘Theorising the International Rule of Law’ (2008) 34 Rev o f Inti Studies 385; section 
1.5, Chapter One above.
2'Spencer Zifcak, ‘Globalising the Rule of Law: Rethinking Values and Reforming Institutions’ in 
Spencer Zifcak (Ed), Globalisation and the Rule o f Law, Routledge, London, 2005 (p32), p36. 
22Brahimi Report, para 38.
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The Brahimi Report demonstrates that legitimacy is a substantive rather than 
a formal concept, but assumes easily that the UN mission ought therefore be to 
promote democratisation, especially given the membership of non-democratic states 
in the UN. Sovereignty, it appears, permits that discretion as to domestic 
organisation. An apparent tension follows between the preservation of domestic 
jurisdiction from intervention under Article 2(7) of the Charter, and the desire to 
promote democracy “as distinct from implementing the international law of human 
rights which did not necessarily presuppose a democratic political order.”
In the late twentieth century, cases of ‘humanitarian intervention,’ 
particularly in Kosovo but also in Iraq, indicate that “a growing number of state no 
longer assert that sovereignty can shield everything done within their borders, 
however heinous.”24 It followed a notable hiatus in United Nations-authorised rule of 
law interventions in the course of the Cold War, which has been attributed to both 
“strategic and normative factors.” Since the fall of the Berlin Wail, however, 
human rights as the foundation of the rule of law, and thus legitimacy, have emerged 
as the greatest challenge to sovereignty, leading to interventions to restore or create
9 z
the domestic rule of law in independent sovereign states.
Part of the problem is dispute about the content of ‘sovereignty’ as a 
foundational concept of the international legal system. Roberts considered there to be 
“no unambiguously clear definition,” although there is a core meaning of territorial 
decision-making authority “not subject to a higher sovereign.” It is “independence” 
within that territory. Roberts, however, questions the extent to which there ever was 
any complete freedom from external constraint, and prefers a formulation of “prime 
responsibility,” in face of international standards institutions and controls, although 
he acknowledges the still “powerful” attraction the concept of sovereignty holds in
■^Preliminary Discussion in Umesh Palwankar (Ed), Symposium on Humanitarian Action and Peace- 
Keeping Operations: Report, ICRC, Geneva, 1994, pp35-6.
24Glennon, above nl3, p i61. Tomuschat, describing a “process of progressive erosion,” as part of a 
“development of greater community discipline” and a renegotiation of “the right balance” between the 
interests of states and of humanity: Christian Tomuschat, Lecture at Hague Academy of International 
Law, 1993, quoted in Adam Roberts, ‘End of Occupation’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 27, at 40.
25Stromseth et al, above n2, p29.
26Ibid.
27Roberts, above n24, at 39.
28Island o f Palmas Arbitration (1928) 22 AJ1L 867 at 875, per Judge Huber. Roberts notes that 
although the UN Charter refers to sovereign equality in Article 2(1), it is not defined: Roberts, ibid, at 
39.
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post-1945 international relations.These standards form the agreed basis of the 
international rule of law relationship, but they cannot be accepted as internationally 
legitimate (socially acceptable), if it remains acceptable through the doctrine of 
sovereignty for states not to express the same view domestically.
Domestic realignment, possibly by coercion (through ‘humanitarian 
intervention’), must occur if the international rule of law is to remain coherent and 
legitimate itself. As the chief organisation for the international community, the UN 
has taken a lead role in managing this problem of coherence, notwithstanding its 
original structure and charter to regulate “the relationships between or among but not
TOwithin states” a result which requires a reinterpretation of traditional sovereignty. 
Where a regime is not seen to draw legitimacy from subjective domestic features 
such as democracy or the rule of law, consistent with the international rule of law, it 
is not possessed o f ‘sovereignty’ warranting freedom from external intervention.
Sovereignty is thus an expression of, or benefit of, international legitimacy. 
Implementing within a state a legal system characterised by legality, accountability,
i
equality, and a commitment to fundamental human rights, endows it with 
international rule of law legitimacy. Internationally, that is thought also to confer 
domestic legitimacy through democratisation/“ Equally as importantly, the appeal to 
a rule of law mission in interventions attracts legitimacy to the interference in 
sovereignty. In both Kosovo and Iraq, for example, unilateral interveners 
subsequently sought Security Council support for aims including democratisation 
and the rule of law, to gamer greater global support. The politicising of 
humanitarian intervention by papering over other missions or outcomes with rule of 
law rhetoric has attracted criticism in different forms from the International 
Committee of the Red Cross34 and the Brahimi Report, which preferred no
2)Roberts, ibid, at 40-1. Thus, for example, the Iraq Interim Government, to which “sovereignty” was 
transferred on 28 June 2004 at the end of occupation was not absolutely independent, but may yet 
have been sovereign: at 41.
20Kelly, Peace Operations, above nl, para 112.
2lZifcak, above n21, p36. Zifcak takes the current institutionalist view of the rule of law, requiring 
features such as a constitution, judicial review, inter-party dispute resolution (with a broader focus 
than simply criminal justice) and enforceability of decisions, all informed by fundamental human 
rights: pp38-9.
32For example, Brahimi Report, paras 13-14.
^Stromseth, above n2, pp51-2.
,4Jean de Courten (ICRC) criticised the subordination of purely humanitarian objectives to political 
ends in 1990s UN operations and in An Agenda for Peace, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
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intervention where Security Council consensus-building resulted in ambiguous 
mandates and outcomes in dangerous situations.35
What, however, is meant by legitimacy, and how is it measured? Rather than 
involve some element of objective rightfulness, empirical approaches regard it 
simply as a function of social acceptability. Blueprint and substantive theorists are 
unable to measure this aspect of rule of law intervention, because they assume 
universality of forms (and thus that the existence of forms reflects the rule of law, 
notwithstanding the relationship of the population to those institutions and the flow- 
on effects for order, security and efficacy), and, equally or more importantly, they are
Tiftunable to measure accurately what they seek to change through intervention.
For those who do identify performance indicators, the measures are simple 
ones. Jose Juan Toharia, for example, proposes that the best means to evaluate justice 
systems is the conduct of “public opinion polls,” and that such a survey not only tests 
the system’s legitimacy but actually reinforces the rule of law. He concludes that 
“technical efficiency and social legitimacy are not necessarily correlated,” although 
it will be noted that blueprint and substantive theories of the rule of law both are 
concerned with technical standards and efficiency. Toharia’s view reflects the rule of 
law properly so called, which lacks required institutional forms or mandatory 
expressions. It is overlooked because of the pressure for consistency to maintain the 
international rule of law.
Legitimacy as social acceptability represents a match between the concerns of 
the subject population and the system and rules they agree to institute in response. In
Peace-Keeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit 
Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277 -  S/24111,17 June 1992: ‘Fulfilment 
of the Humanitarian Mandate in the Context of Peace-keeping Operations’ in Umesh Palwankar (Ed), 
Symposium on Humanitarian Action and Peace-Keeping Operations: Report, ICRC, Geneva, 1994 
(P29), pp29, 31.
35The ambiguity could be in the text or in differing interpretations emerging in the course of the 
operation, and which are “papered over” as a compromise: Brahimi Report, para 56, Part F: Clear, 
Credible and Achievable Mandates. Ganzglass is critical that NGO rule of law assistance provided to 
local governments imbues them with a legitimacy they may not otherwise have: Martin P. Ganzglass, 
‘Afterword: Rebuilding the Rule of Law in the Horn of Africa,’ in William Maley, Charles Sampford 
and Ramesh Thakur (Eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities in 
Failed States, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003 (p340), p348. 
v,Plunkett, for example, struggles with this aspect: above n3, pp224-5.
77Jose Juan Toharia, ‘Evaluating Systems of Justice Through Public Opinion: Why, What, Who, How, 
and What For?’ in Erik G. Jensen and Thomas C. Heller (Eds), Beyond Common Knowledge: 
Empirical Approaches to the Rule o f Law, Stanford University Press, Stanford (USA), 2003 (p21), see 
especially pp25-31.
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Iraq, for example, the refusal of the occupation authorities to allow the Iraqi people 
to decide whether or not, or to what extent, the new constitution and judiciary would 
rely on Islamic law was subject to significant criticism -  legitimacy was not 
necessarily a result of secularism or objectivity, but of closeness to the values and
38concerns of the population.
Domestic legitimacy is the essence of the few emerging criticisms of rule of 
law interventions. Efforts, particularly military efforts, to implement standard form 
‘rule of law’ measures, risk “a destabilising imposition of legal norms,” and
a superficiality of externally imposed norms. While creating the illusion of progress, 
such structures have little or no grounding and hence little long term viability in the 
soil of sovereign stability. In essence, this would be a form of legal colonialism that 
could undermine international peace and security and actually be counterproductive 
in terms of societal stability.39
5.3 The Remaining Role for Interveners
That is not to say that there is no remaining role for intervention; indeed, 
there are two. The first, and most important, is the restoration of public order. To this 
end, the law of intervention under occupation or by Security Council authority 
permits a variety o f measures to restore “public order” and the “administration of 
justice,” or “international peace and security.” These, as has been shown, are not 
necessarily consistent with the rule of law properly conceived, nor even conceived on 
rights-based institutionalism views of the rule of law.
More importantly, the simple involvement o f foreign interveners, who tend to 
be exempt from the laws and the legal system (the Taw and order’ to use the terms of
38Stanley Roberts, ‘Socio-Religious Obstacles to Judicial Reconstruction in Post-Saddam Iraq’ (2004) 
33 Hofstra LR 367, at 398-9. Lisa Anderson provides an interesting analysis of the legitimacy 
challenge posed by populist Islamic movements to secular, Western-style governments, when the 
former prove themselves “better organised, more efficient and less corrupt than the government 
administration” and are able to “guarantee law and order:” Lisa Anderson, ‘Fulfilling Prophecies: 
State Policy and Islamic Radicalisation,’ in John L. Esposito (Ed), Political Islam: Revolution, 
Radicalism or Reform?, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1997 (pi7), p24.
39Michael A. Newton, ‘Harmony or Hegemony: The American Military Role in the Pursuit of Justice’ 
(2004) 19 Conn J  Int’l Law 231, at 232. Stromseth and her colleagues examine the theme of 
imperialism during 1990s interventions, observing a link between former colonial Western states, who 
denounce imperialism, conducting interventions in which they tend to remain as “de facto 
governments” for years afterward, and the fact that most states intervened in (whether “failed” like 
Sierra Leone, or “rogue” like Iraq) have previously been under imperial rule: above n2, p2.
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occupation law) which they are attempting to create or impose, means that they 
cannot participate directly in the domestic rule of law relationship. In Kosovo and 
East Timor, for example, UN forces exercised ‘all legislative and executive authority 
... including the administration of the judiciary, ’” 40 but were themselves were 
explicitly excluded from the legal system they sought to create.41 The explicit role of 
the intervener is to exercise potentially coercive powers to restore order, including 
administrative detention for security purposes and the creation of special security 
courts and offences. These measures should be employed to the extent necessary to 
restore a basic level of security in public life.42
However, that is not to say that no ‘rule of law’ role in recovering states 
remains, especially given the pressure for consistency and coherency in the 
hierarchical structure of international law. Interveners and the international 
community may, and perhaps should if expert, continue to be observers, trainers and 
facilitators in the rule of law discussion within the subject society. They may usefully 
bring examples from other legal systems as ideas to emulate, but they cannot 
mandate them through permanent changes to domestic structures or systems. Brahimi 
noted in his report the role of “unnoticed” diplomatic efforts towards conflict 
prevention and peacemaking as a one of the “three principal activities” of UN peace 
operations;43 this is also the primary means of rule of law assistance although it is 
much less than active intervention.
Commenting on the work to create the rule of law in newly independent 
Eritrea, Ganzglass notes with approval the control retained by the government of 
Eritrea over the process of developing and adopting substantive rules -  foreign 
drafting assistance was sought but Eritrea controlled “process and content.” Although 
not quite clear whether by choice or by conditions attached to international
40Simon Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 Am J  Comp L 331, at 349, referring 
to UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Regulation 1/1999: On the Authority o f the Interim 
Administration in Kosovo, entered into force 7 September 1999. Stromseth et al, above n2, make this 
point more generally, arguing that the credibility of the intervener depends on their own adherence to 
rule of law principles (which they conflate with human rights protection) during the intervention, at 
p4.
4‘lbid.
42For example, Plunkett considers the first requirement for a peace operation to create a “domestic 
criminal justice system to prosecute offenders for crimes committed during the currency of the 
operation, which may involve the intervener bringing their own law and establishing their own 
courts:” above n3, pp213-4. Intervention law addresses this in some detail, but only in the contest of 
security matters.
4,Brahimi Report, para 10. The other two are peace-keeping ad peace-building.
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development funding, “Eritreans gave the Commercial Code priority because they 
regarded it as essential for attracting private investment and rebuilding the 
economy.”44 Advisor Ganzglass considered that it was the inclusion of “not only the 
legal community, but also representatives of the society to be governed by the laws,” 
here Eritrean women, that “the draft truly became Eritrean law.”45 Significantly, in 
providing advice, the team of which Ganzglass was part drew on laws from eight 
different systems.46
The Eritrean experience is to be contrasted to the Brahimi report which 
suggests the application of a standard criminal code in situations of emergency.47 
Developing “a coherent international legal framework for the organisation of justice 
in post-conflict societies,” does not require standard form solutions across vastly 
different societies. They are a simple solution, but because they may represent 
significant changes to the domestic legal structure and content, they produce visible 
results. An intervener appealing to a rule of law mission as an appeal for mission 
legitimacy who can demonstrate such change can better attract the political, financial 
and material support seen as essential to mission success.49
In the residual advisory role, the capacity of military interveners to provide 
useful assistance must be questioned. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider 
the actual skill and capability of military forces to advise or assist in judicial and 
legal reform. However, once order is restored as the primary role of intervention, 
then the security obstacles to the deployment of civilian experts, whether through 
government agencies or Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), are removed. 
Ganzglass favours the latter to hasten dissemination of expert advice in the target 
area, although he is critical of the legitimacy and political problems arising from the 
national basis of most “justice-based NGOs,” recommending a new international 
NGO.50 Practice in Afghanistan in 2008, for example by Germany, favours an
44Ganzglass above n35, pp345-6.
45Ibid, p347.
46Singapore, Australia, Canada, Greece, Israel, Germany, Great Britain and Ethiopia: ibid, pp345-6. 
47Brahimi Report, paras 80-1.
4SStahn, above n 10, at 318.
4)Kelly, Peace Operations, above nl, para 1039. The Brahimi Report described “political support” as 
one of the “key conditions” for success: para 4.
50Ganzglass above n35, pp348.
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approach of advice and assistance to Afghan authorities through the National Justice 
Program.51
Kelly too favours non-military NGO involvement under occupation, due to 
the minimal level of obligation upon the occupant to act to meet the needs of the 
local population and a constant NGO presence. Although he considers occupation 
law broadly permissive as to rule of law intervention, requiring only that any feasible 
excess of administrative resources should be devoted to the local population. The 
Brahimi Report, closely following a blueprint analysis of the rule of law, takes a 
more governmental approach -  unsurprising given its assumption of UN Security 
Council auspices, and thus intergovernmental participation -  and calls for trained 
“on-call lists of civilian police, international judicial experts, penal experts and 
human rights specialists ... in sufficient numbers to strengthen rule of law 
institutions, as needed.” They should enter an area of operations before the “main 
body” of police and legal specialists and as part of the missions “law and order 
component.”54 This presupposes the existence of a basic level of security already in 
existence.
Although practice in rule of law operations, particularly in Iraq since 2003, 
has suffered significantly from the assumption that permanent reform should proceed 
contemporaneously with security, or that the former should produce the latter, and 
from the lack of legitimacy that has stemmed from the fact of intervention, the 
provision of security and advice to the Interim Iraqi Government seems now to be 
fruitful, with a declining death rate, the conduct of provincial elections in January 
2009, and the withdrawal of MNF-I troops from the streets.55 The abundant lessons
51 Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, The Federal 
Government’s Afghanistan Policy, Berlin, September 2008, p23.
52Kelly, Peace Operations, above nl, p237, reference omitted.
5Tbid.
54Brahimi Report, p.xiii. The Report has a heavy bias towards the role of deployed police and criminal 
justice experts in building the rule of law and human rights, particularly in retraining and restructuring 
the local police forces and building capacity to respond to disorder. Applying the blueprint analysis, 
the Report also requires domestic courts suitably ‘strengthened’ by international rights experts, and 
conceives of international police directly participating in international war crimes investigation and 
prosecution: paras 39-40.
55See for example, Executive Summary, Report to Congress in accordance with the Department of 
Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008: Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, March 
2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Measuring_Stability_and_Security_in_Iraq_ 
March_2009.pdf, viewed 18 October 2009; Alissa J. Rubin, ‘Iraq Marks Withdrawal of US Troops 
from Cities,’ New York Times, 30 June 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/world/ 
middleeast/0 liraq.html, viewed 18 October 2009.
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from this intervention and others, both under occupation and by Security Council 
Authority, indicate the future of rule of law operations. Military interveners should 
focus their attention on their primary security function, restoring order in daily life 
and using the extraordinary measures granted them to do so. Accepting this reality 
allows a domestic rule of law to take shape, with the scope for advice allowing the 
input the international rule of law requires for its own coherence.
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